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9I. Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, the illegal exploitation of natural resources has emerged 
as a primary means of financing armed violence. In countries as diverse as Afghani-
stan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone, the sale of natural resources within conflict zones has not only created perverse 
incentives for war, it has also furnished warring parties with the finances necessary to 
sustain some of the most brutal hostilities in recent history. As a consequence of the 
illegal trade in minerals, metals, timber, and other natural resources, armed conflicts in 
which participants are able to draw upon easily accessible natural resource wealth are 
often more bloody, financially costly, and intractable than other forms of armed violence. 
Resource wars also contribute to the so-called resource curse, whereby the richest 
nations in terms of resource endowment are poorest in terms of social development 
and most prone to violent upheaval. While there is broad consensus that the correla-
tion between resource wealth and armed violence must be addressed through a range 
of initiatives geared at fighting corruption, policing the resource sector domestically, 
and building judicial capacity in countries recovering from war, the liability of foreign 
businesses for trading in illicit conflict commodities is also vital. Resource wars, after 
all, are entirely dependent on commercial actors to purchase, transport, and market the 
resources that are illegally acquired in order to sustain violence.
As part of this growing interest in resource wars, Corporate War Crimes: Prosecut-
ing the Pillage of Natural Resources explores the elements of corporate liability for the war 
crime of pillage. Although the term pillage has a long pedigree in the laws of war, the 
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offense also features as a contemporary war crime in the statutes of all modern inter-
national criminal courts and a large number of domestic criminal systems. In essence, 
pillage means theft during war, and is synonymous with other equally evocative terms 
such as looting, spoliation, and plunder. 
A substantial body of jurisprudence has applied the offense in practice. Modern 
courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
enforce the offense as a matter of course. At present, Liberia’s former president Charles 
Taylor and the former vice-president of Congo Jean-
Pierre Bemba are facing trial before international 
courts for having allegedly perpetrated acts of pillage 
during war, but the most important precedents derive 
from World War Two. In the wake of that conflict, a 
significant number of business representatives were 
prosecuted for pillaging natural resources in circum-
stances that are often strikingly similar to corporate 
practices in modern resource wars. 
By exploring these cases and the law govern-
ing pillage in detail, Corporate War Crimes seeks to 
guide investigative bodies and war crimes prosecutors 
engaged with the technicalities of these issues. We 
also hope that this manual will be useful for advocates, 
political institutions, and companies interested in 
curbing resource wars. Our belief is that the deterrent 
effect created by even a single case is likely to trans-
form conflict financing in a large number of ongoing 
conflicts. At the same time, we are conscious of the 
potential humanitarian consequences of depriving 
warring factions of access to resource wealth in some contexts, and of the serious dan-
gers of tarnishing reputable companies that provide the legitimate investment essential 
to rehabilitating economies ravaged by war. With this balance in mind, this project seeks 
to act as a catalyst for reinvigorating prosecution of the war crime of pillage and to bring 
accountability to companies that illegally trade in conflict commodities. 
“Various reports have 
pointed to links between 
the activities of some 
African, European, and 
Middle Eastern companies 
and the atrocities taking 
place in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. 
Their activities allegedly 
include gold mining, the 
illegal exploitation of oil, 
and the arms trade.”
Prosecutor, International 
Criminal Court
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II. Sources of Law Prohibiting Pillage
The Prohibition of Pillage in International 
Humanitarian Law
1. The laws of war, also known as international humanitarian law, protect property 
against pillage during armed conflict. In the Hague Regulations of 1907, for instance, 
two provisions categorically stipulate that “the pillage of a town or place, even when 
taken by assault, is prohibited,”1 and that “pillage is formally forbidden.”2 After the end 
of World War Two, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 again reaffirmed that “pillage is 
prohibited.”3 These provisions bind all states. The Geneva Conventions are presently 
ratified by all states within the international community, and both the Hague Regula-
tions and Geneva Conventions are also widely accepted as reflecting customary inter-
national law. In both these respects, the prohibition of pillage is universally binding.4
2. The prohibition against pillage governs civil war as well as interstate warfare. 
Although the provisions concerning pillage contained in the Regulations and Geneva 
Conventions traditionally applied uniquely during armed conflict between states, devel-
opments in more recent years have seen the extension of the offense to non-interna-
tional armed conflicts. Article 4(2)(g) Additional Protocol II of 1977, which governs 
“armed conflicts not of an international character” explicitly prohibits pillage. Although 
a strict reading of this provision would limit the offense to the pillage of property from 
“persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities,” 
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experts have never seen this restriction as limiting the scope of the offense.5 The Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross’ extensive review of state practice concludes that 
the prohibition of pillage is a norm of customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts, and that the limitation based on 
“persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities” does not reflect the state of cus-
tomary international law.6 This, as we will see in the following section, is reinforced 
by provisions of criminal codes and statutes that criminalize acts of pillage in identical 
terms within both of these contexts.
Further Reading
Jean-Marie Henkaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Vol. I, 182–185 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), also available at http://www.
icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule52.
For a compilation of state practice on pillage, see ICRC, Customary IHL Database, 
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule52.
Codifications of the Crime of Pillage
3. Pillage is also a criminal offense in the statutes of international courts and in the 
domestic criminal law of most countries. The offense enjoys a long history. The criminal 
nature of pillage first featured within the Lieber Code of 1863, which stipulated that “all 
pillage or sacking, even after taking place by main force […] are prohibited under the 
penalty of death.”7 The fact that acts of pillage can be criminally punished was again 
reflected in the work of the Commission of Responsibilities established at the end of 
World War Two, which listed pillage as one of the war crimes perpetrated during the 
conflict.8 Since then, pillage has featured in all international criminal statutes and a 
raft of domestic criminal legislation governing war crimes. This section sets out various 
examples of these codifications. 
4. The statutes of two international courts codify pillage and plunder as equivalents. 
Article 6(b) of the Statute of the Nuremberg Charter criminalized “plunder of public 
or private property,” while the French version of the same statute prohibited “le pillage 
des biens publics ou privés.”9 The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia replicated the linguistic differences contained in the Nurem-
berg Charter by again criminalizing “pillage” and “plunder” in the French and English 
versions respectively.  As the next chapter of this manual examining the terminology 
confirms, both courts have treated pillage and plunder as synonyms in practice.
5. Other codifications of the offense within international criminal statutes list “pil-
lage” as a war crime, but do so by adopting archaic language devoid of contemporary 
legal meaning. The Statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Iraqi 
Special Court prohibit “pillaging a town or place even when taken by assault.”10 The 
reference to a town or place even when taken by assault might be consistent with the 
wording contained in one of the provisions within the Hague Regulations of 1907, but 
the language adds nothing of contemporary relevance.11 As the definitions of pillage set 
out in chapter IV of this manual show, the reference to a town or place even when taken 
by assault is legally redundant in modern international criminal law. 
6. The final group of international criminal statutes that codify pillage are consider-
ably simpler than their various counterparts. The Statutes of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) simply list 
“pillage” among war crimes applicable within their jurisdiction.12 This less complicated 
approach avoids the antiquated language and duplication in terminology adopted in 
other international criminal statutes. Moreover, these definitions reinforce the potential 
application of pillage in non-international armed conflicts, because both the Statutes 
of the ICTR and the SCSL apply uniquely to armed conflicts not of an international 
character.
7. A large number of states have also codified pillage within their national legal 
orders, albeit through divergent methodologies. The U.S. War Crimes Act exemplifies 
a trend amongst several domestic lawmakers toward criminalizing pillage by simply 
cross-referencing pertinent treaty provisions within a criminal statute. Section 2441(c)(2) 
of the U.S. War Crimes Act 1996 defines war crimes as including any conduct “prohib-
ited by Article 23, 25, 27, or 28 of the Annex to the Hague Convention IV, Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed October 18, 1907.” Article 28 of the 
Hague Regulation, to which the provision refers, states that “[t]he pillage of a town or 
place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.” In this sense, U.S. federal courts have 
jurisdiction over an offense that also features within the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. 
8. Other countries have incorporated pillage within their national legal order by 
referring to the definitions of war crimes contained within the ICC Statute or custom-
ary international law more generally. The Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and 
War Crimes Act (2000) typifies this trend. The act criminalizes pillage by prohibiting 
“war crimes” and defining the term as any infraction that attracts individual criminal 
responsibility “according to customary international law or conventional international 
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law applicable to armed conflicts, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the 
law in force at the time and in the place of its commission.”13 As previously seen, the 
war crime of pillage is prohibited in both custom and convention, thereby satisfying the 
definition contained within this legislation.14 Other countries, such as the United King-
dom, implement pillage as a domestic offense by cross-referencing the relevant article 
of the ICC Statute that governs war crimes.15 By either methodology, pillage becomes 
an independent domestic crime within each of the countries.
9. A third and final group of states, which includes Germany and Australia, crimi-
nalize pillage by defining the offense explicitly within domestic legislation rather than 
cross-referencing provisions of treaties or international criminal statutes. The Australia 
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002, for instance, 
makes pillage a federal crime by explicitly replicating the ICC Elements of the Crime 
within national criminal legislation. Sections 268.81 and 268.54 of the Australian Act 
emulate the ICC’s definition exactly. Similarly, German legislation has also codified 
pillage as part of a comprehensive code governing international crimes. In the German 
Code, however, pillage is attributed an independent definition that ostensibly departs 
from the wording of the ICC Elements of Crimes.16 In these and other states that have 
adopted equivalent legislation, pillage exists in domestic criminal law independently of 
international treaties or statutes. 
III. Terminology: Pillage, Plunder, 
 Spoilation, and Looting
10. The previous chapter noted a duplication of the terms pillage and plunder in the 
statutes of international criminal tribunals. Unfortunately, this overlapping terminology 
is exacerbated by the use of the labels spoliation and looting. In this section, we explore 
jurisprudence that highlights the common legal meaning of pillage, plunder, spolia-
tion, and looting, pointing out that pillage is the only one of these terms that features 
in treaties governing the laws of war. This clarity allows subsequent chapters to draw 
on cases involving the plunder of natural resources, and justifies use of these cases as 
precedents in jurisdictions that only criminalize pillage.
11. Plunder and pillage are legally synonymous. As early as the 17th century, Grotius 
used the two terms interchangeably,17 creating a practice that became widespread among 
subsequent commentators.18 At the turn of the 19th century, Westlake again described 
pillage as “indiscriminate plundering,” amounting to “the unauthorized taking away of 
property, public or private.”19 Aside from the clear linguistic equivalence of pillage and 
plunder identified within the French and English versions of the Statutes of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal,20 the Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment also used the terms interchange-
ably by addressing the widespread incidents of property violations during World War 
Two under a heading entitled “pillage of public and private property,” and by treating 
the terms pillage and plunder as analogues throughout the course of its reasoning.21 
1 5
1 6   C O R P O R A T E  W A R  C R I M E S
12. The ICTY’s Statutes not only replicated the Nuremberg Charters’ linguistic dif-
ferences; the tribunal’s verdicts also reflected the essentially interchangeable nature of 
the two labels. In more than one judgment, an accused was convicted of pillage in the 
original version of the judgment, but of plunder in the English translation.22 The tribu-
nal also acknowledged that the “the unlawful appropriation of public and private prop-
erty in armed conflict has varyingly been termed “pillage,” “plunder,” and “spoliation,” 
and that the term plunder “should be understood to embrace all forms of unlawful 
appropriation of property in armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility 
attaches under international law, including those acts traditionally described as ‘pil-
lage’.”23 The finding that plunder merely includes pillage stemmed from a hesitation 
that “pillage in the traditional sense implied an element of violence.”24 Although the 
tribunal considered that it was not necessary for their purposes to rule on this issue, 
a more thorough investigation reveals that its hesita-
tion was unfounded. Even though a select number 
of historical definitions of pillage had associated the 
offense with physical violence,25 this association was 
never broadly accepted.26 On this basis, modern codi-
fications of pillage almost invariably omit reference to 
overt violence in defining the offense.27 For all these 
reasons, pillage and plunder share a common mean-
ing in modern international criminal law.
13. The term spoliation also describes the same 
offense. Like plunder, the label spoliation does not 
feature in international treaties or codified lists of 
international crimes, but in the wake of World War 
Two, prosecutors preferred the term spoliation over 
the more legally correct alternative. The directors of 
IG Farben, for instance, were charged with spoliation, 
prompting the court to clarify that “the term ‘spolia-
tion,’ which has been admittedly adopted as a term of convenience by the prosecution, 
applies to the widespread and systematized acts of dispossession and acquisition of 
property in violation of the rights of the owners, which took place in territories under 
the belligerent occupation or control of Nazi Germany during World War II.”28 The 
same tribunal then confirmed that “spoliation is synonymous with the word ‘plunder’ as 
employed in Control Council Law No. 10, and that it embraces offenses against property 
in violation of the laws and customs of war of the general type charged in the indict-
ment.”29 By extrapolation, the terms spoliation, plunder, and pillage share a common 
legal meaning. 
 “[t]he prohibition of the 
unlawful appropriation 
of public and private 
property in armed conflict 
is well-established in 
customary international 
law where it has been 
variously referred to as 
‘pillage’, ‘plunder’ and 
‘looting’.” 
Brima Trial Judgment, 
para. 751
14. To exacerbate an already unnecessary duplication of terms used to describe pil-
lage, “looting” has also emerged as a further label for an established legal concept. The 
Australian War Crimes Act adopted after World War Two criminalized “[p]illage and 
wholesale looting,”30 without distinguishing between the two terms. In the same vein, 
the United States Uniform Code for Military Justice provides for the punishment of 
persons engaged in “looting or pillage,” again without elaborating on the content of 
either offense.31 Courts, however, have dismissed the notion that there is any distinc-
tion between the terms. The Simic´ Trial Judgment found that “‘looting’ is likewise a 
form of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict and is therefore embraced 
within ‘plunder’ as incorporated in the Statute.”32 In fact, there is unanimity that “the 
prohibition against the unjustified appropriation of public and private enemy property 
is general in scope, and extends both to acts of looting committed by individual soldiers 
for their private gain, and to the organized seizure of property undertaken within the 
framework of a systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory.”33 The same 
conclusion was reached by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which explained that 
“the prohibition of the unlawful appropriation of public and private property in armed 
conflict […] has been variously referred to as ‘pillage’, ‘plunder’ and ‘looting.’”34 Looting 
then, like spoliation and plunder, is merely another colloquial label for pillage. 
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IV. Defining Pillage: 
 Elements of the Offense
15. Although pillage enjoys a long history in the laws of war, the earliest codifications 
of the crime did not identify the elements of the offense with any degree of precision. 
The Lieber Code of 1863, for instance, made pillaging a capital offense but failed to 
expand on the elements of the crime or clarify when the offense was perpetrated. More 
than a century later, the initial definitions of pillage adopted by the ICTY simply defined 
pillage as “embrac[ing] all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflict 
for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law.”35 Since 
then, the Assembly of States Party to the International Criminal Court has adopted the 
so-called ICC Elements of Crimes, which are an influential but non-binding series of 
definitions adopted by consensus vote in order to “assist” the court in its adjudicative 
function.36 According to the ICC Elements of Crimes, “pillaging” in both international 
and non-international armed conflicts includes the following key legal components:37
 1. The perpetrator appropriated certain property;
 2. The perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appro-
priate it for private or personal use; [*]
 3. The appropriation was without the consent of the owner;
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 4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an inter-
national or non-international armed conflict; and
 5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.
[*] As indicated by the use of the term “private or personal use,” appropriations justified by military necessity 
cannot constitute the crime of pillaging.
16. While the definition above provides an extremely useful guide that inspires the 
structure of the remainder of this manual, one of these requirements does not reflect 
accepted understandings of the offense in customary international law. By restricting 
pillage to appropriation “for personal or private purposes,” the ICC Elements of Crimes 
depart from the vast majority of relevant World War Two cases that condemned acts 
of pillage perpetrated in furtherance of the Axis war effort. In one instance involving 
Japanese seizure of oil stocks from Singapore, a judge declared that “the seizure and 
subsequent exploitation by the Japanese armed forces of the oil resources of the appel-
lants was economic plunder of private property in violation of the laws and customs of 
war.”38 The reference to “personal or private purposes” within the ICC definition not 
only contradicts this and other similar historical precedents, it also runs counter to 
modern interpretations of the offense. As a more recent war crimes judgment has reaf-
firmed, the laws of war “do not allow arbitrary and unjustified pillage for army purposes 
or for the individual use of army members.”39 For all these reasons, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone was correct in declaring that “the requirement of ‘private or personal 
use’ is unduly restrictive and ought not to be an element of the crime of pillage.”40 
17. Moreover, the reference to military necessity in a footnote to the phrase “personal 
or private purposes” is also inconsistent with the laws of war. To reiterate, the ICC Ele-
ments of Crimes contain a footnote stipulating that “[a]s indicated by the use of the term 
‘private or personal use’, appropriations justified by military necessity cannot constitute 
the crime of pillaging.” This position is inaccurate. For one reason, military necessity 
cannot act as an independent and separate justification for pillage, primarily because 
military necessity was already taken into account in crafting the exceptions contained 
in the Hague Regulations. During the negotiating of the regulations, diplomats and 
military personnel who drafted the convention considered but dismissed military neces-
sity as a justification for pillage, precisely on the grounds that the necessary exceptions 
were already explicitly incorporated into the Hague Regulations.41  Moreover, it is also a 
settled principle of the laws of war that military necessity will not act as a justification 
for a violation unless the term “military necessity” is explicitly listed as an exception to 
the rule in question.42 This is not the case for pillage, which is prohibited in absolute 
terms.43 
18. Instead of limiting pillage to appropriation “for personal or private purposes” or 
“military necessity,” most war crimes jurisprudence defines pillage as appropriation 
without the consent of the owner subject to a series of exceptions contained in the 
Hague Regulations. The U.S. Military Tribunal established at Nuremberg after World 
War Two, for instance, defined pillage in the IG Farben case by stipulating that “[w]here 
private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed 
to exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private 
property against the will and consent of the former 
owner, such action, not being expressly justified by any 
applicable provision of the Hague Regulations, is in 
violation of international law.”44 Modern war crimes 
jurisprudence also adopts this position. The Martic´ 
Trial Judgment, to cite but one example, defined pillage 
as appropriation of either public or private property 
without the consent of the owner, subject to the same 
set of limitations set out in the Hague Regulations.45 
Consequently, the remainder of this manual uses the 
criteria in the ICC Elements of Crimes, substituting 
exceptions contained in the Hague Regulations for the 
overly restrictive requirement that exploitation must 
occur “for personal or private purposes.” 
19. We also recommend using this definition in 
non-international armed conflicts. This is legally con-
troversial. Formally speaking, only foreign military 
occupiers are able to exercise the exceptions con-
tained in the Hague Regulations. Consequently, when 
a leader of the Revolutionary United Front rebel group 
claimed that the exceptions in the Hague Regulations 
justified his appropriation of property during the civil 
war in Sierra Leone, the SCSL declared the argument “to be misconceived.”46 According 
to the SCSL, “[t]he rights and duties of occupying powers, as codified in the 1907 Hague 
Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, apply only in international armed con-
flicts.”47 Despite this formality, we would advise prosecutors to assume the contrary as 
a matter of caution rather than law. First, there is a small body of jurisprudence that 
extends aspects of the Hague Regulations of 1907 to warring factions operating in non-
international armed conflicts.48 Second, the policy arguments for allowing rebel groups 
to seize certain types of property during war are sometimes strong—there is little basis 
“for the crime of plunder 
[pillage] to be established, 
the appropriation of 
private or public property 
must be done without 
lawful basis or legal 
justification… According 
to the Hague Regulations, 
forcible contribution of 
money, requisition for the 
needs of the occupying 
army, and seizure of 
material obviously related 
to the conduct of military 
operations, though 
restricted, are lawful in 
principle.”
Martic´ Trial Judgment, 
para. 102.
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for expecting rebel groups to comply with the laws of war without offering certain 
privileges. Third, as a subsequent section of this manual explains in greater detail, rebel 
groups are often proxies for foreign governments.49 Under these circumstances, a rebel 
group acting as an agent for a foreign state might be able to formally claim privileges 
that derive from the law governing international armed conflicts. For all these reasons, 
we advise prosecutors to adopt a cautious approach that treats the exceptions contained 
in the Hague Regulations as applicable in both international and non-international 
armed conflicts.
20. In light of this synthesis of the law governing pillage, the remainder of this 
manual adopts the ICC’s definition as a basis for assessing the liability of commercial 
actors for the pillage of natural resources in conflict zones, except that it substitutes 
exceptions to the Hague Regulations for the reference to “private or personal use” in the 
Elements. This, as we have seen, aligns with most historical and contemporary defini-
tions of the offense.
Further Reading
Knut Dörmann, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, pp. 272–280 (Cambridge, 2002).
Gunénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96–98 (Oxford, 
2005).
V. The Armed Conflict Requirement
21. War crimes can only be perpetrated during armed conflict. As a consequence, 
evidence that the illegal exploitation of natural resources took place during an armed 
conflict is essential in sustaining a charge of pillage. To use language adopted in the ICC 
Elements of Crimes, the relevant conduct must have taken place in the context of and been 
associated with an international or non-international armed conflict. In order to clarify the 
definition of international and non-international armed conflict, this chapter explores 
the law defining both concepts. The chapter also highlights a third approach that avoids 
the cumbersome process of distinguishing between these two types of armed conflict by 
simply concluding that an armed conflict existed without classifying the hostilities one 
way or the other. Although either or both of these types of conflict might arise in any 
given situation, courts are increasingly adopting the easier approach in pillage cases on 
the basis that the offense shares the same content in both types of armed conflict.  
The Definition of International Armed Conflict
22. International armed conflict is armed violence between two or more states. 
According to Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions, “the present Convention 
shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not rec-
ognized by one of them.” In other words, an international armed conflict is the resort to 
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armed force between two parties to the Geneva Conventions. An armed conflict between 
two or more states can arise in a number of ways. The Tadic´ Appeal Judgment found that:
[i]t is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes place between 
two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal armed conflict breaking out 
on the territory of a State, it may become international (or, depending upon the 
circumstances, be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict) 
if (i) another State intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively 
if (ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on behalf of that 
other State.50 
23. The first of these standards is easily established. There is incontestably an inter-
national armed conflict when two states wage war directly against one another—conflict 
between Britain and Germany during World War Two is one obvious example. When 
pillage takes place in this context, the qualification of the armed conflict as international 
is a mere formality and will probably not require careful assessments of fact or law. The 
two standards for indirect international armed conflicts are, however, significantly more 
complex.
24. In applying the first of these standards, namely international armed conflict 
through foreign intervention, the Blaškic´ Trial Judgment found that the conflict between 
a non-state group named the Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia Herzegovina 
Army was rendered international based on the Croatian government’s military inter-
vention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The presence of an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 regular 
Croatian Army troops was found to have had an impact on the conflict between the 
Croatian Defense Council and the Bosnia Herzegovina Army, sufficient to render the 
conflict between the two warring parties an international armed conflict.51 In a simi-
lar fashion, the Kordic´ and Cˇerkez Judgment found that Croatian military intervention 
rendered the conflict between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims international “by 
enabling the Bosnian Croats to deploy additional forces in their struggle against the 
Bosnian Muslims.”52  While open to a degree of criticism,53 this same reasoning was 
endorsed by a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, which concluded that Ugandan presence 
in the Northeast of the Congo was sufficient to internationalize surrounding conflict 
between non-state groups.54 
25. An international armed conflict also exists where states wage war against one 
another by using domestic military groups as proxies. Three different standards deter-
mine whether an armed entity could be considered a proxy for a foreign state, each of 
which differs according to the nature of the entity and the control exerted by the state.55 
By far the most common form of state control over foreign organized military groups 
is that “of an overall character”.56 In practice, this term means that a state must have 
“a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military 
group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational support 
to that group” but that it “does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific orders 
by the State, or its direction of each individual operation.”57 On this basis, a number of 
judgments have found that the armed conflict that took place in the Republika Srpska 
within Bosnia was international in nature because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
had overall control over the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
forces during their hostilities with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.58 Likewise, the 
ICC has held that because the Ugandan government was the main supplier of weapons 
and ammunition to Congolese rebel groups, the conflict concerned was international.59
26. Finally, an international armed conflict can also arise where a foreign army occu-
pies territory belonging to another state, irrespective of whether armed violence ever 
erupted. During World War Two, a number of countries simply capitulated to occupa-
tion on the basis that armed resistance was futile. On the basis of this capitulation, the 
German occupiers denied that the laws of war applied in these territories, claiming that 
the law only applies where there are hostilities. In response, the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 explicitly included a provision that “[t]he Convention shall also 
apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”60 This develop-
ment has special importance for the liability of commercial actors for pillaging natural 
resources in a number of modern contexts, because it establishes that the offense might 
be perpetrated even when foreign occupation was not met by substantial military resis-
tance, or in instances where resistance subsided a long time prior to the exploitation of 
natural resources. 
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Non-International Armed Conflict
27. Pillage is also a war crime in civil wars. The technical term for civil war within the 
Geneva Conventions is “conflict not of an international character,” but commentators 
and courts also frequently use the phrase non-international armed conflict to describe 
the same phenomenon. The leading definition of non-international armed conflict was 
articulated in the Tadic´ Appeals Chamber Decision on Jurisdiction, which found that “an 
armed conflict exists whenever there is… protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State.”61 The terms “protracted armed con-
flict” and “organized armed groups” are understood to 
demand an appraisal of the intensity of armed violence 
between the two warring factions and an assessment 
of the military character of the parties engaged in this 
violence. As the International Committee of the Red 
Cross has argued “ascertain[ing] whether there is a 
non-international armed conflict does not depend on 
the subjective judgment of the parties to the conflict; it 
must be determined on the basis of objective criteria; 
the term ‘armed conflict’ presupposes the existence of 
hostilities between armed forces organised to a greater 
or lesser extent; there must be the opposition of armed 
forces and a certain intensity of the fighting.”62 
28. In terms of intensity, the Tadic´ definition 
emphasizes that armed violence must be “protracted.” 
Although this term cannot be defined in the abstract, 
factors such as the duration of hostilities, the types of 
weapons used, and the number of victims caused by 
hostilities are all relevant to this assessment. Courts, 
for instance, have found that armed violence of a 
relatively limited duration might constitute an armed 
conflict. In the La Tablada case, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
found that an armed attack by a military group on a state army barracks that lasted a 
mere 30 hours was governed by the laws applicable in non-international armed conflict 
because of the nature of the hostilities between essentially military groups.63 Similarly, 
a non-international armed conflict need not produce massive loss of life. The ICTY, 
“ascertain[ing] whether 
there is a non-
international armed 
conflict does not depend 
on the subjective 
judgment of the parties 
to the conflict; it must be 
determined on the basis 
of objective criteria; the 
term ‘armed conflict’ 
presupposes the existence 
of hostilities between 
armed forces organised 
to a greater or lesser 
extent; there must be 
the opposition of armed 
forces and a certain 
intensity of the fighting.”
International Committee 
of the Red Cross
for instance, has concluded that hostilities in 2001 between Macedonian forces and a 
national liberation organization constituted a non-international armed conflict, even 
though the armed confrontations between the two groups only caused 168 deaths over 
the course of the year.64 Together with the La Tablada case, this decision provides some 
rough guidance as to the lower end of what might satisfy intensity requirements neces-
sary to prove a non-international armed conflict. 
29. The second criterion for establishing a non-international armed conflict requires 
an assessment of the command structure of the warring factions. This inquiry is impor-
tant in order to distinguish armed conflict from ordinary criminality, riots, or isolated 
terrorist acts, all of which are capable of precipitating widespread violence which would 
not be governed by the laws of war. The element of organized military command might 
involve assessing whether the group has an organized hierarchical structure, controls 
territory, and is capable of formulating a common military strategy. Other factors con-
sidered in practice include the existence of a military headquarters, the promulgation 
and enforcement of laws, and the issuance of internal rules and regulations. In applying 
these standards to hostilities between the Kosovo Liberation Organization (KLA) and 
Serbian armed forces, one war crimes trial concluded that the KLA was a sufficiently 
organized military group, even though the organization operated in secrecy under-
ground and its commanding officers did not meet regularly because of the threat posed 
by their militarily superior adversary.65 The existence of a military chain of command, 
the organized nature of armed confrontations and the internal regulations within the 
KLA were deemed sufficient to convert the violence between the KLA and Serb forces 
into a non-international armed conflict.66
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The Unified Approach
30. Recent war crimes trials have dispensed with the task of classifying armed con-
flicts as either international or non-international where the war crimes charged share 
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a common legal meaning in both types of conflict. This practice has allowed courts 
charged with adjudicating certain war crimes to avoid what often proves to be a time 
consuming, imprecise, and controversial process of classifying armed conflicts. A num-
ber of courts have adopted this unified approach in cases involving allegations of pil-
lage, based on the supposition that the offense shares 
the same elements in both types of conflict. In the 
Martic´ Trial Judgment, for instance, the ICTY applied 
the crime of pillage to a conflict that was not qualified 
as either international or otherwise, precisely because 
pillage is criminalized in both types of war.67 
31. This unified approach to conflict qualification 
has also gained ascendancy as the preferable means of 
addressing other offenses that share the same origins 
as pillage. For example, the Oric´ Trial Judgment prose-
cuted the war crime of wanton destruction, which also 
derives from the Hague Regulations, without qualify-
ing the surrounding conflict as either international or non-international.68 In this and 
the other instances, courts merely determine that there was protracted armed violence 
between organized armed groups, then proceed to assess the substantive elements of 
the offense without attempting to ascertain whether the surrounding conflict was purely 
internal, whether military groups were otherwise under the control of foreign states, 
or whether the conflict was rendered international by the intervention of foreign state 
forces. The unified approach to conflict qualification thus simplifies the task of proving 
armed conflict for the purpose of cases involving corporate liability for the pillage of 
natural resources.  
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Prosecutor v. Martic´, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, paras. 41–43 (June 10, 2007).
“It is immaterial whether 
the armed conflict 
was international 
or noninternational 
in nature.”
Delic´  Trial Judgment, 
para. 40
VI. A Nexus to the Armed Conflict
32. According to the elements of all war crimes contained in the ICC Elements 
of Crimes, the illegal exploitation of property must take place “in the context of” and 
“associated with” an armed conflict in order to constitute pillage. This so-called nexus 
requirement distinguishes war crimes from other violations of domestic criminal law. 
The distinction stems from the observation that pre-existing rates of ordinary crime, 
such as murder, robbery, rape, and fraud are not spontaneously transformed into war 
crimes as soon as war erupts. In the context of allegations of corporate responsibility 
for illegally exploiting natural resources in conflict zones, the nexus requirement thus 
delineates actions governed by domestic law from those susceptible to prosecution as 
pillage. 
33. The distinction is important, because even though acts amounting to pillage are 
unquestionably prohibited by domestic analogues such as theft, receiving stolen prop-
erty or money laundering, pillage offers a number of advantages over these domestic 
alternatives. Like other war crimes, pillage is not subject to statutes of limitations,69 falls 
within t he jurisdiction of international criminal courts,70 and triggers state obligations 
to investigate and prosecute violations.71 A robust understanding of the nexus require-
ment is therefore essential in assessing potential liability for corporate implication in 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
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34. According to decisions rendered by the ICC, the terms “in the context of” and 
“associated with” are best interpreted in light of earlier war crimes jurisprudence.72 This 
jurisprudence has emphasized that conduct must be “closely related” to a surround-
ing armed conflict in order to constitute a war crime. In elaborating on the meaning 
of this standard, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has opined that “[w]hat ultimately 
distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic offence is that a war crime is shaped 
by or dependent upon the environment—the armed conflict—in which it is commit-
ted.”73 According to t he chamber, “[t]he armed conflict need not have been causal to the 
commission of the crime, but the existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, 
have played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to 
commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which it was com-
mitted.”74 At times, courts also appear to have condensed this standard into the question 
of whether the crime occurred “under the guise of an armed conflict,”75 but we view th e 
term “closely related” as a better reflection of the relevant jurisprudence. 
35. One series of cases has sought to define further guidelines for determin-
ing whether a particular act is closely related to armed conflict, but it seems doubt-
ful whether these criteria are an accurate reflection of the law governing war crimes. 
According to the Kunarac Appeal Judgment,
In determining whether or not the act in question is sufficiently related to the 
armed conflict, the Trial Chamber may take into account, inter alia, the following 
factors: the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a 
non-combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the 
fact that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and 
the fact that the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetra-
tor’s official duties.76 
The passage is controversial because each of the factors is unnecessarily lim-
ited—civilians can perpetrate war crimes, combatants can be victims of war crimes, war 
crimes can be committed irrespective of the military’s ultimate goals, and can certainly 
be perpetrated in a personal capacity. Given that each of the criteria in the Kunarac 
Appeal Judgment is at least incomplete, it seems doubtful whether the test is a meaning-
ful guide to differentiating domestic offenses from war crimes. Courts are thus likely 
to focus more on whether commercial actions were “closely related” to armed conflict 
in the sense identified in the previous paragraph. 
36. Companies operating in conflict zones will satisfy these standards in a range of 
circumstances. In instances where companies collaborate directly with armed groups 
involved in the exploitation of natural resources as part of their war effort, the resulting 
property transactions are clearly “shaped by and dependent upon the surrounding hos-
tilities.” Without the warring factions participation in war, there would be no commerce. 
Even a company that purchases natural resources inde-
pendently from civilians during armed violence might 
be “closely related” to hostilities and perpetrate pillage, 
since war will frequently play a substantial part in the 
ability of businesses to purchase conflict commodities 
such as diamonds, coltan, or gold. In this sense, the 
armed conflict provides the company’s “ability” to per-
petrate the crime. After all, resource wars by definition 
involve the financing of armed violence through illicit 
trafficking in natural resources by commercial actors. 
37. A corporation is not required to acquire natural 
resources from a battlefield during active hostilities to 
perpetrate pillage—the illegal exploitation of conflict 
commodities may still be closely related to hostilities 
when the corporate acts occur after hostilities in a particular region and away from 
open gunfire. As one leading authority declared, “the requirement that the acts of the 
accused must be closely related to the armed conflict would not be negated if the crimes 
were temporally and geographically remote from the actual fighting.”77 This is con-
sis tent with a large number of convictions of corporate representatives for pillaging 
property during World War Two, which frequently occurred a considerable distance 
from battlefields and well after sustained confrontations in the region had ceased. As 
a consequence, the illegal exploitation of natural resources from outside a particular 
zone of combat or after foreign troops depart can still constitute pillage, provided the 
acts remain closely related to hostilities in a broader sense. 
 38. Likewise, a company is not required to support or otherwise endorse one side 
of the conflict in order to perpetrate pillage. War crimes jurisprudence has found that 
it is not necessary that the crime alleged “be part of a policy or of a practice officially 
endorsed or tolerated by one of the parties to the conflict, or that the act be in actual 
furtherance of a policy associated with the conduct of war.”78 For example, in one case 
involving allegations of war crimes perpetrated in Rwanda, a civilian mayor was initially 
acquitted of war crimes charges on the grounds that he had not acted “for” either of the 
“What ultimately 
distinguishes a war crime 
from a purely domestic 
offence is that a war crime 
is shaped by or dependent 
upon the environment—
the armed conflict—in 
which it is committed.”
Kunarac Appeals Judgment, 
para. 58
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warring factions in perpetrating acts of murder. The Appeals Chamber overturned this 
finding on the basis that war crimes do not necessitate a relationship with the warring 
parties.79 This position again accords with precedents derived from World War Two, 
where numerous business representatives and other civilians were convicted of pillage 
even though their commerce was not formally linked to a particular army.80 Even com-
panies operating more independently in the peripheries of a surrounding conflict are 
therefore potentially bound by the prohibition against pillage.
39. Finally, a recent Dutch judgment dealing with war crimes suggests that acts 
that “stimulate warfare” can also satisfy the nexus requirement for war crimes. In this 
particular case, the Dutch court found a business employee named Joseph Mpambara 
guilty of torture, but acquitted him of war crimes because his acts were insufficiently 
linked to an armed conflict.81 After a comprehensive review of the jurisprudence dealing 
with the nexus requirement, the court dismissed war crimes charges on the basis that 
the defendant’s acts did not “contribut[e], not even in the least, to the accomplishment 
of the RAF [Rwandan Armed Forces] in its conflict with the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic 
Forces].”82 Similarly, the fact that the defendant was accompanied by soldiers was not 
sufficient to establish a nexus, since the soldiers assistance in the torture “did not serve 
any military purpose.”83 By contrast, commercial actors involved in exploiting natural 
resources from war zones frequently “stimulate warfare,” contribute to the trajectory of 
ongoing violence, and become linked to the military purposes of armed groups. In all 
these regards, companies and their employees who illegally exploit natural resources 
during warfare might be liable for pillage.
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VII. Appropriation of Property
40. According to the ICC Elements of Crimes, a person accused of pillaging natural 
resources must “appropriate” property during armed conflict in order to commit pil-
lage. In many instances, foreign companies operating in conflict zones “appropriate” 
natural resources directly from the rightful owners by extracting the resources them-
selves. In other circumstances, companies appropriate natural resources indirectly from 
the owner by purchasing the commodities from an intermediary. This chapter focuses 
on defining the term “appropriation,” and explores the prodigious jurisprudence that 
shows that appropriation includes both direct and indirect alternatives. In other words, 
pillage encompasses extraction of natural resources directly from the owner as well as 
purchasing resources illegally acquired during war. As will become apparent, the signifi-
cance of this interpretation is hard to overstate, because it means that an entire supply 
chain perpetrates pillage provided that it satisfies other elements of the crime. Before 
we proceed to investigate this law in detail, it is worth recalling that this section only 
deals with the objective element or actus reus of pillage, leaving a subsequent section to 
explore the contours of intention required to prove pillage. 
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Direct Appropriation
41. Companies operating in conflict zones frequently appropriate natural resources 
directly from the owners, usually in one of three ways. First, companies appropriate 
natural resources directly from the owner by collaborating with a warring army. In a 
classic illustration of this scenario, the Nuremberg Tribunal convicted Walther Funk 
for his role in the management of a commercial enterprise named the Continental Oil 
Company, which exploited crude oil throughout occupied Europe in conjunction with 
the German army.84 According to Funk’s own testimony, whenever German troops 
seized oil wells German officials assigned the Continental Oil Company the task “of pro-
ducing oil in these territories and of restoring the destroyed oil-producing districts.”85 
The Nuremberg Tribunal unanimously considered that this constituted pillage, finding 
Funk personally culpable for his role in these practices.86 In the same way, commercial 
actors that collaborate with rebel groups or foreign governments in the extraction of 
natural resources in conflict zones “appropriate” these resources from the true owners.
42. Second, companies also exploit natural resources directly from the owner by rely-
ing on the authorization of a warring party to exploit resource wealth. For instance, the 
U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found Paul Pleiger, the manager of Mining and 
Steel Works East Inc. (BHO), guilty of pillaging coal from mines located in Poland.87 
According to the tribunal, BHO exploited these Polish coal mines after the Reich gov-
ernment issued a so-called trusteeship to the company. Given that the Reich govern-
ment had no authority to seize these properties, Pleiger became personally culpable for 
the appropriation his company carried out. In particular, Pleiger personally appointed a 
local manager to the mines, maintained an active interest in the development of these 
sites, and supervised a yield in excess of 50,000 tons of coal from the area each year 
of the war.88 Although the tribunal never addressed the issue specifically, this type of 
extraction constitutes appropriation for the purposes of the offense. 
43. Third, overharvesting of an otherwise legitimate concession provides another 
common form of direct appropriation of natural resources from an owner. In a number 
of contemporary armed conflicts, corporate representatives take advantage of the sur-
rounding climate of insecurity to overharvest concessions lawfully granted to them. For 
instance, the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission cited one foreign company 
for “unlawfully extract[ing] approximately 80,000m3 of logs monthly by clear cutting 
its concession area in violation of Liberian law and FDA regulations.”89 In fact, a World 
Bank contractor concluded that the same company had not respected the legal cutting 
limits in any of the three years of operations during the war, and that “[o]ver harvesting 
in concession area” was common practice during the conflict.90 Each of these scenarios 
illustrates common forms of resource “appropriation” during war.
Indirect Appropriation—Receiving Stolen Property
44. The term “appropriate” also includes indirect appropriation from an intermedi-
ary by purchasing stolen property. First and foremost, a literal interpretation of the ICC 
Elements of Crimes supports this reasoning. Given that the term “appropriate” appears 
in the elements without qualification, a literal interpretation would extend the term 
to situations where a purchaser “appropriates” the property from a warring faction or 
foreign army. As this section will show, an analysis of customary international law on 
the topic provides compelling corroboration of this literal interpretation.
45. A considerable body of international precedent explicitly supports the view that 
receiving stolen property during war falls within the rubric of the term “appropriate” 
as employed in the ICC Elements of Crimes. In one example, an individual named 
Willi Buch was convicted of pillage for purchasing silverware at auction, which the 
German Kommandantur at Saint-Die had illegally requisitioned in occupied France.91 
In a similar case, a German couple and their daughters were convicted of pillage for 
purchasing furniture and other property from a German custodian in charge of an aban-
doned farm.92 When reflecting upon the daughters’ convictions, the UN War Crimes 
Commission reasoned that “[t]he case against the daughters of the Bommer couple is 
an illustration of how receiving stolen goods may, under the same principles, equally 
constitute a war crime.”93 
46. A range of other cases apply this thinking to corporate representatives for pil-
lage, by openly accepting that receiving stolen property constitutes pillage. A Tribunal 
of Military Government for the French Zone of Occupation in Germany tried and con-
victed representatives of the Roechling firm for pillage arising out of the commerce in 
illegally seized scrap metal from the German Raw Materials Trading Company, known 
by the acronym ROGES.94 Herman Roechling, the director of the Roechling firm, was 
convicted of pillage for purchasing illegally seized property known as “Booty Goods” 
from ROGES. The tribunal rejected Roechling’s claim that the seizures were justified 
by the Reich annexing French territory because “[k]nowingly to accept a stolen object 
from the thief constitutes the crime of receiving stolen goods.”95 Hermann Roechling 
was thus convicted of pillage on the basis that he was “a receiver of looted property.”96
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47. In a much larger number of instances, individuals were convicted of pillage for 
appropriating property from an intermediary in terms that tacitly support this position. 
A table annexed to this manual indicates that at least 26 pillage cases have involved 
receiving stolen property during war. In the IG Farben case, for instance, company rep-
resentatives were convicted of pillage for purchasing “land, buildings, machinery, equip-
ment” from the Boruta factory, which the Reich Ministry of Economics had seized.97 
Similarly, representatives of the firm Krupp were convicted of pillage for purchasing 
an office in Paris “not from the rightful owners of 
the premises but from the provisional administrator 
of the Société Bacri Frères by virtue of a decision of 
a commissariat for Jewish questions.”98 And in one 
final example, the chairman of the Hermann Goering 
Works was convicted of pillage because his company 
“was the recipient of considerable property seized in 
Poland.”99 These and the other examples evidenced 
within the annex confirm that, as a matter of custom-
ary international law, pillage can involve either direct 
or indirect appropriation from the rightful own
48. This definition is not conceptually troubling. 
While it is essential not to confuse the scope of pillage 
in customary international law with domestic notions 
of theft, national law is helpful in confirming that 
there is nothing philosophically objectionable in treat-
ing receiving stolen property as a subset of pillage. In 
at least one national jurisdiction, theft and receiving 
stolen property are also amalgamated into a single offense on the basis that the original 
thief and the receiver both appropriate property with the intent to deprive the rightful 
owner of the asset.100 As the commentary to the U.S. Model Penal Code argues, “[a]
nalytically, the receiver does precisely what is forbidden by [the prohibition against 
theft]—namely, he exercises unlawful control over property of another with a purpose 
to deprive.”101 On a s imilar basis, a leading British commentator has rightly observed 
that “[a]lmost every handling is also a second theft—the handler dishonestly appropri-
ates property belonging to another with the intention permanently to deprive the other 
of it.”102 So while a number of other countries still maintain a distinction between theft 
and receiving stolen property that derives from the way the crimes developed histori-
cally,103 this d istinction neither affects the definition of pillage in international law nor 
raises compelling conceptual criticisms that justify a departure from customary inter-
national law. 
 “It is not correct to say, 
as defense counsel says, 
that because a crime has 
been completed no further 
crime may follow from it. 
Receiving stolen goods is 
a crime in every civilized 
jurisdiction and yet the 
larceny, which forms its 
basis, has already been 
completed.”
U.S. Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg, 
Pohl Case, p. 1244.
49. There is thus good reason to agree with the United Nations War Crimes Commis-
sion’s conclusion that “[i]f wrongful interference with property rights has been shown, 
it is not necessary to prove that the alleged wrongdoer was involved in the original 
wrongful appropriation.”104 As a result, the purchase by commercial actors of “appro-
priated” natural resources falls within the meaning of pillage, irrespective of whether 
the commercial actors were implicated in the initial extraction of the resources. This 
highlights how many commercial actors involved in the purchase of conflict commodi-
ties can commit pillage as principal perpetrators even though they were not involved in 
the initial misappropriation.
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VIII. Ownership of Natural 
 Resources
50. In order to establish a case of pillage, property must be appropriated without the 
consent of the rightful owner. Consequently, a court tasked with adjudicating allegations 
of pillage will have to determine ownership of the property in question. This chapter 
draws on four areas of law that might require consideration in determining ownership 
of natural resources. Which of these areas of law is relevant will depend on the circum-
stances of each particular case, but as a general rule national law and constitutional 
principles are most likely to define ownership within war crimes cases involving allega-
tions of natural resource pillage.
Ownership of Natural Resources in National Law
51. In the past, cases involving the pillage of natural resources have defined own-
ership by considering the domestic law governing mineral rights. At Nuremberg, for 
instance, representatives of the firm Krupp were charged with having pillaged a tung-
sten mine in northern France, which lead a judge in the case to define ownership of 
the tungsten ore by assessing the applicable French law. The judge stated that “[u]nder 
French law all mineral rights are owned by the State but the extracted ores become the 
property of the individual to whom the government grants a lease or concession for the 
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purpose of exploiting a mine.”105 A similar approach to defining ownership of natural 
resources in modern resource wars will require courts to assess ownership based on 
laws applicable within the country at war. To that end, this section provides an overview 
of natural resource ownership in various national legal systems.
52. Ownership in natural resources varies between jurisdictions and depending on 
the nature of the natural resource—forestry in Liberia is not subject to the same system 
of ownership as oil in Iraq. There are, however, three 
models of natural resource ownership which cover 
most scenarios.106 The first of these models, known as 
the claims system, confers ownership of minerals on 
anyone who discovers the deposit, subject only to cer-
tain formalities. According to this model of ownership, 
undiscovered minerals belong either to the state or to 
no one and become the property of whoever asserts 
first title. In the United States, for instance, minerals 
such as gold, silver, tin, and copper located on public 
land are still subject to a claims system.107 By contrast, 
the accession system stipulates that natural resources 
such as timber or copper belong to the owner of the 
land where the resources are found. This system 
derives from Roman law, which considered ownership 
of land to imply ownership of all property below the 
surface to the center of the earth and above as far as 
the sky. The accession system remains in force with 
respect to many natural resources in the United King-
dom, although the British Government has created 
exceptions for specific minerals such as oil, gas, and 
coal.108 The third and final model of resource owner-
ship is known as the concession system, which typi-
cally vests ownership of natural resources in the state, 
and gives a particular state organ authority to grant rights to search for, extract, process, 
and sell these resources. 
53. Although a court will have to investigate the laws applicable within the specific 
country at war in order to bring pillage charges, the concessionary system is likely to be 
the most common model. In the vast majority of developing nations, where resource 
wars are most prevalent, domestic legislation indicates that the state owns specific 
natural resources within the territory, except when these resources are allocated to a 
“The deposits of mineral 
substances, including 
artificial deposits, 
underground water and 
geothermal deposits on 
surface or in the sub-soil 
or in water systems of the 
National Territory, are the 
exclusive, inalienable and 
imprescriptible property 
of the State. However, 
the holders of mining or 
quarry exploitation rights 
acquire the ownership of 
the products for sale by 
virtue of their rights.”
Congolese Mining Code 
(2002), Article 3
private party through a concession or agreement.109 In Ecuador, for example, the 
Ecuador Mining Law of 1991 states that “[a]ll the mineral substances existing in the 
territory….belong to the inalienable and imprescriptible domain of the State…” Like-
wise, Article 14(1) of the Sierra Leonean Mines and Minerals Decree of 1994 states that 
“[a]ll rights or ownership in, of searching for, mining and disposing of minerals in, 
under or upon any land in Sierra Leone and its minerals continental shelf are vested in 
the Republic of Sierra Leone.” By way of further example, Section 2 of the Philippines 
Mining Act (1995) states that “[a]ll mineral resources in public and private lands within 
the territory and exclusive economic zone of the Republic of the Philippines are owned 
by the State.” Most states have passed legislation that contains equivalent provisions.
54. Many state constitutions also address the ownership of natural resources. Article 
9 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo states that “the State 
exercises a permanent sovereignty over Congolese soil, sub-soil, waters and forests 
as well as maritime and airspace. The modalities of the management of the State’s 
domain mentioned in the preceding sentence are determined by law.”110 Similar provi-
sions are contained in the Chinese Constitution, which also emphasizes that “[m]ineral 
resources, waters, forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches and other 
natural resources are owned by the state, that is, by the whole people, with the exception 
of the forests, mountains, grassland, unreclaimed land and beaches that are owned by 
collectives in accordance with the law….” These provisions provide anecdotal examples 
of legislative and constitutional provisions that are likely to determine ownership of 
natural resources in cases focused on the pillage of resource wealth.
55. It nonetheless bears recalling that natural resources are sometimes privately 
owned, either when the resource in question is governed by a claims or accession sys-
tem of ownership or when a state has conferred title in the resource to a private party. 
For example, Congolese legislation recognizes the right of private entities to acquire 
ownership in natural resources when it stipulates that “[t]he deposits of mineral sub-
stances, including artificial deposits, underground water and geothermal deposits on 
surface or in the sub-soil or in water systems of the National Territory, are the exclusive, 
inalienable and imprescriptible property of the State. However, the holders of mining 
or quarry exploitation rights acquire the ownership of the products for sale by virtue of 
their rights.”111 Similarly, according to the Peruvian Law of Sustainable Use of Natural 
Resources, natural resources at their source, be these renewable or nonrenewable, are 
owned by the nation, but the products derived from them, and obtained in the form as 
prescribed under the law, are owned by the title holders of rights granted to them.112 
Consequently, prosecutors should bear in mind that private entities can also own natu-
ral resources that are pillaged from conflict zones.
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Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
56.  The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has the potential 
to affect the reliance on domestic law in determining ownership of natural resources in 
certain contexts. In general terms, sovereignty dictates which entity can freely dispose of 
natural resources, or in other words, who has the power to determine ownership. The 
doctrine’s relevance to pillage is disputed. In the Uganda v. Congo case, the International 
Court of Justice concluded that although permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
“is a principle of customary international law,” there was nothing suggesting that it is 
“applicable to the specific situation of looting, pillage and exploitation of certain natural 
resources by members of the army of a State militarily intervening in another State.”113 
Nonetheless, as Judge Koroma cogently argues in a separate opinion in that case, “these 
rights and interests [permanent sovereignty over natural resources] remain in effect at 
all times, including during armed conflict and occupation.”114 Consequently, this section 
reviews the development of permanent sovereignty over natural resources then goes 
on to explore the two instances where this principle may be most relevant for present 
purposes.
57. The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources developed during 
the decolonization process in order to ensure that newly-independent states were not 
bound to respect pre-existing resource concessions agreed to during colonial rule. At 
the same time, newly-independent states involved in drafting the notion of permanent 
sovereignty were motivated to emphasize that “peoples” still struggling for indepen-
dence had power over their nations’ resource wealth. As a result of these two purposes, 
the first codifications of the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
inconsistently vested ownership in “peoples,” “nations,” and “states.” For instance, in 
the most frequently cited source of the right to permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, UN General Assembly Resolution 1803, states that “[t]he right of peoples and 
nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exer-
cised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people 
of the State concerned.”115 And yet, the preamble to the same resolution speaks of “the 
inalienable right of all States freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources…”116 
This duality was replicated in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,117 
and apparently also in the International Covenants 
on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Cultural 
and Social Rights.118 In addition, a large number of 
General Assembly resolutions speak of “countries” or 
“states” as the holders of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.119
58. Although some scholars argue that only peoples 
enjoy permanent sovereignty over natural resources,120 
a majority of experts tend to the view the right as one 
that inheres in peoples or states depending on the 
context. Schrijver, for instance, advocates for a return 
to the roots of permanent sovereignty by favoring a 
people-centered interpretation of the concept,121 but 
later concedes that “a clear tendency can be discerned 
to confine the circle of direct permanent sovereignty 
subjects solely to States, that is all States.”122 In the same vein, despite clear wording in 
human rights treaties stating that “[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth,” Hossain argues that “[a]t the core of the concept of permanent 
sovereignty is the inherent and overriding right of a state to control and dispose of 
the natural wealth and resources in its territory for the benefit of its own people.”123 
Others, such as Brownlie conclude that, loosely speaking, “permanent sovereignty is the 
assertion of the acquired rights of the host State which are not defeasible by contract 
or perhaps even by international agreement,”124 whereas the UN Security Council has 
referred to peoples’ rights to natural resources on more than one occasion.125 Given 
that permanent sovereignty over natural resources vests in both peoples and states, the 
doctrine can arguably be relevant to pillage cases in either scenario.
59. In the first of these scenarios, the people’s right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources may be relevant where resources are appropriated from peoples who 
enjoy an unrealized right to self-determination. Crawford, for instance, states that “even 
if, as I suspect, the question of permanent sovereignty in relation to independent States 
“Even if, as I suspect, the 
question of permanent 
sovereignty in relation to 
independent States is a 
right of States rather than 
peoples, in the context of 
colonial self-determination 
it seems clearly to be a 
peoples’ right.”
Professor James Crawford
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is a right of States rather than peoples, in the context of colonial self-determination it 
seems clearly to be a peoples’ right.”126 The same opinion finds support in the views of 
the UN legal advisor involved in drafting the principles, who suggests that the terms 
“peoples and nations” were originally intended to cover non-self-governing territories 
“which could not be covered by any concept of the sovereignty of States over natu-
ral resources.”127 In this light, ownership of Nauruan phosphates exploited during the 
Australian, New Zealand, and British mandate over Nauru,128 for instance, might be 
determined pursuant to rules of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, not the 
national law of the trustee nations. In these sorts of instances, permanent sovereignty 
might be central to liability for pillage.
60. In the second scenario, an independent state’s right to permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources might be pertinent if privately owned resources were expropri-
ated by national decree.  This occurs most frequently where a state seeks to rescind a 
previous concession over natural resources, despite the binding contractual agreements 
between the recipient of the concession and the state. Determining ownership in this 
context may require recourse to the state’s right to permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources. Although many would argue that this type of expropriation is inherent 
in a state’s inherent territorial sovereignty, a majority of states attribute the ability to 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In the Amoco award, for instance, the 
U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal explicitly found that “the right to nationalize property is today 
unanimously recognized, even by states that reject the notion of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources, considered by a majority of states as the foundation of such a 
right.”129 On this basis, the doctrine may have some role to play in the limited number 
of cases involving pillage of resources previously expropriated by a government. 
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Indigenous Ownership of Natural Resources 
61. In other circumstances, indigenous groups might own natural resources within 
a conflict zone. Although it is important to recall that ownership and sovereignty are 
distinct concepts, a number of recent cases have found that indigenous groups have 
proprietary interests in natural resources in areas they traditionally occupied, as well as 
procedural entitlements surrounding the use and allocation of these resources. Indige-
nous peoples might thus enjoy ownership of certain natural resources illegally exploited 
during armed conflict, irrespective of whether national mining legislation or domestic 
constitutional principles explicitly recognize these rights. It is therefore essential to 
understand the legal principles and precedents governing indigenous rights to natural 
resources, because this body of law might require closer consideration in assessing the 
liability of commercial actors for the pillage of natural resources within countries at war. 
62. A number of international instruments support the notion of indigenous prop-
erty rights in natural resources located within areas traditionally occupied by indige-
nous peoples. The International Labor Organization’s Convention (No. 169) concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, for example, affirms indigenous peoples’ rights of own-
ership and possession of the lands they traditionally occupy, and requires governments 
to safeguard those rights and to provide adequate procedures to resolve land claims.130 
In addition, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples con-
firms the rights of indigenous people to “lands, territories, and resources which they 
have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”131
63. International courts have implemented these rights by relying on the human 
right to property. In the Awas Tingni Community case, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights found that Nicaragua had violated the human right to property enjoyed 
by the Awas Tingni indigenous community by issuing concessions over their traditional 
lands to companies interested in developing roads and exploiting forestry from the 
territory.132 According to the court, the property rights protected by the human rights 
conventions are not limited to those property interests already recognized by states or 
defined by domestic law—the right to property has an autonomous meaning in interna-
tional human rights law. As such, property rights of indigenous peoples are not defined 
exclusively by a state’s formal legal regime, but also include property that arises from 
indigenous custom and tradition.133
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64. These principles were further advanced by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights in the Maya Indigenous Communities case, where the commission 
endorsed the notion that indigenous groups own natural resources by finding that 
the state authorities in Belize had violated an indigenous group’s right to property by 
assigning companies concessions to exploit timber and oil from ancestral land.134 The 
Inter-American Commission found that “the right to use and enjoy property may be 
impeded when the State itself, or third parties acting with the acquiescence or tolerance 
of the State, affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of that property without due 
consideration of and informed consultations with those having rights in the property.”135 
Although the commission agreed that a state was sovereign and could therefore expro-
priate an indigenous group’s entitlement to natural resources, it also emphasized that 
the expropriation would require fully informed consent, the absence of discrimination 
and fair compensation.136 Where these conditions are not met, indigenous peoples 
arguably retain ownership of natural resources in areas they historically occupied.
65. The notion that indigenous peoples own natural resources not explicitly appropri-
ated by the state is also reflected in a number of national legal systems. In the landmark 
decision known as Mabo, the High Court of Australia declared that indigenous inhabit-
ants of Australia have traditional land ownership rights that remain in force provided 
that the sovereign government has not acted to extinguish these rights.137 Similarly, the 
Canadian Supreme Court in Delgamuukw recognized that indigenous peoples enjoy 
ongoing proprietary interests in land and resource wealth. According to the Supreme 
Court, “aboriginal title encompasses mineral rights and lands held pursuant to aborigi-
nal title should be capable of exploitation.”138 The South African Constitutional Court 
has adopted a similar principle by finding that at least one indigenous community 
owned land prior to British colonial rule, and that this ownership still entitles the com-
munity “to use its water, to use its land for grazing and hunting and to exploit its 
natural resources, above and beneath the surface.”139 In each of these contexts, the 
precise nature of the indigenous rights over natural resources varies, but the decisions 
highlight the potentially importance of indigenous title in determining natural resource 
ownership. 
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A Rebel Group’s Ownership of Resources 
under Its Control
66. In many civil wars such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, 
and Cote d’Ivoire, rebel factions take over large portions of territory, then establish their 
own parallel administration. This often involves rebel groups appointing their own min-
ister of mines, creating a separate body charged with granting mining concessions and 
issuing formal decrees cancelling earlier mining rights. The two conflicting systems of 
resource regulation create an inescapable tension. On the one hand, concessions issued 
by state authorities become irrelevant formalities in rebel-held territory where national 
law is ignored. On the other, decrees issued by rebel movements purporting to grant 
rights in natural resources contravene constitutional principles and the terms of the 
national legislation. Even though certain national jurisdictions have accepted that the 
rebel groups’ seizures might be lawful to the extent that the group effectively controls 
the territory,140 a growing body of more recent jurisprudence insists that ineffective 
national law remains applicable in rebel held territories. 
67. During the American Civil War, the Confederate rebellion established in the 
South of the United States purported to pass legislation seizing state property. In White 
v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine the right of two 
individuals named White and Chiles to national bonds they purchased from the Con-
federacy after the bonds had been seized by Confederate legislation.  In declaring the 
legislative acts that claimed to seize the property null and void, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that while an unlawful government might be capable of passing laws regulat-
ing marriages and protecting other basic functions of daily life, “acts in furtherance or 
support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of 
citizens, and other acts of the like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and 
void.”141 The Confederacy thus had no power to pass legislation seizing state bonds, 
meaning that White and Chiles received no title in the bonds they purchased.142 
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68. The U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning on this topic was later adopted by the Inter-
national Court of Justice, albeit in a slightly different context that did not involve rebel 
groups as such. In an important advisory opinion dealing with the consequences of 
South Africa’s then continuing presence in Namibia, the International Court of Justice 
applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion in White v. Texas in a case that dealt with 
natural resource exploitation more explicitly. In advising states on the legal implica-
tions arising from South Africa’s illegal presence in Namibia, the International Court 
of Justice reasoned that: 
In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory 
should not result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages derived 
from international co-operation. In particular, while official acts performed by the 
Government of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termi-
nation of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity cannot be extended to 
those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births, deaths and marriages, 
the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of 
the Territory.143
69. Consequently, attempts by the then South African government to grant title in 
Namibian natural resources were “illegal and invalid,” since the expropriation of natural 
resources could hardly be reconciled with the humanitarian exceptions to the general 
rule—expropriating natural resources is not analogous with registering births, deaths, 
and marriages. One of the judges on the case explicitly confirmed this interpretation 
in a separate opinion by stating that “other States should not regard as valid any acts 
and transactions of the authorities in Namibia relating to public property, concessions, 
etc.”144 Other lea ding authorities, such as the UN Security Council and United Nations 
Council for Namibia, later confirmed this view.145 And even though the case involved 
foreign occupation rather than legislation passed by a rebel group, the principles derived 
from the advisory opinion would appear to apply with equal relevance to situations 
where a rebel group seizes territorial control in a civil war. 
70. The European Court of Human Rights has tacitly confirmed this view in a case 
involving the seizure of private property from an entity that was not recognized as a 
state by the international community. In Loizidou v. Turkey, the court ruled that the 
petitioner’s right to property was violated by expropriations premised on legislation 
enacted by an unrecognized government, namely the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC). The TRNC had seized control of the property in Northern Cyprus fol-
lowing the Turkish military intervention in the territory in May 1974, which sparked 
the partitioning of Cyprus along ethnic lines. Over the years that followed, the TRNC 
authorities established a government, promulgated a constitution, and declared inde-
pendence. The international community, however, universally rejected these claims, 
relegating the TRNC to a status approximately equivalent to a rebel group in most 
contemporary resource wars. As a consequence of the TRNC’s unrecognized status, the 
European Court of Human Rights deemed the provision of the TRNC Constitution that 
purported to expropriate private property void. In reliance of the International Court of 
Justice opinion on Namibia, the European Court declared that:
[t]he Court cannot attribute legal validity for purposes of the Convention to such 
provisions as Article 159 of the fundamental law on which the Turkish Govern-
ment rely….  The Court confines itself to the above conclusion and does not 
consider it desirable, let alone necessary, in the present context to elaborate a 
general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts 
of the ‘TRNC’. It notes, however, that international law recognises the legitimacy 
of certain legal arrangements and transactions in such a situation, for instance 
as regards the registration of births, deaths and marriages…146
71. As previously mentioned, certain domestic jurisdictions adopt a different inter-
pretation in their own private international law,147 but it is doubtful whether these 
limited exceptions remain valid in light of the more recent international precedents 
identified above. Moreover, international criminal courts and tribunals will follow prec-
edents derived from public not private international law, thereby confirming the reason-
ing in the White v. Texas, Namibia, and Loizidou cases. Consequently, domestic courts 
are also likely to adopt this position in order to ensure that their domestic standards are 
compliant with those applicable before international courts. This pressure for harmo-
nized standards between international and domestic legal systems is especially strong 
in international criminal law, because the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction creates real 
incentives for national courts to follow international interpretations. In the vast major-
ity of instances, then, national legislation will define ownership in natural resources 
during war, even when rebel groups promulgate new law in territory they control. As 
a later section explains, potentially adverse humanitarian effects of this interpretation 
are partially offset by aspects of the law of war.148 
Further Reading
Antonello Tancredi, “A Normative ‘Due Process’ in the Creation of States Through 
Secession, in Secession,” International Law Perspectives 171, 200-207 (Cambridge, 
2006). 
O W N E R S H I P  O F  N A T U R A L  R E S O U R C E S   4 9
5 0   C O R P O R A T E  W A R  C R I M E S
Brad R. Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law, 152–159 (Clarendon Press, 
1999); 
Enrico Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law: Reconciling Effective-
ness, Legality and Legitimacy, 136-150 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).
Ownership through Recognition of Governments 
and New States 
72. In some instances, it may be necessary for a court adjudicating allegations of pil-
lage to identify the government. In international law, recognition serves this purpose. 
This recognition can have important consequences for determining ownership of natu-
ral resources in conflict zones, because it effectively distinguishes actions that would 
be illegal when carried out by private actors from those that are legitimate exercises of 
sovereign authority. In other words, the forcible acquisition of natural resources by an 
unrecognized group will generally amount to theft, whereas a recognized government 
not only has the authority to control natural resources through regulations in force, it 
also enjoys the power to amend legislation governing resource exploitation or to expro-
priate pre-existing property rights. In order to clarify the potential relevance of these 
issues, this section provides an overview of the law governing the concept of recognition 
in international law together with a series of cases that highlight how the doctrine might 
potentially impact corporate liability for pillaging natural resources from war zones.
73. In certain conflicts, recognition plays very little role in determining ownership of 
natural resources, because the UN Security Council has passed resolutions that prevent 
states from recognizing a particular faction as a government. In the case of the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus, for instance, Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) 
called upon all states “not to recognise any Cypriot State other than the Republic of 
Cyprus ...”149 As a result, the European Court of Human Rights was adamant that the 
constitution passed by the TRNC purporting to acquire private property was null and 
void.150 These types of situations have also arisen in Rhodesia, Namibia, and Kuwait, 
creating situations where warring factions are unlikely to be able to claim the rights of 
a government over resource wealth.151 In these situations, armed groups have no title 
to state-owned or privately held mineral wealth, rendering corporate trade with these 
groups equivalent to receiving stolen property. 
74. Recognition is also less relevant when a de facto administration of part of a 
country has no plausible claim to represent a national government. In the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, for instance, rebel groups controlled large portions of Congolese 
territory, but never claimed to represent the national government or to secede from the 
Congo. In such situations, recognizing these rebel movements as the governments of 
the Congo would violate international law, which stipulates that “[r]ecognizing or treat-
ing a rebellious regime as the successor government while the previously recognized 
government is still in control constitutes unlawful interference in the internal affairs of 
that State.”152 While states might recognize these groups as rebellions or insurgencies, 
these forms of recognition have not been exercised since the American Civil War and 
would only mean that rebel groups become bound by 
the law governing international armed conflict.153 As 
the subsequent section on exceptions in the laws of 
war will show, rebel groups would not enjoy the right 
to exploit natural resources in these circumstances.
75. In other instances, however, recognition by 
foreign governments will play an important role in 
determining which group enjoys governmental status 
in foreign courts when multiple parties claim to rep-
resent the state. A case heard in U.S. courts relating 
to competing claims to government during the Libe-
rian civil war best highlights this scenario. In Bickford 
v. Liberia, the Interim Government of Liberia and the 
National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Govern-
ment (NPRAG) both sought payment of funds held in 
the United States that belonged to the state of Liberia.154 The funds, held in the United 
States as a result of payments to the Liberian state mining company, unquestionably 
belonged to the state of Liberia. The only question requiring clarification was which 
of the two entities represented the state. To answer the question, the court obtained 
a certificate from the U.S. Department of State indicating that it favored the claim of 
the interim government. By implication, the exploitation of natural resources by the 
NPRAG “government” was unlawful insofar as this unrecognized government went 
beyond transactions such as the registration of births, deaths, and marriages. Compa-
nies that trade natural resources with unrecognized governments such as these there-
fore risk liability for pillaging these commodities.
76. Companies are also vulnerable to criminal prosecution for trading natural 
resources with secessionist movements that are not recognized as new states. During 
the Biafran civil war, for instance, a Nigerian separatist group traded oil expropriated 
from within territory under its control, but failed to garner sufficient recognition from 
“[c]ourts of high repute 
have held that confiscation 
by a government to which 
recognition has been 
refused has no other effect 
in law than seizure by 
bandits or by other lawless 
bodies.”
New York Supreme Court, 
Sokoloff v. National City 
Bank of New York (1924)
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foreign states to achieve political autonomy. The extraction of oil was therefore unlawful 
for reasons similar to those applicable in the NPRAG government mentioned above—
the Biafran separatist movement had no capacity to displace state ownership in the 
oil it sold to businesses or to substitute for the state during the conflict. By contrast, 
the widespread recognition of Bangladesh after it claimed independence from Paki-
stan enabled the Bangladeshi authorities to legitimately exercise eminent domain over 
natural resources within the territory. Unlike failed succession attempts in Biafra and 
elsewhere, Bangladeshi authorities could therefore issue decrees granting commercial 
actors rights to resource wealth. As the next paragraph shows, this analysis becomes 
more complicated when some states recognize the secessionist movement as a new 
state while others do not. 
77. The more problematic scenario arises when foreign states are split in their rec-
ognition of competing governments within a country at war. There are several perti-
nent examples of this phenomenon. At the outset of the Angolan Civil War in 1975, 
countries aligned with the Soviet bloc recognized the MPLA Government (the People’s 
Republic of Angola), while the United States, South Africa, and others supported and 
recognized the claims of the Democratic People’s Republic of Angola lead by UNITA. 
Although this situation later changed as the MPLA gained ascendancy over the ensuing 
years of bloodshed, the task of identifying the government capable of allocating natural 
resources during these initial years was inescapably problematic—both armed groups 
had internationally supported claims to constitute the lawful government of the state. 
Although complexities of this sort probably make a conviction for pillage less viable 
during this period, they are nonetheless rare and need not detract from the range of 
situations where armies trading natural resources with commercial actors are simply 
never recognized.
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IX. Exceptions in the Laws of War
78. In the earlier section dealing with the definition of pillage, we observed that the 
majority of contemporary war crimes trials define pillage as appropriation of either 
public or private property without the consent of the owner, subject to limitations set 
out in the Hague Regulations.155 As that section shows, these exceptions in the Hague 
Regulations color the interpretation of pillage; not “private or personal use” or “military 
necessity” as set out in the ICC Elements of Crimes.156 In keeping with this position, 
this chapter explores the law governing each of the exceptions contained in the Hague 
Regulations, showing that although an army might have a limited ability to exploit 
resources in occupied territory for the benefit of the local population, the forcible exploi-
tation of natural resources from outside occupied territories or where an occupying 
army does not apply the proceeds of resource sales to the needs of the local population 
constitutes pillage.
Requisitions “for the Needs of the Army of 
Occupation”
79. The Hague Regulations condone requisitions of privately owned property “for the 
needs of the army of occupation.”157 The term is widely understood as meaning property 
essential to the army’s immediate upkeep.  The Krupp Judgment, for instance, considered 
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that requisitions entailed “billets for the occupying troops and the occupation authori-
ties, garages for their vehicles, stables for their horses, urgently needed equipment and 
supplies for the proper functioning of the occupation authorities, food for the army of 
occupation, and the like.”158 Other auth orities define the category as including such 
things as “food and supplies, liquor and tobacco, cloth for uniforms, leather for boots, 
and the like.”159 Even allowing for a broader interpretation in modern warfare, natural 
resources extracted or traded for profit during war are not comparable to these objects, 
all of which are necessary for the day-to-day needs of an army.
80. The transfer of requisitioned property to areas outside occupied territory would 
also contradict “the needs of the army of occupation.” In a decision of obvious rel-
evance for companies exporting natural resources acquired from contemporary conflict 
zones, an Anglo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal found that the shipment to Germany 
of a quantity of cotton seized by the German army of occupation in Antwerp during 
World War One could not constitute a requisition because the export of the property 
evidenced a purpose that was patently inconsistent with the immediate needs of the 
occupying army.160 Companies exporting minerals such as gold, coltan, and cassiterite 
from conflict zones can therefore be confident that the resources were not legitimately 
requisitioned.
81. The sale of requisitioned property is also categorically prohibited, further under-
mining suggestions that conflict commodities could be legitimately requisitioned. 
A robust body of judicial authority emphasizes that requisitions cannot be effected for 
the purposes of commerce without transgressing the “needs of the army of occupa-
tion.”161 In the words of one Belgian court, “[i]f a measure was taken in reliance on 
Article 52 [of the Hague Regulations], the chattel must be used for the needs of the 
army of occupation and therefore cannot, in principle, be sold.”162 The French Cour de 
Cassation has agreed with this finding, insisting that although international law might 
afford an army the right to requisition property owned by private individuals, “it does 
not give an army of occupation the right to sanction the transfer to private individuals 
of goods taken from others by acts of violence.”163 On the strength of these various 
precedents, leading commentators confirm that “not only requisitioning for shipment 
to the occupant’s home country has been held illegal, but also requisitioning for resale 
and profit rather than for the use of the occupying army.”164 Requisition s, therefore, will 
not suffice to pass title in natural resources traded by rebel groups or foreign armies.
Moveable State Property “of a Nature to Serve 
Operations of War”
82. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations stipulates that “[a]n army of occupation can 
only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the 
property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, 
generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military 
operations.”165 Although the provision contains an ambiguity this section explores in 
more detail, publicly owned moveable resources, such as artisanal diamonds or gold, 
do not fall within the correct interpretation of the rule. 
83. The rule contains a contradiction. One the one hand, the authoritative French 
equivalent of the phrase “used for military purposes,” is “of a nature to serve operations 
of war.”166 This implies that an occupying army can only seize moveable state property 
that could be used immediately in battle, such as “depots of arms, means of transport, 
stores and supplies.” On the other, as one leading commentator points out, “cash, funds 
and realizable securities” are also listed in the rule, even though they inevitably require 
conversion in order to serve military purposes.167 Given this ambiguity, the provision’s 
negotiating history becomes important. This history confirms that the word “nature” 
in Article 53 was intended to limit legitimate seizures of state moveable property to 
property which, “by its very nature” is capable of military use.168 In fact, the word 
“nature” was inserted precisely in order to avoid the argument that “everything that 
can be converted into money can serve the goals of war.”169 Consequently, a majority of 
commentators rightly interpret the term “of a nature to serve operations of war” as only 
covering objects “susceptible to direct military use.”170 Diamonds, gold, and timber, of 
course, are no more susceptible of direct military use than art, which is frequently the 
subject of pillage proceedings.171 
84. A number of cases supp ort this interpretation. In the Krupp case, for instance, 
the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found that “machinery and raw materials” hur-
riedly removed by corporate representatives from a state-owned steel works in Ukraine 
during an evacuation constituted pillage.172 The tribunal rejected arguments that the 
state property was legitimately seized, finding that “the property removed did not fall 
into any category of movable public property which the occupant is authorized to seize 
under the Hague Regulations.”173 If publicly owned machinery and raw materials from 
a steel works cannot be lawfully seized as state moveable property, forcible acquisition 
of artisanal minerals such as gold and diamonds cannot be justified based on the same 
provision. This reasoning is consistent with a variety of other decisions, which have 
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condemned the trade in a wide range of state property that was seized then sold by occu-
pying forces.174 And although at least one decision has adopted a divergent position,175 
it is difficult to reconcile the position adopted in this case with the bulk of the case-law 
on the subject, the majority position among academics or the negotiating history set out 
above. The preferable interpretation of Article 53(1), to cite a Belgium court, is that “the 
decision of the enemy to alienate a chattel which he has seized in pursuance of Article 
52 or Article 53, and all subsequent alienations, must be regarded as unlawful.”176 This 
precludes commercial exploitation of state owned moveable resources, including natu-
ral resources like alluvial diamonds.
Munitions-de-Guerre
85. The Hague Regulations also recognize the ability of an army to seize munitions 
of war, irrespective of whether these munitions are owned by public or private parties. 
Article 53(2) of the Hague Regulations reads “all appliances, whether on land, at sea, 
or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or 
things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds 
of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must 
be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.” 
86. The precise definition of the term munitions of war, together with its more fre-
quently deployed translation “munitions-de-guerre,” has primarily centered around the 
legality of seizing privately held crude oil stocks from occupied territories. In the lead-
ing case on point, colloquially known as Singapore Oil Stocks, a Singaporean court 
considered competing claims to crude oil reserves located in Singapore that were ini-
tially attributed to a Dutch oil conglomerate, then seized by Japanese troops during the 
war, before ultimately being recaptured by British forces when Singapore was liberated 
toward the end of the war.177 
87. In re jecting the British government’s claim that the crude oil they had recap-
tured constituted munitions-de-guerre, the court drew on a passage contained in the 
then British Manual of Military Law that rightly defined the term munitions-de-guerre 
as “such things as are susceptible of direct military use.”178 On the strength of this 
definition, the court ruled that the need for sophisticated installations and considerable 
processing to extract and refine the oil meant that the crude oil failed to qualify as “arms 
or ammunition which could be used against the enemy in fighting.”179 Clearly, most 
commodities that motivate contemporary resource wars are even less likely to satisfy 
this standard, because resources such as diamond, gold, coltan, and cassiterite can only 
deliver a military application once converted into cash or exchanged for arms. 
88. Two years after the decision in Singapore Oil Stocks, a revised British manual 
emerged repudiating the rule in question on the largely unsubstantiated grounds that 
“there is no justification for the view that ‘war material’ means materials which could be 
used immediately without being processed in any way for warlike purposes: for example 
crude oil could be included in the term ‘war material.’”180 Unfortunately, this change 
of position was maintained in subsequent editions of the British Military Manual. The 
most recent version asserts that an army may seize “raw materials such as crude oil.”181 
As this section shows, however, this definition is inconsistent with the majority of expert 
opinion, the negotiating history to the Hague Regulations, and law applied in contem-
porary war crimes jurisprudence.
89. The vast majority of expert commentators interpret the term munitions of war as 
implying property “susceptible of direct military use.”182 After completing a full review 
of the negotiating history to the Hague Regulations, one leading commentator also 
concluded that the regulations “did not include within the conception of munitions-
de-guerre real property or raw materials which would require processing of a costly or 
lengthy character in order to make them suitable for use in war—despite the fact that 
when so processed they might be of the utmost value.”183 The preferable definition of 
munitions of war is thus reflected in the U.S. Military Manual, which defines the con-
cept as “everything susceptible to direct military use.”184
90. Courts prosecuting pillage have also endorsed this interpretation in practice. In 
the Esau case in 1948, for example, the Special Court of Cassation in the Netherlands 
ruled that the chief commissioner of Germany’s high frequency research council could 
be held guilty of plunder of public and private property for ordering the removal of a 
range of scientific instruments together with a sum of gold for war related purposes. 
In response to the claim that the property was munitions of war, the court ruled that 
“[n]either the text nor the history of Article 53 gave grounds for the thesis that the term 
‘munitions-de-guerre’ should be extended to materials and apparatus such as boring 
machines, lathes, lamps, tubes, and gold, nor even to the other objects removed, how-
ever important they might be for technical or scientific research.”185 Over half a century 
later, the Naletilic´ Trial Judgment independently reached a similar conclusion in defining 
war booty as “material obviously related to the conduct of military operations.”186 The 
Hadžihasanovic´ Judgment also adopted the standards contained in the Singapore Oil 
Stocks Judgment when it declared that “weapons, ammunition, and any other materials 
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which have direct military applications, even if they are private property, may be seized 
as war booty.”187 The seizure of natural resources and crude oil cannot be reconciled 
with this standard.
Usufruct
91. The Hague Regulations restrict the appropriation of immoveable state property 
through the Roman law device known as usufruct. Article 55 of the Hague Regulations 
stipulates that “[t]he occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usu-
fructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to 
the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of 
these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.” The 
term usufruct literally means “use of fruit.” As the translation suggests, the doctrine 
traditionally allowed an occupant to exploit and consume the fruit from an occupied 
orchard on the condition that the value of the trees and land was preserved. 
92. The extrapolation of this paradigm to natural resource exploitation during war 
was originally premised on the misconceived perception that minerals were naturally 
renewable—Roman legal scholars believed that resources within the ground automati-
cally regenerated.188 These geological misconceptions not only infiltrated early inter-
pretations of usufruct in the law of war, the inaccuracy has endured even in the face of 
commonly accepted scientific understandings to the contrary. Soon after the Brussels 
Declaration of 1874 adopted the doctrine of usufruct a s a then novel means of limiting 
an occupying power’s rights over immoveable state property, one author argued that the 
principle entitled an occupying army to “lop forests and work the mines.”189 Having 
copied this original error, several contemporary military manuals still state that a bel-
ligerent has a right “to work the mines” of publicly held property,190 without recognizing 
the fallacy of treating minerals as fruits.
93. The misconception of mineral wealth as renewable creates an inescapable inter-
nal contradiction. Mining depletes a limited supply of resources, when the central 
tenet of usufruct demands preservation of capital. As one of the earlier commentators 
queried: “[t]he products of mines and quarries are certainly not a fruit, but a part of 
the ground. It is therefore the substance of the thing which the exploiter successively 
depletes; how can the usufructuary have the right to exploit the mines and quarries 
when he must conserve the substance?”191 Evidently, the U.S. Department of State 
shared this misgiving. In a memorandum addressing the legality of Israeli oil exploita-
tion in occupied Sinai in light of usufruct, the State Department officials argued that 
“[r]esources such as oil deposits, which are irreplaceable and have value only as they 
are consumed, cannot be used without impairing the capital of the oil bearing land.”192 
For these reasons, t he exploitation of non-renewable resources contradicts the expressed 
wording of Article 55, which mandates that the occupying power “must safeguard the 
capital of these properties.” 
94. Commentators are conscious of this legal fiction but reluctant to declare that an 
occupying army is categorically prohibited from exploiting resources in all contexts. 
In an article that resembles much of the academic writing on the subject,193 Claggert 
and Johnson argue that usufruct “logically prohibits any exploitation of minerals.”194 
They nonetheless end orse a portion of definitions of 
usufruct derived from a number of civil law coun-
tries that permit a usufruct to continue exploitation 
at pre-occupation rates.195 As the authors themselves 
acknowledge, the interpretation that a usufruct is enti-
tled to continue pre-occupation rates of extraction is 
“a not wholly logical compromise between the basic 
concept of usufruct and a misconceived application 
of that concept in the law of ancient Rome.”196 The 
compromise, whic h is illogical and based on obsolete 
science, employs a legal fiction that places a state’s 
natural resource wealth in the hands of any foreign 
army.
95. A number of cases have rejected this position 
in practice. To cite but one illustration, the Ministries 
Judgment at Nuremberg found Paul Pleiger, chairman 
of Mining and Steel Works East Inc., guilty of pillage. Through this company, Pleiger 
was responsible for the massive exploitation of state held mines in occupied Russia.197 
In response to submissions that Article 55 of the Hague Regulations allowed seizures 
of this nature, the tribunal held that “[t]his claim is far too broad.”198 The tribunal thus 
concluded that the manganese, coal, and iron exploited from these state-owned proper-
ties “were seized and used without regard to the rules of usufructuary.”199 Other cases 
involving pillage of natural resources simply overlook usufruct without addressing the 
concept at all. For example, of the pillage cases set out in Annex A to this manual, we 
anticipate that courts could have but did not consider usufruct in over 10 instances, 
often in contexts that led to convictions for pillaging state-owned natural resources.200 
“Just as the inhabitants 
of the occupied territory 
must not be forced to 
help the enemy in waging 
the war against their 
own country or their own 
country’s allies, so must 
the economic assets of the 
occupied territory not be 
used in such a manner.”
In Re Krupp, at 623.
E X C E P T I O N S  I N  T H E  L A W S  O F  W A R   5 9
6 0   C O R P O R A T E  W A R  C R I M E S
Precedents of this nature would preclude all exploitation of all non-renewable natural 
resources in conflict zones.
96. Despite these precedents, we cautiously endorse the fiction that non-renewable 
resources can be exploited by an occupying army, provided that the money from these 
sales is spent exclusively on the humanitarian needs of the local population. Allowing 
this exception accounts for one of the real concerns with enforcing pillage. A report 
by a UN panel of experts in 2007, for instance, recommended against imposing sanc-
tions on companies involved in the illicit diamond trade, precisely because “the con-
siderable dependence on artisanal mining… exposes these miners to potentially severe 
consequences should measures be taken that could threaten an already vulnerable live-
lihood.”201 A Congolese NGO expressed the same concern in more striking terms, 
arguing that “calling regulations or relationships established by warring factions for 
the exploitation of resource wealth ‘illegal’ is meaningless in a country where the illegal 
informal economy has been the sole mechanism of survival for large parts of the popu-
lation.”202 But instead of dispensing with legality altogether, usufruct might be inter-
preted as creating a limited exception that responds to these humanitarian concerns.
97. This appears to have been the position adopted at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg 
Judgment, for instance, found that “[t]hese articles [in the Hague Regulations] make 
it clear that … the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear the 
expense of the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of the 
country can reasonably be expected to bear.” Although the phrase “expense of the occu-
pation” could be interpreted very broadly,203 the more compelling interpretation limits 
the term to costs associated with an occupier’s humanitarian obligations toward the 
local population.204 A wider reading of the exception risks permitting a legal fiction to 
justify a self-financing military occupation, thereby creating perverse incentives for war. 
A wider interpretation would also allow a nation’s resources to be used to fuel violence 
against its own people, contradicting the declaration in the Nuremberg Judgment that, 
“[ j]ust as the inhabitants of the occupied territory must not be forced to help the enemy 
in waging the war against their own country or their own country’s allies, so must the 
economic assets of the occupied territory not be used in such a manner.”205 
98. In the face of these concerns, courts have rightly limited the term “expenses of 
the occupation” to the humanitarian needs of the local population. The International 
Court of Justice, for instance, found that exploitation of natural resources “carried out 
for the benefit of the local population” was “permitted under international humanitarian 
law.”206 As a result, if courts endorse the fiction that the doctrine of usufruct applies 
to non-renewable resources, proceeds from natural resource exploitation in occupied 
territory must be spent exclusively on the needs of the local population in order to 
avoid criminal liability for pillage. In this light, a company or business representative 
perpetrates pillage by acquiring natural resources through an occupying army when 
proceeds from the transaction are not spent on the local population. A range of factors 
are capable of satisfying this standard. These might include situations where (a) the 
occupier uses proceeds from the sale to purchase weapons or to finance the war effort 
more broadly; (b) where proceeds from resource rents only benefit military or political 
elites; or (c) when the proceeds from illicit resource transactions are repatriated to a 
foreign country or region beyond the occupied territory.
99. Some also argue that a usufruct cannot exploit natural resources beyond pre-
occupation rates, although we do not consider this claim sufficiently settled to jus-
tify criminal liability.  According to many interpretations of usufruct, an occupying 
army cannot increase rates of exploitation within the territory it controls. As one expert 
explains, an occupant “may not cut more timber than was done in pre-occupation 
days.”207 In accordance with this interpretation, the French Court of Cassation held that 
a businessman who felled in excess of 13,000 trees from state and municipal forests in 
occupied France during World War Two “could not escape civil and criminal responsi-
bility,” because the exploitation exceeded rates permitted by pre-existing regulations.208 
There is, however, considerable opposition to this interpretation.  In a dispute involving 
the drilling of new oil fields in the Sinai, the Israeli government argued that usufruct 
“includes the obligation and right to continue reasonable, considered and orderly new 
drillings.”209 Given the number of experts who support this minority view,210 criminal 
charges for violating the principle seem difficult to justify. Accordingly, pending legal 
clarification, we do not recommend charging companies that are only responsible for 
exploiting natural resources beyond pre-occupation rates.
100. These principles should extend to territories administered by rebel groups during 
civil wars. As previously mentioned, this proposition is legally controversial, because 
only foreign military armies who establish an occupation are formally able to exercise 
the exceptions contained in the Hague Regulations. Recall, for instance, the SCSL’s find-
ing that at least in the context of pillage, a range of arguments favors extending these 
exceptions to non-international armed conflicts as a matter of prosecutorial strategy. To 
reiterate, certain cases have already extended aspects of The Hague Regulations, which 
include the right to usufruct, to warring factions operating in non-international armed 
conflicts. Moreover, offering rebels privileges in the laws of war also creates incentives 
for them to comply with this body of rules during the course of their hostilities. Finally, 
rebel groups are frequently subject to the law applicable to international armed conflict 
insofar as they fight as proxies for foreign governments.211 With respect to usufruct 
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specifically, if the doctine serves purely humanitarian purposes, then extending it to 
civil wars merely promotes the plight of civilian populations in rebel-held territories. 
In this sense, applying usufruct in civil wars is not only sage prosecutorial strategy, it 
also furthers fundamental aspirations of international humanitarian law.
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X. Consent
101. Pillage is essentially appropriation of property without consent. In the words of 
the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, “[w]e deem it to be of the essence of the crime 
of plunder or spoliation that the owner be deprived of his property involuntarily and 
against his will.”212 This focus on the lack of consent is reinforced by the definition of 
pillage within the ICC Elements of Crimes, which also insists that “the appropriation 
was without the consent of the owner.”213 Importantly, this consent must come from 
the rightful owner. In the context of natural resource exploitation, the earlier chapter 
on ownership concluded that in most countries suffering the scourge of resource wars, 
either the state or private parties own natural resource wealth. When the state owns 
the resources, it frequently consents to the exploitation and trade of these resources by 
passing legislation that defines procedures for obtaining the right to exploit resources 
and by empowering a state body to allocate these resources. When private entities own 
resources, a commercial contract most frequently provides consent. Although this man-
ual cannot explore the various national laws that govern these principle in great detail, 
this section illustrates several broad examples of the absence of consent in war-time 
resource extraction and provides guidance on how to determine consent in a particular 
context.
102. Companies operating in conflict zones often ignore the need for state con-
sent entirely by relying on authorizations granted by rebel groups or foreign military 
forces. In one such example, the Nazi Hans Kehrl was convicted of pillage for having 
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exploited large quantities of iron, crude steel, and coal from the Vitkovice Works in 
then Czechoslovakia.214 Like a number of companies operating in modern resource 
wars, Kehrl purported to derive authority from a decree issued by a warring party to 
the hostilities.215 The illegitimacy of these sorts of decrees had serious legal ramifica-
tions—Kehrl himself was convicted for pillaging steel 
and coal from the mines. In a similar case, six direc-
tors of the firm IG Farben were convicted of pillaging 
the Strassbourg-Schiltigheim oxygen and acetylene 
plants in Alsace-Lorraine on the basis that the Ger-
man civil administration’s decree confiscating the 
plants was “without any legal justification under inter-
national law.”216 As a result, the company’s directors 
were found criminally liable because they “acquired 
these plants from the German Government without 
payment to or consent of the French owners.”217 Thus, 
the concessions issued by rebel groups or foreign mili-
tary in modern war zones will not protect companies 
against liability for pillage, because these concessions have neither a greater claim to 
legal justification in international law, nor go further in obtaining adequate consent in 
accordance with applicable state legislation. 
103. In other circumstances, businesses trade in state-owned natural resources with-
out regard to the various forms of consent expressed in relevant national legislation. 
These forms of consent often vary depending on the nature of the natural resource and 
the means of extraction. In the context of industrial mining, for instance, states gener-
ally consent to exploitation of valuable resources by issuing a concession or entering 
into a mining agreement that gives the recipient the exclusive right to extract specific 
resources within a given area.218 In some countries, consent to undertake artisanal min-
ing functions differently, by allowing a state representative to designate artisanal mining 
zones and then by licensing others to exploit and sell resources from these zones.219 
In the Congolese context, for example, the Mining Code of 2002 allows the minister of 
mines to designate a specific zone from which licensed Congolese nationals can exploit 
artisanal resources,220 provided they are then on-sold to registered middlemen (négo-
tiants), who in turn trade the commodities to registered trading houses (comptoirs).221 
It follows that the trade in artisanal resources such as diamonds or gold harvested from 
outside designated zones or by individuals who have no state-sanctioned authority to act 
in these capacities is devoid of consent and therefore illegal. The misappropriation of 
natural resources in violation of these rules is legally equivalent to Wilhelm Stuckart’s 
“[w]e deem it to be of the 
essence of the crime of 
plunder or spoliation that 
the owner be deprived of 
his property involuntarily 
and against his will.”
IG Farben case, at 1134
conviction for pillaging “cut and uncut precious stones,”222 because in both instances 
property is acquired without respecting the proprietors’ wishes.
104. Business entities can also pillage natural resources from private owners by 
exploiting resources allocated to competitors or by simply stealing extracted resources 
from warehouses or from vehicles during transportation. As the previous section on 
ownership shows, private entities often own natural resource wealth. In these circum-
stances, consent must emanate from the private owner, generally through a binding 
contract or lease. A number of precedents govern the pillage of privately owned prop-
erty in violation of these standards. For instance, in one war crimes trial convened in 
Poland soon after the end of World War Two, Joseph Buhler was found guilty of pillage 
for “economic exploitation of the country’s resources,” in this instance through the 
issuance of decrees confiscating privately held mining rights and mining shares.223 
Companies operating in modern-day war zones might not issue decrees or seize private 
shareholdings in mines in precisely the same way, but in certain circumstances they 
also benefit from the backing of warring parties to exploit privately held property in 
natural resources without the consent of the rightful owners. This, once again, risks 
liability for pillage when the transaction is bereft of the owner’s consent.
105. The purchasers of illicitly-seized conflict resources also appropriate property 
without the owner’s consent. Jurisprudence from World War Two again best illustrates 
the absence of consent in these contexts. In the Roechling case, the German business-
man Hermann Roechling was found guilty of pillage for purchasing scrap steel from 
the German company ROGES, knowing that the merchandise had been illegally seized 
without the consent of the owners. The company ROGES was a mere front established 
for the German Army High Command and other Nazi authorities, tasked with acquir-
ing property from German military and economic agencies then selling the property 
to German industry.224 As previously seen, the tribunal established in the French zone 
of occupation in Germany convicted Roechling of pillage for purchasing from ROGES, 
declaring that “Hermann Roechling, like all other German industrialists in the same 
circumstances, was a receiver of looted property.”225 These allegations are similar to 
incidents in contemporary resource wars, where businesses have traded with warring 
factions who exploit natural resources they do not own. In both these situations, the 
rightful proprietors of the resources do not consent to the trade. 
106. Coercion can also vitiate consent in natural resource exploitation during war, 
which also gives rise to criminal liability for pillage. As the IG Farben case famously 
stated, “[w]hen action by the owner is not voluntary because his consent is obtained by 
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threats, intimidation, pressure, or by exploiting the position and power of the military 
occupant under circumstances indicating that the owner is being induced to part with 
his property against his will, it is clearly a violation of the Hague Regulations.”226 Dur-
ing war, commercial transactions involving natural resources frequently satisfy this 
standard. In a relatively obvious example, the director of the Dresden Bank, Karl Rasche, 
was found guilty of pillaging the Rothschild-Gutmann share in the Vitkovice steel plants 
by negotiating the “sale” of the shareholdings on behalf of the German authorities while 
one of the owners of the steel plant was held by the Gestapo in Vienna.227 This, accord-
ing to the tribunal, constituted pillage. 
107. In a further example of coercion, the directors of IG Farben were convicted of pil-
laging French chemical industries by compelling three of the then primary producers of 
dyestuffs to agree to participate in a venture named Francolor, in which Farben acquired 
a 51 percent shareholding to the severe economic detriment of the other participants.228 
After sustained protest, the French companies resigned themselves to essentially gifting 
their market dominance to a foreign company that was instrumental in the enemy’s war 
effort. The transaction was deficient because Farben had used their relationship with the 
German army to influence negotiations, such that the transaction was undertaken “in 
utter disregard of the rights and wishes of the owner.”229 Representatives of IG Farben 
were thus convicted of pillage for their role in the deal. There are, therefore, a range of 
circumstances through which businesses acquiring natural resources during war do so 
without the consent of the rightful owner. A more intricate understanding of how these 
principles function in a specific context will nonetheless require a closer understand-
ing of the domestic law governing the allocation of the natural resources in the country 
at war.
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XI. The Mental Element 
 of Pillage
108. Intent differentiates liability for the pillage of natural resources within a con-
flict zone from the unwitting participation in the trade of stolen conflict commodities. 
Unfortunately, the Geneva Conventions themselves are unhelpful in defining the men-
tal element required to perpetrate the offense—the Conventions merely stipulate that 
“pillage is prohibited.”230 The requisite mental elements may therefore vary depend-
ing on the jurisdiction that prosecutes pillage. This reality requires a careful study of 
the applicable standards within the criminal code, legislative act or statute applicable 
within the jurisdiction that will hear the charges. As a general rule, however, at least 
two graduated degrees of intention—direct and indirect intent—are possible. As the 
Martic´ Trial Judgment ruled, “with respect to the mens rea of this crime, the unlawful 
appropriation of the property must have been perpetrated with either direct or indirect 
intent.”231 In the context of pillage, direct intent refers to a situation where an accused 
acquires natural resources with the purpose of unlawfully depriving the owner of the 
property, whereas indirect intent implies a lower degree of intent approximately equiva-
lent to recklessness in certain common law jurisdictions and dolus eventualis in civil law 
systems. This chapter explores these alternatives in greater detail, providing examples 
of both that might guide future pillage cases.
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Direct Intent
109. In all jurisdictions that criminalize pillage, direct intent will suffice to prove 
the offense. The “direct” intention to perpetrate pillage requires that a business rep-
resentative purposefully acquires natural resources knowing that the owner does not 
consent. Hermann Roechling’s conviction for the pillage of iron ore from mines in east-
ern France typifies this standard. Roechling was the president of the board of a family 
company, which owned three subsidiaries in the iron, steel, and coal industries.232 After 
the German invasion of France, Roechling was appointment as general plenipotentiary 
for the region, which handed him exclusive administrative authority over mines located 
within the territory. Roechling promptly seized steel plants at Moselle and Meurthe-et-
Moselle that yielded 9 million tons of liquid steel per annum “without furnishing to the 
real owners a proper inventory.”233 In convicting Roechling of pillage, the French Tribu-
nal found that in March 1944 German authorities operating in the region celebrated the 
mining of 100 million tons of ore from pits located in eastern France alone.234 Clearly, 
Reochling’s purpose was to acquire natural resources while knowing that the property 
he acquired was obtained without the true owner’s approval. In the words of the tribu-
nal itself, “[t]he act committed by him constitutes, especially in this case, a robbery.”235 
The corporate appropriation of natural resources based on the authority of a foreign 
government or domestic rebel factions will frequently satisfy this same standard.   
110. Many national criminal jurisdictions also distinguish a marginally lower standard 
of direct intent, where the perpetrator does not want to acquire property unlawfully but 
is nonetheless aware that this is a virtually certain consequence under the prevailing 
circumstances.236 In many jurisdictions, this is known as oblique intention. Again, the 
example of the company ROGES from the World War Two jurisprudence illustrates the 
application of this principle to the corporate pillage of natural resources.237 To recall, 
ROGES was created by the German Army High Command together with other Nazi 
authorities.238 The company was tasked with acquiring property from German military 
and economic agencies, then on-selling the property to German industries. The Krupp 
firm purchased two categories of property from ROGES—illegally seized property 
known as “booty goods” and so-called “purchased goods” that the German economic 
agencies were compelled to purchase from vendors on the black market.239 The tribunal 
found that Krupp “received wares and goods of all kinds from ROGES,” particularly 
large quantities of scrap steel. 
111. The tribunal was also satisfied that the Krupp directors received clear indicators 
that the Booty Goods were in fact stolen property. According to the tribunal, the pur-
chased goods were delivered to the Krupp firm with an attached invoice reflecting the 
price ROGES had paid for the property, whereas stolen booty goods were simply sent to 
Krupp without an invoice or any other indication of price.240 In reimbursing ROGES for 
its “commerce,” Krupp would immediately repay the amount indicated on the invoices 
for purchased goods, whereas the two companies would negotiate a nominal price for 
booty goods some considerable time after Krupp received the property. From the dispar-
ity in these accounting procedures, the tribunal deduced that “the Krupp firm knew the 
source of these goods purchased from ROGES and that certain of these items such as 
machines and materials were confiscated in the occupied territories and were so-called 
booty goods.”241 Six representatives of the firm were convicted of pillaging the booty 
goods as a consequence. 
112. The same principles will apply to companies operating in modern conflicts, 
where correspondence from military groups selling natural resources, transportation 
records, the origins of certain types of resources and other relevant evidence also render 
the illicit origins of the commodities virtually certain. 
Indirect Intent–Probably Stolen
113. Commercial actors are also guilty of pillage in a number of jurisdictions based on 
what international courts often refer to as an indirect standard of intent. As previously 
mentioned, indirect intent involves taking impermissibly high risks, which national 
legal systems describe as recklessness or dolus eventualis. Some but not all criminal 
jurisdictions will allow liability for pillaging natural resources based on an indirect stan-
dard of intent. Ad hoc international criminal tribunals, for instance, have consistently 
affirmed that pillage can be perpetrated with only indirect intent. As mentioned earlier, 
the Martic´ Trial Judgment and other international jurisprudence have clearly found that 
pillage may be perpetrated “with either direct or indirect intent.”242 These findings are 
especially important for other courts, because they purport to represent the current 
state of customary international law on the issue. Nonetheless, there remains some 
doubt whether the ICC Statutes are equally broad.243 This inconsistency is also true 
at a domestic level. In some, indirect intent will suffice to prove pillage—a number of 
common law jurisdictions adopt a rule that, in the absence of specific language defin-
ing the mens rea requirement for a crime (as is the case with pillage), intent should be 
interpreted as at least implying recklessness.244 Similarly, in continental European juris-
dictions, case-law extends the concept of dolus eventualis to all offenses, which would 
logically extend to pillage.245 Yet, other national jurisdictions may insist that only direct 
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intent suffices.246 For the benefit of those jurisdictions where indirect intent might 
suffice to prove pillage, this section provides a general overview of indirect intent stan-
dards, then explores how these standards might apply to commercial actors pillaging 
natural resources.
114. Indirect intent encompasses different concepts in different jurisdictions, but 
knowledge that natural resources are probably stolen provides helpful general guid-
ance. In many common law jurisdictions, recklessness means “consciously disregarding 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result”.247 
In continental European jurisdictions, the concept of dolus eventualis demands that 
the perpetrator perceive the occurrence of the criminal result as possible, and that he 
or she at least makes peace with this possibility.248 In a bid to harmonize these dif-
ferences, ad hoc international criminal tribunals refer to indirect intent as requiring 
proof of “awareness of a substantial likelihood” or “knowledge that the offense was a 
probable consequence of the act or omission.”249 Conveniently, this latter description 
aligns with definitions of intention attributed to theft in the U.S. Model Penal Code. The 
Model Penal Code stipulates that theft is perpetrated when a person “purposely receives, 
retains, or disposes of moveable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, 
or believing that it has probably been stolen…”250 On this basis, the rest of this manual 
employs the phrase “probably stolen” for ease of reference in describing indirect intent, 
conscious that the actual legal test will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
115. A range of evidence can be used to establish that a company acquired natural 
resources from a war zone knowing that they were probably stolen. Although the type 
of proof necessary will very much depend on the circumstances of each case, several 
indicators are especially common. Payment of a price well below market rates is a 
primary factor in establishing knowledge that property is stolen within domestic legal 
systems.251 At Nuremberg, six representatives of the firm Krupp were convicted of pil-
lage for purchasing machinery in occupied France for “a ridiculously low price.”252 The 
principles underlying the conviction parallel events in certain contemporary resource 
wars, where companies purchase minerals from warring factions at prices well below 
market rates available elsewhere.253  
116. In other situations, the clandestine nature of certain mineral transactions also 
serves as an indicator that natural resources acquired from a conflict zone were prob-
ably illicitly acquired.  For example, purchasing conflict commodities like diamonds 
from known arms traffickers or a warlord under a shroud of secrecy could suggest 
that the purchasers knew that the property was probably stolen. In the same vein, 
unheeded warnings from reputable authorities that property stems from illicit sources 
can also evidence the requisite degree of knowledge. A company that continues to 
source natural resources from a warring faction, even once informed of the origins of 
their merchandise by investigators, public authorities, NGOs or other credible sources, 
is therefore aware that their resources are probably 
stolen. Depending on the circumstances, other types 
of evidence such as transportation logs, commercial 
contracts, and testimony from customs officials might 
also be useful in demonstrating the applicable mental 
element.
117. A case from World War Two highlights the 
application of these principles in practice. In the Min-
istries case, the managing director and vice president 
of the Reich Bank, Emil Puhl, was found guilty of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity for the receipt of 
property taken by the SS from victims at concentration 
camps.254 The tribunal rejected Puhl’s claim that he 
had not realized the nefarious origins of the property 
housed within the bank, highlighting the extraordinary 
nature of the transactions through which the bank came upon the goods, the secrecy 
associated with the transactions, and dissent amongst colleagues employed within the 
bank.255 According to the tribunal, “that this was not looked upon as an ordinary transac-
tion within the scope of its corporate purposes or official functions by the Reich Bank 
officials, including Puhl, is evidenced by the extreme secrecy with which the transaction 
was handled, the fact that the account was credited in the first instance to a fictitious 
name, Max Heiliger, and the contemporaneous misgivings expressed by officials and 
employees of the bank at the time.”256 On this same basis, the purchaser of conflict 
commodities in modern resource wars might be deemed to have known that the prop-
erty was probably stolen where the transaction was carried out in secrecy with warring 
parties when others have publicly denounced the trade.
Intention and Usufruct
118. In earlier sections, we concluded that the doctrine of usufruct in the laws of war 
allows an occupying army or rebel group to exploit state-owned immoveable natural 
resources without the owner’s consent, provided that the proceeds of the transaction are 
used to meet the humanitarian needs of the local population.257 This conclusion modi-
“With respect to the mens 
rea of this crime, the 
unlawful appropriation of 
the property must have 
been perpetrated with 
either direct or indirect 
intent.” 
Martic´ Trial Judgment, 
para. 104.
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fies slightly the means of proving the mental elements for pillage. This section briefly 
explains this variation, in order to avoid confusion about how usufruct intersects with 
intention. As the following paragraphs explain, in situations where usufruct applies, 
the focus shifts from whether companies acquired natural resources aware of the cer-
tainty, virtual certainty, or probability that the resources were acquired without the own-
er’s consent, to whether they were aware that the requirements of usufruct were not 
satisfied.
119. This chapter has shown that different jurisdictions adopt different mental ele-
ments for pillage, depending on the extent to which they embrace direct and indirect 
standards of intent.258 In the context of pillage, these mental elements modulate the 
degree of awareness an individual must possess in order to merit blame for pillaging 
natural resources. As we have seen, each of the three standards (awareness with cer-
tainty, awareness of a virtual certainty, and awareness of the probability) relate to the 
illegality of the underlying resource transaction.259 In most circumstances, this illegality 
is proved where the businessperson is aware that the resources in question are acquired 
without the owner’s consent. As the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg declared “[w]
e deem it to be of the essence of the crime of plunder or spoliation that the owner be 
deprived of his property involuntarily and against his will.”260 Nonetheless, because 
usufruct acts as an exception to the need for consent, establishing intent in this scenario 
requires proof of an awareness that the exploitation in question did not comply with the 
law of usufruct.
120. The first means of establishing this awareness is to show that the exploitation 
was not “carried out for the benefit of the local population.”261 Earlier in this manual, 
we concluded that a range of factors are capable of proving this standard, including 
situations where (a) the occupier uses proceeds from the sale to purchase weapons or to 
finance the war effort more broadly; (b) where proceeds from resource rents only benefit 
military or political élites; or (c) when the proceeds from illicit resource transactions are 
repatriated to a foreign country or region beyond the occupied territory.262 The second 
means of establishing this awareness, also articulated earlier, arises where the occupy-
ing army exploits resources at a rate that exceeds that “done in pre-occupation days.”263 
In cases where occupying armies of rebel groups exploit state-owned immovable natural 
resources from territories they control, the emphasis in pillage prosecutions will there-
fore shift to showing the business representative was aware of these elements, which 
render the transaction illegal.
Further Reading
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XII. The Criminal Responsibility 
 of Corporations and 
 Their Representatives
Individual Criminal Responsibility of Business 
Representatives
121. The traditional means of prosecuting corporate criminality involves indicting 
representatives of a company in an individual capacity for crimes perpetrated during the 
course of business. As early as 1701, a British court dismissed the corporate structure as 
irrelevant in criminal trials of business representatives, declaring that “a corporation is 
not indictable, but its individual members are.”264 This reasoning continues to govern 
white-collar crime in common law jurisdictions, where individual business representa-
tives are frequently prosecuted for offenses like insider trading, tax evasion, and fraud. 
Civil law states adopt the same approach. In Germany, for instance, the absence of 
criminal liability of the corporate entity itself requires public prosecutors to “find out 
individual allegations against single employees of the company and to accuse these 
employees individually.”265 Other jurisdictions, such as France, have codified provi-
sions within the Criminal Code that formally stipulate that “the criminal responsibility 
of the corporate entity does not exclude that of natural persons who are perpetrators or 
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accomplices to the same act”266 In all of these different systems, criminal courts are 
perfectly capable of prosecuting business representatives for pillage perpetrated during 
the course of commercial activities in a conflict zone. This chapter explains the legal 
basis for and precedents supporting this form of individual criminal liability. 
122. The individual liability of corporate representatives for war crimes such as pillage 
is premised on the idea that civilians can be prosecuted for violations of the international 
laws applicable during war. The liability of civilians for war crimes was made clear after 
World War Two, when the Nuremberg Tribunal stated 
that “[i]nternational law… binds every citizen just as 
does ordinary municipal law. Acts adjudged criminal 
when done by an officer of the Government are crimi-
nal also when done by a private individual.”267 The 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Proto-
col II signed several decades later contributed to the 
notion that the laws of war bind civilians by creat-
ing norms that bind rebel groups, even though these 
groups almost never negotiate or endorse the relevant 
treaties. Broad consensus has thus emerged that the 
laws of war bind individuals even though they are not 
party to the relevant international law treaties. As a 
reflection of this consensus, numerous domestic mili-
tary manuals now accept that “acts constituting war 
crimes may be committed by combatants, noncomba-
tants, or civilians.”268 
123. A host of jurisprude nce has ratified this the-
ory by convicting civilians of war crimes in practice. 
In the Essen Lynching case, for instance, three German 
civilians were convicted of murder as a war crime for their role in intercepting then kill-
ing captured British airmen. The civilians, who formed part of a local crowd that inter-
vened when the airmen were transported to a Luffewaffe base for interrogation, were 
held criminally responsible for their part in throwing the captives from a bridge and 
then firing upon the survivors.269 In the Hadamar trial, civilian personnel of a medical 
institution located in Hadamar, Germany, were found guilty of the same offense for 
administering lethal injections to over four hundred Russian and Polish nationals admit-
ted to their sanitarium.270 The convicted perpetrators included a chief administrative 
officer, the institution’s bookkeeper, and a telephone switchboard operator.271 Elsewhere, 
civilian judges and prosecutors were convicted of murder as a war crime for their role in 
“[r]esponsibility does not 
automatically attach to an 
act proved to be criminal 
merely by virtue of a 
defendant’s membership 
in the Vorstand [Company 
Board]. Conversely, 
one may not utilize the 
corporate structure to 
achieve an immunity from 
criminal responsibility 
for illegal acts which he 
directs, counsels, aids, 
orders, or abets.” 
IG Farben Case, p. 1153.
sham trials engineered to give the unlawful executions of prisoners the semblance of 
legality.272 
124. In a World War Two case of particular relevance, members of a German family 
were convicted of pillage for retaining illegally-acquired property from a deported civil-
ian’s farm.273 In commenting on the this t rial, the United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission described the verdict as “confirmation of the principle that laws and customs 
of war are applicable not only to military personnel, combatants acting as members of 
occupying authorities, or, generally speaking, to organs of the State and other public 
authorities, but also to any civilian who violates these laws and customs.”274 A much 
wider body of precedent also holds civil administrators, politicians, concentration camp 
inmates and other civilians liable for war crimes.275 As one modern international crimi-
nal tribunal has found, “the laws of war must apply equally to civilians as to combatants 
in the conventional sense.”276 On this basis, courts in Be lgium and Switzerland have 
convicted civilians of war crimes in recent years.277
125. A vast body of jurisprudence confirms that this reasoning is equally applicable to 
individual corporate representatives acting in a commercial capacity. After World War 
Two, the Nuremberg Judgment’s conclusion that crimes against international law “are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities,” was deployed to ensure that the corpo-
rate structure did not shield business representatives from individual criminal liability. 
As we have noted earlier in this manual, the IG Farben Judgment stipulated that “respon-
sibility does not automatically attach to an act proved to be criminal merely by virtue 
of a defendant’s membership in the Vorstand [Board]. Conversely, one may not utilize 
the corporate structure to achieve an immunity from criminal responsibility for illegal 
acts which he directs, counsels, aids, orders, or abets.”278 On the basis of this statement 
and the practice reviewed, there is little doubt that the traditional approach to prosecut-
ing commercial actors for international crimes involves dispensing with the corporate 
entity and assessing whether individual business representatives satisfy require-
ments for regular modes of liability such as aiding and abetting, instigating or direct 
perpetration.
126. A number of courts, both historical and contemporary, have convicted individual 
businessmen for various war crimes in accordance with this approach. Soon after the 
close of hostilities in World War Two, two businessmen were convicted for murder as a 
result of commercial transactions involving the supply of the industrial chemical Zyklon 
B to the Nazi’s, cognizant that the merchandise was destined to asphyxiate civilians in 
gas chambers.279 In concluding its review of this case, the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission again described the affair as “a clear example of the application of the rule 
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that the provisions of the laws and customs of war are addressed not only to combat-
ants and to members of state and other public authorities, but to anybody who is in a 
position to assist in their violation.”280 
127. In more recent years, Dutch courts have also prosecuted businessmen for war 
crimes.281 In one of these cases, a Du tch businessman named Frans Van Anraat was 
convicted of inhuman treatment as a war crime for commercial transactions that 
involved the sale of chemicals ultimately subjected upon Iraqi Kurds.282 The court held 
Van Anraat personally responsible for transactions performed through intermediary 
firms in which he was a leading figure. These subsidiaries supplied a total of 1,400 
metric tons of a vital chemical precursor to the then government of the Republic of Iraq 
knowing that the chemicals would used as mustard gas during the ongoing hostilities 
against Iran.283 In sentencing Van Anraat to 17 years imprisonment for his complicity 
in the war crimes that ensued, the appellate court cautioned that “[p]eople or companies 
that conduct (international) trade, for example in weapons or raw materials used for 
their production, should be warned that—if they do not exercise increased vigilance—
they can become involved in most serious criminal offences.”284  
128. Modern international criminal courts have also convicted businesspeople for 
these most serious international crimes. Before the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, members of the commercial radio station Radio Station Milles Collines were 
charged and convicted of incitement to genocide even though their calls for bloodshed 
were made during their employment with a commercial broadcasting facility.285 Simi-
larly, the tribunal also convicted a tea factory director of genocide for failing to prevent 
or punish acts of genocide perpetrated by his employees.286 Although these judgments 
relate more to genocide than war crimes, they demonstrate the probable stance of courts 
when called to adjudicate international offenses perpetrated by individuals acting in 
commercial capacities. This same stance was evident from language adopted by an 
internationalized court operating under UN mandate in Kosovo, which completed a 
review of the principles governing the issue by stating that “not only military personnel, 
members of government, party officials or administrators may be held liable for war 
crimes, but also industrialists and businessmen, judges and prosecutors…”287 In short, 
business representatives, like other civilians, can be convicted of war crimes.
129. Commercial actors engaged in the pillage of natural resources are prone to crimi-
nal sanction on this same legal basis. As previously noted, the IG Farben Judgment 
defined pillage as “[w]here private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to 
exploit the military occupancy by acquiring private property against the will and consent 
of the former owner.”288 In a classic illustration of the application of these standards to 
corporate representatives for acts of pillage in which they personally participated, the 
director of the Dresden Bank, Karl Rasche, was found guilty of pillage in a personal 
capacity for his role in the transfers of Jewish property to German interests. According 
to the court, Rasche was criminally culpable because the confiscations concerned were 
“carried out under the control of the Dresdner Bank, whose policies in these respects 
reflected the attitude and purposes of defendant Rasche.”289 
130. The focus on assessing the individual responsibility of business representatives 
evidenced in the Rasche trial also leads to the differentiated liability of company employ-
ees depending on their implication in specific transactions. In the IG Farben case, 
Georg Von Schitzler was convicted of plunder for his role in the company’s exploitive 
practices in France and Poland but discharged of responsibility for similar corporate 
practices in Norway and Alsace-Lorraine.290 As justification for the partial acquittal, the 
tribunal recalled that “[r]esponsibility does not automatically attach to an act proved to 
be criminal merely by virtue of a defendant’s membership in the Vorstand [Board].”291 
On the other hand, perpetrating, aiding, and abetting or instigating pillage of natural 
resources renders individual business representatives guilty of a war crime.
Corporate Criminal Responsibility
131. While the concept of corporate criminal liability was discussed during the nego-
tiation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, states ultimately rejected the 
proposal to include corporate criminal liability within the court’s jurisdiction.292 A large 
number of domestic criminal courts, however, have jurisdiction over war crimes perpe-
trated by companies even if the International Criminal Court does not. The domestic 
capacity to try corporate entities for criminal offenses was initially unique to Anglo-
American legal systems, but other jurisdictions have gradually adopted laws permit-
ting corporate criminal liability in the past decades. As a reflection of the growth, two 
contemporary surveys of a limited number of national jurisdictions reveal that over 
two dozen states in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australasia have promulgated laws 
permitting the prosecution of corporate entities.293 This chapter explores the legal basis 
upon which these criminal courts can assert jurisdiction over acts of pillage perpetrated 
by corporate entities, and highlights the circumstances under which a corporation will 
be attributed criminal blame for the offense.
132. Domestic legal systems adopt a number of different legislative techniques to 
ensure that corporations might be prosecuted for violations of international criminal 
law. Legal systems that favor the codification of a comprehensive criminal code often 
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dedicate a provision to corporate criminal liability among the preliminary provisions of 
their code, before proceeding to prohibit war crimes elsewhere within the same legal 
instrument. In Australia, for example, the Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code 
of 1995 initially states that “[t]his Code applies to bodies corporate in the same way as 
it applies to individuals,”294 then later lists and defines pillage as a domestic criminal 
offense.295 By implication, Australian courts can convict corporate entities of pillag
133. In other countries, an interpretative act enables prosecutors to charge companies 
with war crimes that are defined in separate legislation. Section 35 of the Canadian 
Interpretation Act, for example, states that “[i]n every enactment … ‘person’, or any 
word or expression descriptive of a person, includes a corporation.”296 Consequently, 
the statement within the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act 
that every “person” who commits a war crime is guilty of an indictable offense must 
be read as including companies.297 British courts, likewise, will enjoy jurisdiction over 
corporate entities responsible for pillage based on a strikingly similar legislation.298 In 
the same vein, U.S. federal courts are also capable of prosecuting corporate entities for 
pillage, because the terms of the Dictionary Act of 2000 compel an interpretation of 
the American War Crimes Act of 1996 as conferring jurisdiction over corporate entities 
for war crimes.299 
134. Customary international law does not affect these domestic laws. In recent 
months, a United States Court of Appeal rendered an opinion concluding that compa-
nies could not be sued pursuant to the American Alien Tort Statute for “violations of 
the laws of nations,” on the grounds that “the concept of corporate liability for violations 
of customary international law has not achieved universal recognition or acceptance 
as a norm in the relations of States with each other.”300 This conclusion is certainly 
controversial, but the controversy does not affect the ability of states to try corpora-
tions in accordance with the rules of domestic criminal legislation set out above. Most 
importantly, a state is perfectly free to define its criminal law governing corporations in 
terms that extend beyond the scope of customary international law, and states frequently 
exercise this right when passing legislation implementing international crimes.301 Con-
sequently, customary international law has no bearing on the legislation set out in the 
preceding paragraphs. As the majority in the US Appeals Court rightly recognized, 
“[n]or does anything in this opinion limit or foreclose criminal, administrative, or civil 
actions against any corporation under a body of law other than customary international 
law—for example the domestic laws of any State.”302 Prosecutors, judges, and other 
officials are therefore entitled to interrogate their own national legislation in assessing 
the viability of prosecuting companies for pillage.
135. Courts adopt different standards for determining when a corporation is guilty 
of a criminal offense, each of which relies on a different theory of blame attribution. 
These different means of attributing criminal responsibility to a company fall into three 
broad categories. The first holds companies vicariously liable for criminal offenses per-
petrated by company employees “within the scope of 
his employment and with intent to benefit the cor-
poration.” This theory, which is frequently described 
by reference to the latin phrase respondeat superior, 
holds the corporate entity vicariously liable for their 
employees’ criminal offenses perpetrated in the course 
of business. Companies might therefore be convicted 
for the pillage of natural resources in conflict zones in 
jurisdictions that adopt respondeat superior, provided at 
least one of their employees is implicated in the pil-
lage of conflict commodities.  These countries include 
Austria, South Africa, and the United States.  
136. Other jurisdictions have opted for a more 
restrictive model of corporate criminal responsibil-
ity that only holds a corporate entity criminally liable 
when a senior member of the company’s management 
is responsible for the offense. In this model of cor-
porate criminal liability, only crimes perpetrated by 
senior management make the company criminal liabil-
ity. In 1971, the British House of Lords affirmed this 
so-called identification model on the grounds that only 
sufficiently senior employees could constitute the cor-
poration’s “directing mind and will.”303 In more recent 
years, legislation within Canada has also endorsed the 
identification model of corporate criminal liability. 
According to the amended Canadian Criminal Code, an organization is a party to the 
offense requiring a specific intent if one of its “senior officers” is a party to an offense, 
directs subordinates to commit an offense, or fails to intervene when cognizant of an 
impending violation. The overarching condition that the senior officer’s conduct must 
by motivated “at least in part to benefit the organization,” will generally describe the cor-
porate pillage of natural resources during war, which is almost invariably characterized 
by the illegal acquisition of natural resources for corporate profit.  Canadian and British 
courts might thus hear allegations of corporate liability for pillage where evidence sug-
gests that senior management illegally acquired resource wealth from conflict zones.
 
“Companies convicted 
of criminal offences are 
vulnerable to a range 
of important sanctions 
including pecuniary fines, 
‘imprisonment’ through 
court orders requiring 
the company to suspend 
business, or compulsory 
compliance regimes 
supervised by court-
appointed managers. 
Courts can even issue a 
kind of corporate death 
penalty by requiring that 
a company be dissolved 
permanently.”
Celia Wells, Corporations 
and Criminal Responsibility, 
p. 37.
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137. The third and final method of attributing criminal liability to companies focuses 
on failures in corporate culture. In certain jurisdictions, corporate entities operating 
during armed violence can be convicted of pillage for their failure to create a corporate 
policy that prevents the offense. In Australia, for instance, criminal courts can convict 
companies of offenses for a body-corporate’s failure “to create and maintain a corporate 
culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.”304 Likewise, according 
to the terms of the Swiss Penal Code, a corporation can be criminally responsible inde-
pendently of the criminal liability of its employees “if the corporation can be said to 
have not taken all reasonable and necessary organizational measures to prevent such 
a breach.”305 While a rigorous analysis of whether these provisions couple with war 
crimes will be essential in each particular jurisdiction, there are strong possibilities that 
companies could be convicted of pillaging natural resources based on these standards. 
The failure to instill a culture of respect for property rights in natural resources while 
mining within a foreign conflict zone might thus give rise to corporate criminal liabil-
ity, especially where the company culture is entirely indifferent to the origins of these 
natural resources.
138. Corporate criminal liability and the individual criminal liability of business repre-
sentatives should function in tandem. A number of experts agree that “a dual focus on 
the firm and the individual is necessary. Neither can be safely ignored.”306 This seems 
especially true in the context of liability for pillaging natural resources. On the one 
hand, a range of factors militate in favor of prosecuting corporations—corporations are 
better placed than state authorities to detect, prevent and sanction the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources undertaken by their employees in foreign conflict zones, are often 
too large to locate a specific representative who appropriated resources with the culpable 
mental element, and are frequently more able to pay reparations to victims upon con-
viction.307 On the other, prosecuting individual business representatives is also vital in 
certain circumstances. For example, smaller firms involved in trafficking conflict com-
modities are frequently dissolved after each illicit transaction as a means of subterfuge, 
leaving individual criminal responsibility as the only feasible means of redress. There 
is also broad recognition that only individual criminal liability is likely to create a disin-
centive that transcends the pressures of corporate culture,308 which seems particularly 
important within the extractive industry. Thus, the dual use of corporate and individual 
criminal liability will allow prosecutors to tailor their case to the circumstances and, as 
the subsequent section shows, expands the number of jurisdictions capable of trying 
the offense.
Further Reading
Anita Ramastray and Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict, Legal Rem-
edies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law: A Survey of 
16 Countries, (2006) http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf. 
Megan Donaldson and Rupert Watters, “Corporate Culture” as a Basis for the Criminal 
Liability of Corporations,  Prepared by Allens Arthur Robinson for the United Nations 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Business, (Feb. 
2008) http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-
Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf.
Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities (Albin Eser et al. eds., 1999).
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XIII. Jurisdiction
Active Personality—Jurisdiction Based on Nationality
139. The first and most compelling basis for prosecuting commercial actors for the 
pillage of natural resources involves state prosecutors bringing charges against their 
own companies or business representatives. The so called “nationality” or “active per-
sonality” principle entitles states to assert criminal jurisdiction over offenses perpetrated 
by their nationals overseas. The concept extends to companies registered within a state’s 
jurisdiction as well as individual citizens operating abroad. In common law jurisdic-
tions, war crimes are widely recognized as one of this limited category of offenses that 
warrant extra-territorial application. In the United Kingdom, for instance, active person-
ality attaches to a limited series of explicitly defined offenses including war crimes.309 
British courts, therefore, have a strong claim to jurisdiction over corporate entities 
alleged to have pillaged natural resources in conflict zones. While the United States has 
also adopted active personality in relation to only a limited range of criminal offenses, 
the U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996 also includes provisions that confer criminal jurisdic-
tion on U.S. federal courts over pillage perpetrated by “a national of the United States,” 
regardless of whether the offense occurred “inside or outside the United States.”310 The 
act thus furnishes federal courts with jurisdiction over both American companies and 
citizens alleged to have perpetrated pillage in foreign conflicts.
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140. In the vast majority of civil law systems, active personality is a general principle 
of criminal jurisdiction governing even minor criminal infractions. Thus in Spain, for 
example, acts considered by Spanish criminal law to be crimes are susceptible to pros-
ecution before local courts, “even if they are committed outside the national territory.”311 
The active personality pri nciple has gained such a strong foothold within continental 
legal traditions that the Swedish Supreme Court has even upheld convictions for viola-
tions of the Swedish traffic code committed on foreign roads.312 These principles have 
profound implications for a state’s ability to investigate and prosecute acts of pillage 
perpetrated by companies and their representatives. 
141. Other states are also capable of investigating and charging companies and their 
representatives for pillage based on active personality jurisdiction. A recent survey of a 
portion of criminal jurisdictions reveals that the vast majority of states surveyed extend 
domestic criminal jurisdiction to crimes of nationals committed overseas.313 These 
states include countries as diverse as Argentina, Japan, and South Africa. To provide 
one illustration, Russian courts could have exercised jurisdiction over the infamous 
Russian arms smuggler Viktor Bout for what a UN panel of experts described as a lead-
ing role in the transportation of illegally acquired natural resources from theaters of 
war to Western markets.314 There are thus established jurisdictional grounds that allow 
foreign courts to adjudicate allegations of pillage when law enforcement mechanisms 
within war-torn societies are no longer functioning adequately. These jurisdictional 
bases, which will vary according to the country concerned, can generally be identified 
in criminal codes or specific legislation governing international crimes.
Further Reading
Ilias Bantekas and Susan Nash, International Criminal Law (Cavendish, 2nd e., 2003), 
p. 152 . 
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge, 7th 
ed., 1997), p. 111.
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford, 2003), pp 281–282.
Universal Jurisdiction
142. Universal jurisdiction provides another basis upon which states can investigate 
and prosecute corporations or their representatives for pillaging natural resources. The 
often controversial notion of universal jurisdiction has developed based on the idea 
that certain offenses are sufficiently grave that all states can assert criminal jurisdiction 
over the perpetrators regardless of where the offenses took place or the nationality of 
the respective participants. War crimes clearly meet the requisite degree of gravity. As 
a Swiss Military Court found when exercising universal jurisdiction over a Rwandan 
mayor accused of war crimes, “given their qualification as war crimes, these infractions 
are intrinsically very serious.”315 War crimes are also widely regarded as peremptory in 
character and thus enjoy a higher rank in the international hierarchy of norms than 
treaty law or even ordinary customary rules. The Kupreškic´ Trial Judgment affirmed this 
proposition in declaring that “most norms of international humanitarian law, in par-
ticular those prohibiting war crimes,  crimes against humanity and genocide, are also 
peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens, i.e. of a non-derogable and overrid-
ing character.”316 On the strength of a comprehensive synthesis of state practice on the 
subject, the International Committee of the Red Cross has also concluded that “[s]tates 
have the right to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war crimes.”317 
143. There are at least two different variations of universal jurisdiction. One group of 
states has enacted a more restrained form of universality that requires the presence of 
the accused within the state’s territory before jurisdiction can be asserted. In Canada, 
the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act provides that any person who has 
committed a war crime within or outside Canada may be prosecuted on the condition 
that the accused is present in Canada after the offense was committed.318 This jurisdic-
tional principle may allow the investigation and prosecution of foreign companies or 
their representatives who, aside from operating in war zones, also maintain offices or 
carry out commerce within Canadian borders. One might therefore anticipate a more 
frequent exercise of universal jurisdiction conditional upon the presence of the author 
within countries that enjoy this jurisdictional capacity in response to allegations of cor-
porate pillage, especially given the ever increasing mobility of commercial actors within 
a globalized market. 
144. Other states have enacted an unconditional or pure rendition of universal juris-
diction, which presents states with even greater possibilities for the judicial scrutiny 
of corporate pillage. These unconditional versions of universal jurisdiction formally 
disregard the requirement that the accused be present within the territory. The Ger-
man Code of Crimes against International Law states that “[t]his Act shall apply to 
all criminal offences against international law designated under this Act, to serious 
criminal offences designated therein even when the offence was committed abroad and 
bears no relation to Germany.”319 In declining to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by 
this article over acts of torture allegedly committed by Donald Rumsfeld and others in 
Afghanistan, Cuba, and Iraq, the German prosecutor general insisted that she retained a 
discretion not to proceed in cases committed abroad “if a perpetrator is neither present 
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in the country nor can be expected to be present.”320 Nonetheless, according to German 
criminal procedure, this discretion will not exist when the perpetrator is German or 
located within German territory.321 This not only covers German business representa-
tives operating abroad, it also has consequences for foreign businesses that operate 
within Germany. 
145. Other courts, particularly in Spain, have already proved willing to exercise uncon-
ditional universal jurisdiction over individuals for pillaging natural resources. In Febru-
ary 2008, a Spanish judge confirmed the indictment of several high ranking Rwandan 
military officials for a range of international crimes that included the pillage of natural 
resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.322 In particular, the court indicted 
the chief of staff of the Rwandan Army for the pillage of natural resources, ignoring that 
an official Belgian Parliamentary Commission indicated that the same Rwandan official 
habitually sold minerals to a series of companies jointly owned by a Swiss national.323 
As previous chapters of this manual demonstrate, there is little legal basis for distin-
guishing between the indicted Rwandan military leader who extracted the resources and 
the Swiss businessman who purchased the proceeds. Although changes to the Spanish 
law on universal jurisdiction now mean that this case will proceed on the basis that nine 
of the victims were Spanish, the case remains an important illustration of the potential 
of universal jurisdiction. It is plausible that universal jurisdiction could be employed 
to charge businesses and their representatives implicated in the illegal acquisition of 
natural resources from war zones.
Further Reading
Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2003). 
Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and The Prosecution Of Serious Crimes Under Inter-
national Law (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
The Jurisdiction of International Courts
146. The final series of courts capable of exercising jurisdiction over the pillage of nat-
ural resources are international. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for instance, could 
indict foreign corporate representatives involved in the pillage of diamonds during the 
Sierra Leonean wars. The same is true of other internationalized criminal tribunals, 
which serves as important cautions to commercial actors in contemporary conflicts, 
since each of these courts was established after the conflict was underway in order to 
enforce international criminal norms like pillage, which were perpetrated prior to the 
tribunals’ establishment. The creation of similar ad hoc bodies might thus create seri-
ous risks of criminal liability for companies implicated in the illicit trade of natural 
resources during war. 
147. The International Criminal Court, however, is the more likely venue for prosecu-
tion of corporate representatives in the pillage of natural resources. Unlike its various 
ad hoc predecessors, the International Criminal Court enjoys the ability to commence 
proceedings in a large number of states, either against nationals of states parties to 
the court’s statute or in relation to citizens of non-states parties who have perpetrated 
international crimes within the territory of a member state. In other words, the Interna-
tional Criminal Court has jurisdiction over Belgian and British nationals who perpetrate 
pillage in Iraq, but also over American or Chinese business representatives responsible 
for pillaging natural resources from the Congolese conflict and other situations within 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.324 
148. The ICC prosecutor appears to be aware of this potential. In a press release dated 
July 16, 2003, his office publicly acknowledged that “various reports have pointed to 
links between the activities of some African, European, and Middle Eastern companies 
and the atrocities taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo... Their activities 
allegedly include gold mining, the illegal exploitation of oil, and the arms trade.”325 The 
statement then cautioned that “[t]he Office of the Prosecutor is establishing whether 
investigations and prosecutions on the financial side of the alleged atrocities are being 
carried out in the relevant countries.”326 The warning was subsequently reissued in 
more striking terms during an address to the United Nations General Assembly several 
months later. During the address, the prosecutor personally reported that: 
[d]ifferent armed groups have taken advantage of the situation of generalised 
violence and have engaged in the illegal exploitation of key mineral resources 
such as cobalt, coltan, copper, diamonds and gold… Those who direct mining 
operations, sell diamonds or gold extracted in these conditions, launder the dirty 
money or provide weapons could also be authors of the crimes, even if they are 
based in other countries.327 
149. Statements of this sort not only identify the availability of a supranational juris-
diction capable of adjudicating acts of pillage perpetrated by business representatives, 
they also impart a degree of pressure on national courts to exercise other forms of 
jurisdiction over these offenses. To conclude this manual, we now turn to a range of 
other formal legal obligations that compel states to exercise jurisdiction over pillage.  
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XIV. The Obligation to Prosecute 
150. States not only enjoy jurisdiction over acts of pillage; there are also a range of 
obligations to investigate and prosecute appropriate cases. The obligations stem from 
a range of sources in both international law and domestic criminal law. Together, these 
legal duties create an overlapping network of pressures that are likely to affect a prosecu-
tor’s exercise of discretion when faced with allegations of commercial pillage. Moreover, 
they also create positive duties on states that may have implications for international 
institutions, political bodies, and government officials faced with these issues. In this 
chapter, we briefly outline several of these obligations.
151. The laws of war themselves create an obligation to investigate and prosecute acts 
of pillage. At the end of World War Two, signatories to the Geneva Conventions agreed 
to “search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, 
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before 
its own courts.”328 Although pillage is not technically a grave breach of the Geneva Con-
ventions, there is significant evidence that customary international law now extends the 
same duty to all war crimes. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross’ 
study of customary international humanitarian law concludes that states must “inves-
tigate war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals or armed forces, or on their 
territory, and, if appropriate, prosecute the suspects.”329 Given that both corporations 
and businesspeople are nationals of states, the obligation implies a duty to prosecute 
both entities for pillaging natural resources.
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152. The notion of “complementarity” in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court creates another legal incentive for domestic courts to investigate and prosecute 
acts of commercial pillage that fall within their jurisdiction. In simple terms, a case 
of commercial pillage will only be admissible before the ICC if national courts that 
enjoy jurisdiction are “unwilling” or “unable” to bring proceedings.330 In at least one 
recent instance, this rule has forced British courts to try their own soldiers for war 
crimes allegedly perpetrated in Iraq.331 Along with the prosecution of Dutch business 
representatives for war crimes before courts within the Netherlands in the past decade, 
the British trial suggests that the pressure of complementarity may have implications 
for allegations of commercial liability for pillage. This is especially true when the ICC 
prosecutor announces that “[t]hose who direct mining operations, sell diamonds or 
gold extracted in these conditions… could also be authors of the crimes, even if they are 
based in other countries.”332 This manual has provided guidance on the law necessary 
to achieve that possibility.
153. In other circumstances, resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Coun-
cil impart another layer of legal duty to prosecute specific allegations of commercial 
pillage. For instance, after a United Nations panel of experts alleged that a large number 
of predominantly Western companies had illegally exploited natural resources from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo between the years 2000 and 2003, the UN Security 
Council issued resolution 1457 urging all states to “conduct their own investigations, 
including as appropriate through judicial means.”333 Later, the council issued resolution 
1499 insisting that information should be provided to relevant governments to enable 
them to “take appropriate action according to their national laws and international 
obligations.”334 As a matter of international law, UN Security Council resolutions of this 
sort that are issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are formally binding on all 
member states of the United Nations. The war crime of pillage provides the substantive 
framework that enables states to comply with these obligations.
154. Certain domestic criminal jurisdictions also contain obligations for courts to 
hear allegations of pillage, primarily by restricting the scope of discretion open to 
prosecutors. In a number of civil law countries, for instance, a doctrine called partie 
civile enables victims or their representatives to bring charges directly before criminal 
courts.335 To cite one apt example, a group of nongovernmental organizations recently 
used partie civile to lodge a criminal complaint against the multinational timber 
company Dalhoff, Larsen, and Horneman for allegedly receiving stolen timber during 
the Liberian civil war.336 In an appropriate context, partie civile could also be used to 
initiate a criminal charge for pillaging natural resources. Similarly, the German doctrine 
of Legalitätsprinzip implies mandatory prosecution of all provable cases within the 
jurisdiction. Although there are numerous exceptions, this principle would appear to 
extend to business representatives from or resident in Germany.337 These domestic 
obligations to investigate and prosecute crimes compliment the international duties 
identified above. In unison, these obligations promote a resurgence of commercial 
liability for pillaging natural resources in the modern era. 
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 p
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 c
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 D
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 p
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 d
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 c
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 b
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 p
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at
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l p
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D
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 c
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 C
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l p
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 o
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 b
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 c
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 p
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D
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fic
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D
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 b
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r s
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 c
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 b
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 c
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t b
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s
M
ili
ta
ry
Bl
as
ki
c 
wa
s 
co
m
m
an
de
r o
f H
VO
 a
rm
ed
 fo
rc
es
 in
 c
en
tr
al
 
Bo
sn
ia
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
tim
e 
th
e 
ac
ts
 w
er
e 
co
m
m
itt
ed
. 
H
e 
wa
s 
ac
cu
se
d 
of
, i
n 
co
nc
er
t w
ith
 H
VO
, a
id
in
g 
an
d 
ab
et
tin
g 
in
 th
e 
pl
an
ni
ng
, p
re
pa
ra
tio
n 
or
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
of
 
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
 c
rim
es
 a
lle
ge
d 
(a
ga
in
st
 B
os
ni
an
 M
us
lim
s)
. 
M
on
ey
 a
nd
 je
we
ls
 w
er
e 
am
on
g 
ite
m
s 
st
ol
en
 fr
om
 
th
e 
liv
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
de
ad
. B
la
sk
ic
 w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
f t
he
 
pl
un
de
r o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
th
at
 h
e 
di
d 
no
t t
ak
e 
pr
ec
au
tio
ns
 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 c
rim
es
 th
at
 w
er
e 
re
as
on
ab
ly
 fo
re
se
ea
bl
e 
ou
tc
om
es
 o
f h
is
 o
rd
er
s.
 T
he
 d
ec
is
io
n 
wa
s 
up
he
ld
 o
n 
ap
pe
al
.
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ze
jn
il 
D
el
al
ic
, 
Zd
ra
vk
o 
M
uc
ic
, 
H
az
im
 D
el
ilc
, a
nd
 
Es
ad
 L
an
do
o
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
39
1–
39
4
D
el
al
ic
 e
t a
l
Bo
sn
ia
M
on
ey
, w
at
ch
es
, 
wa
lle
ts
, a
 s
ig
ne
d 
ch
eq
ue
, b
an
k 
ca
rd
, 
je
we
lle
ry
 (r
in
gs
, 
ch
ai
ns
, b
ra
ce
le
ts
) 
an
d 
ot
he
r v
al
ua
bl
es
M
ili
ta
ry
D
el
ic
 a
nd
 M
uc
ic
 w
er
e 
ch
ar
ge
d 
wi
th
 th
e 
pl
un
de
r o
f 
pr
iv
at
e 
pr
op
er
ty
 p
er
pe
tr
at
ed
 in
 a
 p
ris
on
 c
am
p,
 th
ro
ug
h 
bo
th
 d
ire
ct
 in
vo
lv
em
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
al
le
ge
d 
cr
im
es
 a
nd
 b
y 
vi
rt
ue
 o
f t
he
ir 
al
le
ge
d 
po
si
tio
ns
 a
s 
su
pe
rio
rs
. M
on
ey
, 
wa
tc
he
s,
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
be
lo
ng
in
g 
to
 p
er
so
ns
 
de
ta
in
ed
 in
 th
e 
pr
is
on
 c
am
p 
we
re
 s
to
le
n.
 T
he
 c
ha
rg
es
 
we
re
 d
is
m
is
se
d 
on
 ju
ris
di
ct
io
na
l g
ro
un
ds
 - 
it 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
th
at
 th
e 
th
ef
ts
 a
s 
al
le
ge
d 
in
 th
e 
In
di
ct
m
en
t w
er
e 
no
t s
er
io
us
 e
no
ug
h 
to
 g
iv
e 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l T
rib
un
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 fo
r p
ro
se
cu
tio
n.
 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
D
is
m
is
se
d 
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
54
5–
54
9
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
-
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
– 
M
ile
tic
i
Bo
sn
ia
Li
ve
st
oc
k,
 v
al
ua
bl
es
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f M
ile
tic
i w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 in
 A
pr
il 
19
93
. 
Th
e 
pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
al
le
ge
d 
th
at
 u
ni
ts
 s
ub
or
di
na
te
d 
to
 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
 p
lu
nd
er
ed
 p
ro
pe
rt
y, 
an
d 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
 fa
ile
d 
to
 ta
ke
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 a
nd
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 th
e 
ac
ts
 fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 o
r t
o 
pu
ni
sh
 th
e 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
. 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
D
is
m
is
se
d
C
as
e 
N
am
e
So
ur
ce
Pa
ge
 N
o.
In
ci
de
nt
 
N
am
e
Lo
ca
ti
on
Pr
op
er
ty
 T
yp
e
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r 
Ty
pe
In
ci
de
nt
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
C
iv
il 
or
 
C
ri
m
in
al
D
om
es
ti
c 
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
Ve
rd
ic
t
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
54
9–
55
6
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
-
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
–G
uc
a 
G
or
a
Bo
sn
ia
Cl
ot
hi
ng
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, 
fu
rn
itu
re
, 
je
we
llr
y, 
te
ch
ni
ca
l 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
fo
od
, 
bu
ild
in
g 
m
at
er
ia
ls
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f G
uc
a 
G
or
a 
wa
s 
at
ta
ck
ed
 in
 Ju
ne
 19
93
. 
In
di
ct
m
en
t a
lle
ge
s 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
kn
ew
 o
r h
ad
 re
as
on
 
to
 k
no
w 
th
at
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f u
ni
ts
 u
nd
er
 h
is
 c
on
tr
ol
 w
er
e 
ab
ou
t t
o 
co
m
m
it 
ac
ts
 o
f p
lu
nd
er
 o
r h
ad
 d
on
e 
so
, a
nd
 
th
at
 h
e 
fa
ile
d 
to
 ta
ke
 th
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
an
d 
re
as
on
ab
le
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 th
os
e 
ac
ts
 fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 c
om
m
itt
ed
 
or
 to
 p
un
is
h 
th
e 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
. C
ha
rg
es
 w
er
e 
di
sm
is
se
d 
af
te
r C
ha
m
be
r f
ou
nd
 th
at
 th
e 
ac
cu
se
d 
to
ok
 p
re
ve
nt
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
ct
s 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 
pu
ni
sh
 th
e 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
.
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
D
is
m
is
se
d
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
55
6–
56
2
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
-
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
–  
       
       
       
    
M
al
in
e
Bo
sn
ia
Ca
rs
, t
ra
ct
or
s,
 
tr
uc
ks
, a
 b
ic
yc
le
, 
fo
od
, t
ob
ac
co
, 
liv
es
to
ck
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
 
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f M
al
in
e 
wa
s 
at
ta
ck
ed
 in
 Ju
ne
 19
93
. T
he
 
ci
vi
lia
n 
po
pu
la
tio
n 
wa
s 
ev
ac
ua
te
d.
 S
om
e 
vi
lla
ge
rs
 
re
tu
rn
ed
 to
 p
re
ve
nt
 p
lu
nd
er
in
g,
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 w
itn
es
se
d 
up
on
 th
ei
r r
et
ur
n.
 T
he
 p
lu
nd
er
in
g 
wa
s 
do
ne
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
by
 A
Bi
H
 s
ol
di
er
s,
 b
ut
 a
ls
o 
by
 M
us
lim
 c
iv
ili
an
s 
fro
m
 a
 
ne
ig
hb
ou
rin
g 
vi
lla
ge
. H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
to
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 a
ct
s 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
s 
in
te
nd
ed
 to
 p
un
is
h 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
. K
ub
ur
a 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
no
t t
o 
ha
ve
 h
ad
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r t
he
 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
 o
f t
he
 c
rim
es
 c
om
m
itt
ed
 in
 M
al
in
e.
 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t
D
is
m
is
se
d
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
56
2–
56
8
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
-
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
–C
uk
le
Bo
sn
ia
Tr
ac
to
rs
, l
iv
es
to
ck
, 
fu
rn
itu
re
, 
ho
us
eh
ou
ld
 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, 
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f C
uk
le
 w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 in
 Ju
ne
 19
93
. A
fte
r a
 
br
ea
ch
 o
f t
he
 d
ef
en
si
ve
 li
ne
, H
VO
 u
ni
ts
 a
nd
 c
iv
ili
an
s 
wi
th
dr
ew
. P
lu
nd
er
in
g 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 in
 s
to
re
s 
an
d 
ho
m
es
 in
 
th
e 
em
pt
y 
vi
lla
ge
. H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
to
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 d
ea
l w
ith
 a
ct
s 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
s 
in
te
nd
ed
 to
 p
un
is
h 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
.
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t
D
is
m
is
se
d 
(H
ad
zi
ha
-
sa
no
vi
c)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
56
8–
58
1
H
ad
zi
ha
-
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Ku
bu
ra
 
–S
us
an
j/
O
vn
ak
/
Br
aj
ko
vi
ci
/
G
ra
ho
vc
ic
i
Bo
sn
ia
Ca
rs
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, r
ad
io
, 
VC
R,
 tr
ac
to
r, 
te
le
vi
si
on
s,
 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
s,
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l 
eq
ui
pm
en
t, 
bu
ild
in
g 
m
at
er
ia
l, 
fo
od
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
is
 a
re
a 
wa
s 
at
ta
ck
ed
 in
 Ju
ne
 19
93
. E
xt
en
si
ve
, r
ep
ea
te
d 
pl
un
de
rin
g 
of
 s
to
re
s 
an
d 
ho
m
es
 fo
llo
we
d,
 p
er
pe
tr
at
ed
 
bo
th
 b
y 
m
ili
ta
ry
 p
er
so
nn
el
 (l
ar
ge
ly
 m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 
m
ili
ta
ry
 p
ol
ic
e)
 a
nd
 c
iv
ili
an
s.
 H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
wa
s 
fo
ur
nd
 to
 h
av
e 
ta
ke
n 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 
ac
ts
 o
f p
lu
nd
er
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
s 
in
te
nd
ed
 to
 p
un
is
h 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
. K
ub
ur
a 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
to
 h
av
e 
pr
ev
en
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
ro
hi
bi
t p
lu
nd
er
 b
ut
 fa
ile
d 
in
 h
is
 d
ut
y 
to
 
pu
ni
sh
 th
e 
pe
rp
et
ra
to
rs
 o
f t
ho
se
 c
rim
es
. T
hu
s 
Ku
bu
ra
 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r a
ct
s 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
.
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
D
is
m
is
se
d 
(H
ad
zi
ha
-
sa
no
vi
c)
, 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
ub
ar
a)
, 
an
d 
up
he
ld
 
on
 a
pp
ea
l
A N N E X  1 :  T A B L E  O F  C A S E S   1 1 3
1 1 4   C O R P O R A T E  W A R  C R I M E S
C
as
e 
N
am
e
So
ur
ce
Pa
ge
 N
o.
In
ci
de
nt
 
N
am
e
Lo
ca
ti
on
Pr
op
er
ty
 T
yp
e
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r 
Ty
pe
In
ci
de
nt
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
C
iv
il 
or
 
C
ri
m
in
al
D
om
es
ti
c 
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
Ve
rd
ic
t
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
58
1–
59
2
Va
re
s
Bo
sn
ia
Au
to
m
ob
ile
s,
 
fo
od
, s
ta
tio
na
ry
, 
fu
rn
itu
re
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, c
lo
th
in
g
M
ili
ta
ry
Va
re
s 
wa
s 
at
ta
ck
ed
 in
 N
ov
em
be
r 1
99
3.
 H
om
es
 a
nd
 
st
or
es
 w
er
e 
ex
te
ns
iv
el
y 
an
d 
re
pe
at
ed
ly
 p
lu
nd
er
ed
, b
ot
h 
by
 m
ili
ta
ry
 p
er
so
nn
el
 a
nd
 c
iv
ili
an
s.
 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
 
(K
ub
ur
a)
, 
an
d 
up
he
ld
 
on
 a
pp
ea
l
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 
v. 
Ed
ve
r 
H
ad
zi
ha
sa
no
vi
c 
an
d 
Am
ir 
Ku
bu
ra
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
58
1–
59
2
Va
re
s
Bo
sn
ia
Au
to
m
ob
ile
s,
 
fo
od
, s
ta
tio
na
ry
, 
fu
rn
itu
re
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, c
lo
th
in
g
M
ili
ta
ry
Va
re
s 
wa
s 
at
ta
ck
ed
 in
 N
ov
em
be
r 1
99
3.
 H
om
es
 a
nd
 
st
or
es
 w
er
e 
ex
te
ns
iv
el
y 
an
d 
re
pe
at
ed
ly
 p
lu
nd
er
ed
, b
ot
h 
by
 m
ili
ta
ry
 p
er
so
nn
el
 a
nd
 c
iv
ili
an
s.
 K
ub
ur
a 
wa
s 
fo
un
d 
a)
 
to
 h
av
e 
be
en
 in
 c
on
tr
ol
 o
f t
he
 s
ub
or
di
na
te
s 
wh
o 
pi
lla
ge
d 
Va
re
s,
 a
nd
 b
) K
ub
ur
a 
fa
ile
d 
in
 h
is
 d
ut
y 
to
 ta
ke
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
an
d 
re
as
on
ab
le
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 th
e 
cr
im
es
, a
nd
 d
id
 
no
t t
ak
e 
pu
ni
tiv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ag
ai
ns
t t
ho
se
 re
sp
on
si
bl
e.
 
Th
us
, K
ub
ur
a 
wa
s 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fo
r a
ct
s 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
. 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
 
(K
ub
ur
a)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
G
or
an
 Je
lis
ic
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
11
Lu
ka
 c
am
p
Bo
sn
ia
M
on
ey
, w
at
ch
es
, 
je
we
llr
y, 
va
lu
ab
le
s
M
ili
ta
ry
It 
wa
s 
al
le
ge
d 
th
at
 m
on
ey
, w
at
ch
es
, j
ew
el
lry
, a
nd
 o
th
er
 
va
lu
ab
le
s 
we
re
 s
to
le
n 
fro
m
 p
er
so
ns
 d
et
ai
ne
d 
at
 L
uk
a 
ca
m
p 
up
on
 th
ei
r a
rr
iv
al
 in
 M
ay
 19
92
. 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
Ac
cu
se
d 
pl
ea
de
d 
gu
ilt
y
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
3–
28
7
N
ov
i T
ra
vn
ik
Bo
sn
ia
Ca
rs
M
ili
ta
ry
N
ov
i T
ra
vn
ik
 w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 in
 O
ct
ob
er
 19
92
. B
ui
ld
in
gs
 
we
re
 d
es
tr
oy
ed
 a
nd
 c
ar
s 
we
re
 s
to
le
n 
by
 H
VO
 s
ol
di
er
s.
 
Ko
rd
ic
 w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
th
at
 h
e 
wa
s 
a 
hi
gh
-ra
nk
in
g 
po
lit
ic
al
 o
ffi
ci
al
, a
nd
 p
lu
nd
er
 w
as
 a
 fe
at
ur
e 
of
 H
VO
 a
tta
ck
s 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f a
 c
om
m
on
 p
la
n.
 
Th
us
 h
e 
wa
s 
im
pl
ic
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
in
g 
of
 th
es
e 
cr
im
es
. T
hi
s 
lin
e 
of
 re
as
on
in
g 
wa
s 
gi
ve
n 
fo
r a
ll 
ch
ar
ge
s 
on
 w
hi
ch
 h
e 
wa
s 
co
nv
ic
te
d.
 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
4
Bu
so
va
-a
Bo
sn
ia
Ca
rs
, p
ro
pe
rt
y
M
ili
ta
ry
Bu
so
va
-a
 w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 in
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
19
93
. T
he
 to
wn
 w
as
 
pl
un
de
re
d 
fo
r a
 n
um
be
r o
f m
on
th
s,
 p
ill
ag
ed
, a
nd
 
de
st
ro
ye
d.
 In
 M
ay
 19
93
, t
he
re
 w
er
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
s 
ab
ou
t 
lo
ca
l p
ol
ic
e 
ro
bb
in
g 
lo
ca
ls
 o
f t
he
ir 
ca
rs
 a
nd
 p
ro
pe
rt
y. 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
4
Lo
n-
ar
i
Bo
sn
ia
Li
ve
st
oc
k,
 v
al
ua
bl
es
M
ili
ta
ry
Lo
n-
ar
i w
a 
at
ta
ck
ed
 in
 A
pr
il 
19
93
. H
ou
se
s 
we
re
 p
ill
ag
ed
 
an
d 
de
st
ro
ye
d,
 a
nd
 c
at
tle
 w
as
 s
to
le
n 
an
d 
de
st
ro
ye
d.
 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
4
G
ra
ho
vc
i
Bo
sn
ia
Ca
rs
, b
us
es
, 
liv
es
to
ck
, 
M
ili
ta
ry
G
ra
ho
vc
i w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 a
fte
r J
an
ua
ry
 19
93
. T
he
 H
VO
 s
et
 
fir
e 
to
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
 in
 th
e 
to
wn
, a
nd
 p
ill
ag
ed
 c
ar
s 
bu
se
s,
 
an
d 
liv
es
to
ck
. 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
5
Ro
til
j
Bo
sn
ia
Ve
hi
cl
es
, t
ra
ct
or
s,
 
ca
ttl
e,
 v
al
ua
bl
es
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f R
ot
ilj
 w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 in
 A
pr
il 
19
93
. H
ou
se
s 
we
re
 lo
ot
ed
 a
nd
 b
ur
ne
d 
do
wn
. .
 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c)
C
as
e 
N
am
e
So
ur
ce
Pa
ge
 N
o.
In
ci
de
nt
 
N
am
e
Lo
ca
ti
on
Pr
op
er
ty
 T
yp
e
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r 
Ty
pe
In
ci
de
nt
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
C
iv
il 
or
 
C
ri
m
in
al
D
om
es
ti
c 
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
Ve
rd
ic
t
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
5
H
an
-P
lo
-a
-
G
ra
ho
vc
i
Bo
sn
ia
Ca
rs
, t
ra
ct
or
s,
 c
at
tle
M
ili
ta
ry
Th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f H
an
-P
lo
 w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 b
et
we
en
 A
pr
il 
an
d 
Ju
ne
 19
93
. T
he
 m
os
qu
e 
wa
s 
bu
rn
ed
 a
nd
 d
es
tr
oy
ed
, 
fo
llo
we
d 
by
 h
ou
se
s.
 K
or
di
c 
wa
s 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
on
 th
e 
gr
ou
nd
s 
th
at
 h
e 
wa
s 
a 
hi
gh
-ra
nk
in
g 
po
lit
ic
al
 o
ffi
ci
al
, 
an
d 
pl
un
de
r w
as
 a
 fe
at
ur
e 
of
 H
VO
 a
tta
ck
s 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f a
 c
om
m
on
 p
la
n.
 T
hu
s 
he
 w
as
 im
pl
ic
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
in
g 
of
 th
es
e 
cr
im
es
. 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
5
Vi
te
z
Bo
sn
ia
W
at
ch
es
, g
ol
d,
 
m
on
ey
, c
ar
s,
 tr
uc
ks
, 
tr
ac
to
rs
M
ili
ta
ry
Af
te
r O
ct
ob
er
 19
92
, s
ev
er
al
 p
ro
pe
rt
ie
s 
we
re
 lo
ot
ed
 
an
d 
de
st
ro
ye
d.
 T
he
 n
ot
ed
 it
em
s 
we
re
 a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
pl
un
de
re
d.
 C
er
ke
z 
wa
s 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
on
 g
ro
un
ds
 th
at
 
he
 w
as
 a
 c
o-
pe
rp
et
ra
to
r b
y 
vi
rt
ue
 o
f h
is
 p
os
iti
on
 a
s 
co
m
m
an
de
r o
f t
he
 b
rig
ad
e.
 T
hi
s 
wa
s 
th
e 
re
as
on
 g
iv
en
 
fo
r b
ot
h 
of
 h
is
 c
on
vi
ct
io
ns
. 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c 
an
d 
Ce
rk
ez
)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
D
ar
io
 K
or
di
c 
an
d 
M
ar
io
 C
er
ke
z
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
28
5–
28
6
St
ar
i V
ite
z
Bo
sn
ia
M
on
ey
, v
al
ua
bl
es
M
ili
ta
ry
In
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
19
93
, h
om
es
 a
nd
 re
lig
io
us
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
 w
er
e 
pl
un
de
re
d 
an
d 
de
st
ro
ye
d.
 T
he
 n
ot
ed
 it
em
s 
we
re
 a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
pl
un
de
re
d.
  
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t 
G
ui
lty
 
(K
or
di
c 
an
d 
Ce
rk
ez
)
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
ila
n 
M
ar
tic
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
13
3
M
ar
tic
– 
H
rv
at
sk
a 
D
ub
ic
a
Ca
rs
, t
ra
ct
or
s,
 to
ol
s,
 
ca
ttl
e,
 m
ac
hi
ne
ry
, 
an
d 
fu
rn
itu
re
M
ili
ta
ry
In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r a
nd
 O
ct
ob
er
 19
91
, H
rv
at
sk
a 
D
ub
ic
a 
wa
s 
at
ta
ck
ed
 a
nd
 ta
ke
n 
ov
er
. S
om
e 
ho
us
es
 w
er
e 
bu
rn
ed
, 
an
d 
th
er
e 
wa
s 
wi
de
sp
re
ad
 lo
ot
in
g 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 b
ot
h 
by
 
ar
m
ed
 g
ro
up
s,
 lo
ca
l c
iv
ili
an
s,
 a
nd
 d
et
ai
ne
d 
pr
is
on
er
s.
 
M
ar
tic
 w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
th
at
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 
of
 th
e 
cr
im
es
 w
as
 a
 fo
re
se
ea
bl
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
m
m
on
 p
ur
po
se
 o
f t
he
 jo
in
t 
cr
im
in
al
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e.
 
Cr
im
in
al
 
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
ila
n 
M
ar
tic
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
13
5
M
ar
tic
–
Ce
ro
vl
ja
ni
Ca
r
M
ili
ta
ry
In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 1
99
1,
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 o
f C
er
vl
ja
ni
 w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
. 
A 
nu
m
be
r o
f h
ou
se
s 
we
re
 b
ur
ne
d 
an
d 
on
e 
ca
r w
as
 n
ot
ed
 
to
 h
av
e 
be
en
 p
lu
nd
er
ed
. T
hi
s 
ch
ar
ge
 w
as
 th
ro
wn
 o
ut
 
as
 it
 w
as
 fo
un
d 
th
at
 th
er
e 
wa
s 
no
t s
uf
fic
ie
nt
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
to
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
th
at
 th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
tio
n 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 g
ra
ve
 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
es
 fo
r t
he
 v
ic
tim
. 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
N
ot
 g
ui
lty
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
ila
n 
M
ar
tic
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
14
2
M
ar
tic
– 
Sa
bo
rs
ko
Ca
rs
, t
ra
ct
or
s,
 
liv
es
to
ck
M
ili
ta
ry
Se
rb
 s
ol
di
er
s 
an
d 
po
lic
em
en
 w
ho
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
ed
 in
 th
e 
at
ta
ck
 lo
ot
ed
 b
us
in
es
se
s 
an
d 
ho
m
es
. N
ea
rly
 e
ve
ry
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
in
 S
ab
or
sk
o 
ha
d 
a 
tr
ac
to
r s
to
le
n.
 M
ar
tic
 
wa
s 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
on
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
th
at
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f 
th
e 
cr
im
es
 w
as
 a
 fo
re
se
ea
bl
e 
co
ns
eq
ue
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
m
m
on
 p
ur
po
se
 o
f t
he
 JC
E.
 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
A N N E X  1 :  T A B L E  O F  C A S E S   1 1 5
1 1 6   C O R P O R A T E  W A R  C R I M E S
C
as
e 
N
am
e
So
ur
ce
Pa
ge
 N
o.
In
ci
de
nt
 
N
am
e
Lo
ca
ti
on
Pr
op
er
ty
 T
yp
e
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r 
Ty
pe
In
ci
de
nt
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
C
iv
il 
or
 
C
ri
m
in
al
D
om
es
ti
c 
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
Ve
rd
ic
t
Th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
la
de
n 
N
al
et
ili
c 
an
d 
Vi
nk
o 
M
ar
tin
ov
ic
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
21
1–
21
3
N
al
et
ili
c 
an
d 
M
ar
tin
ov
ic
 
G
ol
d 
je
we
lle
ry
, 
a 
co
m
pu
te
r, 
ot
he
r v
al
ua
bl
es
, 
a 
ca
r, 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, 
na
m
ep
la
te
s 
fro
m
 
do
or
s,
 
M
ili
ta
ry
M
os
ta
r w
as
 a
tta
ck
ed
 in
 M
ay
 19
93
, a
nd
 th
e 
co
ur
t 
fo
un
d 
th
at
 th
er
e 
wa
s 
a 
se
rio
us
 p
at
te
rn
 o
f p
lu
nd
er
 th
at
 
to
ok
 p
la
ce
 o
ve
r t
he
 c
ou
rs
e 
of
 th
e 
ne
xt
 fe
w 
m
on
th
s.
 
M
ar
tin
ov
ic
 w
as
 fo
un
d 
gu
ilt
y 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 a
s 
he
 k
ne
w 
th
at
 it
 w
as
 b
ei
ng
 c
om
m
itt
ed
 b
y 
hi
s 
su
bo
rd
in
at
es
 in
 
se
ve
ra
l i
ns
ta
nc
es
 b
ut
 d
id
 n
ot
 ta
ke
 re
as
on
ab
le
 s
te
ps
 to
 
pr
ev
en
t i
t o
r p
un
is
h 
th
e 
of
en
de
rs
. I
n 
ot
he
r c
as
es
, h
e 
wa
s 
pr
es
en
t a
t t
he
 ti
m
e 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 a
nd
 p
la
ye
d 
a 
st
ro
ng
 ro
le
 
in
 o
rg
an
iz
in
g 
an
d 
co
m
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
ac
ts
. N
al
et
ili
c 
wa
s 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 a
s 
he
 h
ad
 n
ot
ic
e 
of
 p
lu
nd
er
 ta
ki
ng
 
pl
ac
e 
bu
t d
id
 n
ot
 ta
ke
 re
as
on
ab
le
 m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 
th
e 
pl
un
de
r o
r p
un
is
h 
th
e 
of
fe
nd
er
s.
 B
ot
h 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
 
we
re
 u
ph
el
d 
on
 a
pp
ea
l. 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
 
(N
al
et
ili
c 
an
d 
M
ar
tin
ov
ic
)
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
Bl
ag
oj
e 
Si
m
ic
, 
M
iro
sl
av
 T
ad
ic
, a
nd
 
Si
m
o 
Za
ric
IC
TY
 w
eb
si
te
Si
m
ic
 e
t a
l.
Ca
rs
, c
ar
 k
ey
s,
 
ca
r d
oc
um
en
ts
, 
je
we
lle
ry
, m
on
ey
, 
fa
rm
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t, 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ap
pl
ia
nc
es
, 
fu
rn
itu
re
, g
am
bl
in
g 
m
ac
hi
ne
s,
 g
oo
ds
 
fro
m
 fa
ct
or
ie
s,
 
go
ld
 je
we
lle
ry
, a
 
ga
s 
st
at
io
n 
wa
s 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
d,
 o
th
er
 
va
lu
ab
le
s
M
ili
ta
ry
Im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 a
fte
r t
ak
eo
ve
r i
n 
Ap
ril
 19
92
, w
id
es
pr
ea
d 
lo
ot
in
g 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 in
 B
os
an
sk
i S
am
ac
 m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 in
 
th
e 
th
e 
to
wn
s 
of
 B
os
an
sk
i S
am
ac
, O
dz
ak
, K
or
ni
ca
, 
H
rv
at
sk
a 
Ti
si
na
, N
ov
o 
Se
lo
, H
rv
at
sk
a 
D
ub
ic
a,
 G
re
bn
ic
e,
 
Tr
am
os
ni
ca
, G
or
nj
i a
nd
 D
on
ji 
H
as
ic
i, 
an
d 
G
or
ni
ca
. 
Ci
vi
lia
ns
 p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
fo
rc
ed
 la
bo
ur
 w
er
e 
al
so
 re
qu
ire
d 
to
 a
ss
is
t w
ith
 th
e 
pl
un
de
rin
g.
 W
hi
le
 m
an
y 
of
 th
e 
lis
te
d 
ite
m
s 
we
re
 s
to
le
n 
ou
tr
ig
ht
, o
th
er
s 
we
re
 th
en
 s
ol
d 
af
te
r 
th
e 
fa
ct
. T
he
 T
ria
l C
ha
m
be
r d
id
 a
ck
no
wl
ed
ge
 th
at
 th
e 
pl
un
de
rin
g 
to
ok
 p
la
ce
, b
ut
 ru
le
d 
th
at
 th
e 
Pr
os
ec
ut
io
n 
ha
d 
no
t p
ro
ve
d 
be
yo
nd
 a
 re
as
on
ab
le
 d
ou
bt
 th
at
 a
ny
 
of
 th
e 
ac
cu
se
d 
ha
d 
be
en
 s
uf
fic
ie
nt
ly
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
co
m
m
is
si
on
 o
f t
he
 c
rim
e 
to
 w
ar
ra
nt
 a
 c
on
vi
ct
io
n.
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
N
ot
 g
ui
lty
 
(a
ll 
ac
cu
se
d)
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
oi
ni
na
 F
of
an
a 
an
d 
Al
lie
u 
Ko
nd
ew
a
Sp
ec
ia
l C
ou
rt
 
fo
r S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e
13
1
La
le
hu
n
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
D
oo
rs
, r
oo
fs
, z
in
c 
fro
m
 h
ou
se
s
M
ili
ta
ry
Fr
om
 m
id
-F
eb
ru
ar
y 
to
 a
t l
ea
st
 m
id
-M
ar
ch
 19
98
, 
Ka
m
aj
or
s 
lo
ot
ed
 in
 L
al
eh
un
. T
he
y 
lo
ot
ed
 th
e 
no
te
d 
ite
m
s,
 to
ld
 to
 ta
ke
 o
th
er
 it
em
s 
th
ey
 w
an
te
d,
 a
nd
 b
ur
ne
d 
ni
ne
 h
ou
se
s.
 C
iti
ze
ns
 w
er
e 
or
de
re
d 
to
 c
ar
ry
 lo
ad
s 
of
 
lo
ot
ed
 g
oo
ds
 fo
r t
he
 K
am
aj
or
s.
 T
he
 c
ha
rg
es
 in
 L
al
eh
un
 
an
d 
Ko
rib
on
do
 w
er
e 
di
m
is
se
d 
on
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
th
at
 s
uc
h 
ac
ts
 w
er
e 
no
t i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 N
or
m
an
’s
 (t
he
 c
om
m
an
di
ng
 
of
fic
er
) o
rd
er
, t
hu
s 
it 
co
ul
d 
no
t b
e 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d 
be
yo
nd
 
a 
re
as
on
ab
le
 d
ou
bt
 th
at
 F
of
an
a 
kn
ew
 o
r h
ad
 re
as
on
s 
to
 
ko
nw
 th
e 
cr
im
in
al
 a
ct
s 
wo
ul
d 
be
 c
om
m
itt
ed
. 
Th
ef
t
Ch
ar
ge
 
di
sm
is
se
d
C
as
e 
N
am
e
So
ur
ce
Pa
ge
 N
o.
In
ci
de
nt
 
N
am
e
Lo
ca
ti
on
Pr
op
er
ty
 T
yp
e
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r 
Ty
pe
In
ci
de
nt
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
C
iv
il 
or
 
C
ri
m
in
al
D
om
es
ti
c 
Eq
ui
va
le
nt
Ve
rd
ic
t
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
oi
ni
na
 F
of
an
a 
an
d 
Al
lie
u 
Ko
nd
ew
a
Sp
ec
ia
l C
ou
rt
 
fo
r S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e
13
7–
13
8
Ko
rib
on
do
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
Vi
de
os
, t
ap
e-
re
co
rd
er
s,
 m
on
ey
, 
ge
ne
ra
to
rs
, r
ic
e,
 
zi
nc
, h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
pr
op
er
ty
M
ili
ta
ry
Af
te
r t
he
 c
ap
tu
re
 o
f K
or
ib
on
do
 in
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
19
98
, t
he
 
Ka
m
aj
or
s 
lo
ot
ed
 p
ro
pe
rt
y 
fro
m
 h
ou
se
s.
 
Th
ef
t
Ch
ar
ge
 
di
sm
is
se
d
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
oi
ni
na
 F
of
an
a 
an
d 
Al
lie
u 
Ko
nd
ew
a
Sp
ec
ia
l C
ou
rt
 
fo
r S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e
25
8
Bo
 T
ow
n–
O
C 
Bu
nd
u’
s 
H
ou
se
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
Am
m
un
iti
on
M
ili
ta
ry
In
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
19
98
, O
C 
Bu
nd
u 
(a
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
, t
hu
s 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
to
r w
ith
 th
e 
ju
nt
a)
 w
as
 fo
rc
ed
 
to
 g
o 
to
 h
is
 h
ou
se
 b
y 
Ka
m
aj
or
s,
 w
he
re
 th
ey
 to
ok
 h
is
 
am
m
un
iti
on
. T
he
 C
ha
m
be
r w
as
 s
at
si
fe
d 
th
at
 b
bo
th
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 o
f w
ar
 c
rim
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
el
em
en
ts
 o
f p
ill
ag
e 
as
 a
 w
ar
 c
rim
e 
we
re
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d.
 
Fo
fo
na
 w
as
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 o
f p
ill
ag
e 
fo
r t
he
 in
ci
de
nt
s 
in
 
Bo
 o
n 
th
e 
ba
si
s 
th
at
 th
es
e 
el
em
en
ts
 w
er
e 
m
et
 a
nd
 h
e 
wa
s 
th
e 
su
pe
rio
r o
ffi
ce
r o
f t
ho
se
 c
om
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
cr
im
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 C
ha
m
be
r f
ou
nd
 th
at
 a
lth
ou
gh
 K
on
de
wa
 
wa
s 
pr
es
en
t a
t t
he
 m
ee
tin
g 
wh
er
e 
th
e 
at
ta
ck
 o
n 
Bo
 w
as
 
pl
an
ne
d,
 th
is
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 e
st
ab
lis
h 
be
yo
nd
 a
 
re
as
on
ab
le
 d
ou
bt
 th
at
 K
on
de
wa
 a
id
ed
 a
nd
 a
be
tte
d 
in
 
th
e 
pl
an
ni
ng
, p
er
pa
ra
tio
n 
or
 e
xe
cu
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
cr
im
in
al
 
ac
ts
. 
Cr
im
in
al
Th
ef
t
G
ui
lty
 
(F
of
on
a)
, 
N
ot
 g
ui
lty
 
(K
on
de
wa
)
Pr
os
ec
ut
or
 v.
 
M
oi
ni
na
 F
of
an
a 
an
d 
Al
lie
u 
Ko
nd
ew
a
Sp
ec
ia
l C
ou
rt
 
fo
r S
ie
rr
a 
Le
on
e
25
8
Bo
 T
ow
n–
Ph
ar
m
ac
ie
s
Si
er
ra
 L
eo
ne
M
ed
ic
in
e
M
ili
ta
ry
In
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
19
98
, K
am
aj
or
s 
un
de
r c
om
m
an
d 
of
 T
F2
-0
17
 
lo
ot
ed
 m
ed
ic
in
e 
fro
m
 tw
o 
ph
ar
m
ac
ie
s.
Cr
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Overview of This Worksheet
The following worksheet is intended to help prosecutors and investigators decide if pil-
lage has taken place. By completing the boxes below, it should be possible to determine 
if all of the elements of the crime are satisfied.  Pillage is a complex, multi-part crime; 
this worksheet, while not intended to be comprehensive, is meant to be helpful in mak-
ing a decision on whether or not to pursue a pillage prosecution.
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I.  The Armed Conflict and Nexus Requirements
A.  International Armed Conflict
• Direct International Armed Conflict—evidence that the exploitation of natural 
resources in question took place in association with an armed conflict waged 
directly between two states. (See Manual, para. 23); 
• Foreign Military Intervention—evidence that the exploitation of natural resources 
in question took place in an armed conflict in which a foreign state’s troops 
directly intervened (See Manual, para. 24); or
• International Wars through Proxies—evidence that the exploitation of natural 
resources in question took place in a conflict that involved a foreign state using 
local military groups as proxies in a conflict against a foreign state. This requires 
evidence of the foreign state supplying logistics, weapons or other material to the 
rebel group, as well as some role in directing military operations (See Manual, 
para 25);
• Foreign Occupation without Violence —evidence that the natural resources in 
question were exploited from a territory that was militarily occupied by a foreign 
state, even though there were no active hostilities (See Manual, para 26).
B.  Non-International Armed Conflict
• Intensity—evidence of an internal armed conflict’s intensity, based on duration 
of hostilities, the types of weapons used, and the number of victims caused by 
hostilities (See Manual, paras 27–28); and
• Military Groups—evidence that the war involved military groups, namely, groups 
that have organized hierarchical structures, control territory, formulated common 
military strategy, established military headquarters, or promulgate and enforce 
laws (See Manual, para. 29).
C.  A Nexus to the Armed Conflict
• War Provides Opportunity—eevidence that the armed conflict provided the oppor-
tunity for the illicit resource exploitation in question (See Manual, paras 32–38);
• War Motivates Illicit Resource Transaction—evidence that the armed conflict cre-
ated the motivation for the illicit resource exploitation in question (See Manual, 
paras 32–38);
• The Company has a Relationship with Armed Groups—evidence of the com-
pany’s relationship with armed groups in extracting resources (See Manual, paras 
32–38);
• The Transaction Finances the Conflict—evidence that profits from the sale of the 
specific natural resource being used to finance the conflict (See Manual, paras 
32–38).
II.  Appropriation
A.  Direct Appropriation from Owner—Extraction or Harvesting
• Collaboration with Military Groups—evidence that the company collaborated with 
military groups to extract the natural resources in question (See Manual, para. 41);
• Reliance on Decrees by Occupiers or Rebel Groups—evidence that the company 
relied on a decree by a foreign government or rebel group as a basis for exploiting 
natural resources in the territory (See Manual, para. 42); or
• Over-harvesting Legal Concessions—evidence that the company operating in a 
war zone over-harvested natural resources within or around a concession lawfully 
granted to it (See Manual, para. 43).
B.  Indirect Appropriation—Purchasing Illicit Resources
• Purchasing Illicit Resources—evidence that the company purchased natural 
resources that were illegally acquired. The company’s intention is irrelevant here 
(See Manual, para. 46).
III.  Ownership of Natural Resources
• Ownership in National Law—evidence of the national law that governs owner-
ship of these resources, and if ownership is allocated to private owners, copies of 
concession or mining agreements conferring title (See Manual, paras 51–54);
• Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources—if relevant, evidence that the 
transactions took place in a country where a people enjoy an unrealized right 
to self-determination, or if the matter is contested, evidence that the natural 
resources were previously nationalized by the state (See Manual, paras 56–60).
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• Indigenous Rights—if relevant, evidence of recognized indigenous rights over the 
natural resources in question that are not explicitly extinguished by legislation 
(See Manual, paras 61–65).
IV. Absence of Consent
• Identify Legal Requirements of Consent—evidence of the specific legal require-
ments for conferring and acquiring the owner’s consent to exploit the natural 
resource in question (See Manual, paras 101–107); and
• Breach of these Legal Requirements—evidence that the company acquired the 
natural resources in question without complying with the relevant legal require-
ments for conferring consent (See Manual, paras 101–107).
V.  The Mental Element
A.  Outside Territories Occupied by Foreign Armies or Rebel Groups
• Direct Intention—evidence that a company representative purposively acquired 
the natural resources in question, knowing with certainty that the owner did not 
consent (See Manual, paras 108–109); 
• Oblique Intention—evidence that a company representative purposively acquired 
the natural resources in question, knowing with virtually certainly that the owner 
did not consent (See Manual, paras 110–112); or
• Indirect Intent—evidence that a company representative purposively acquired 
the natural resources in question, aware that the owner probably did not consent 
(This test is approximate—see Manual, paras 113–117).
B.  Within Territories Occupied by Foreign Armies or Rebel Groups
• Usufruct Exception—if the resources were initially exploited by a rebel group or 
foreign army within occupied territory, evidence that the company that appropri-
ates the resources was aware that proceeds from the transaction would certainly, 
virtually certainly, or probably be used to (a) purchase weapons; (b) enrich elites; 
or (c) finance warfare (See Manual, paras 118–120).
VI. Individual and Corporate Criminal Liability
• Liability of Business Representative—in relevant jurisdictions, evidence that a 
specific company representative both performed the appropriation and satisfied 
the mental element of the crime (See headings III and IV above) (See Manual, 
paras 132–135);
• Identification Theory—in relevant jurisdictions, evidence that a specific company 
representative involved in the management of the company both performed the 
appropriation and satisfied the mental element of the crime (See headings III and 
IV above) (See Manual, para 136); or
• Corporate Culture—in relevant jurisdictions, evidence that a specific company did 
not create and maintain a corporate culture that ensured that natural resources 
were acquired through legal sources (See Manual, para. 137).
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Notes
1. Hague Regulations 1907, Article 28.
2. Hague Regulations 1907, Article 47.
3. Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 33, second paragraph.
4. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, I Customary International Humanitarian 
Law 182–185 (2005). [hereafter Customary International Human itarian Law Study], Rule 52 (“Pillage 
is prohibited”). For a compilation of state practice supporting this conclusion, see Customary Inter-
national Humanitarian Law Study, Vol II, pp. 1076–1122. 
5. Although Article 4 of Additional Protocol II appears to limit pillage to property taken from 
persons who do not take a direct part in hostilities, the commentaries to the article indicate that the pro-
vision is intended to extend to the pillage of public and private property generally. See Commentar-
ies, Additional Protocol II, para. 4542 (“The prohibition of pillage is based on Article 33, paragraph 
2 of the fourth Convention. It covers both organized pillage and pillage resulting from isolated acts 
of indiscipline. It is prohibited to issue order whereby pillage is authorized. The prohibition has a 
general tenor and applies to all categories of property, both State-owned and private.”).
6. Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, pp. 182–185.
7. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), 
April 24, 1863, Article 44.
8. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penal-
ties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference, March 29, 1919, Annex A, p. 40.
9. See Nuremberg Charter, Article 6(b).
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10. See ICC Statute, Articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and (e)(v); Iraqi Special Tribunal Statute, art. 2(b)(17). 
December 10, 2003. 
11. The reference to ‘even when taken by assault,’ is reflective of a period of history when it was 
lawful to pillage a town as retribution for local resistance to siege. See N. Bentworth, The Law of 
Private Property in War (London: Sweet & Maxwell,1907), at 8. When the Brussels Declaration of 
1864 was confronted with this practice, it elected to do away with even the exception by prohibiting 
pillage categorically. The Hague Regulations of 1907 emulated this language, even though it was 
merely intended emphasize that the prohibition of pillage abandoned this earlier exception.
12. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Article 4(f); Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, Article 3(f).
13. Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 c. 24 (Can.) §§ 6(3) and 6(4).
14. In this respect, §§ 4(4) and 6(4) of the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
Act also state that “[ f ]or greater certainty, crimes described in articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 of 
article 8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according to customary international 
law, and may be crimes according to customary international law before that date.”
15. International Criminal Court Act, 2001, 17, § 50(1) (Eng.) (“‘war crime’ means a war crime 
as defined in article 8.2.”).
16. Gesetzes zue Einführung des Völkerstrafgesetzbuches [German Code of Crimes against 
International Law] 30 June 2002 BGBl 2002, I, at 2254, § 9(1) (F.R.G) (“Whoever in connection 
with an international armed conflict or with an armed conflict not of an international character 
pillages or, unless this is imperatively demanded by the necessities of the armed conflict, otherwise 
extensively destroys, appropriates or seizes property of the adverse party contrary to international 
law, such property being in the power of the perpetrator’s party, shall be punished with imprison-
ment from one to ten years.”).
17. William Whewell (trans.), Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace (Cambridge, 1953), p. 345 
(“They who condemn this practice nay, that greedy hands, active in pillage, are so forward as to 
snatch the prizes which ought to fall to the share of the bravest; for it commonly happens that they 
who are slowest in fight are quickest in plunder.”).
18. See Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation 30 
(Carnegie, 1942) (who uses the two terms interchangeably) [hereafter Feilchenfeld].
19. John Westlake, International Law, Part II: War (Cambridge, 1907), p. 108.
20. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 9.
21. At one point, for instance, the tribunal indicated that “[p]ublic and private property was 
systematically plundered and pillaged in order to enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense 
of the rest of Europe.” International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgment (1946), 1 Trial of the 
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1945). p. 228 [hereafter Nuremberg 
Judgment].
22. See for instance Kubura’s conviction for “pillage” in the original French, but for “plunder” in 
the English translation. Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanovic´ et al. Case No. IT-01-47-T, Judgment, (March 
15, 2006), disposition [hereafter Hadžihasanovic´ Trial Judgment].
23. Prosecutor v Delalic´ et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, (November 16, 1998), para. 591 
[hereafter Delalic´ Trial Judgment]. 
24. Id.
25. See Australian Defence Force, Law of Armed Conflict, Commanders’ Guide, Australian 
Defence Force Publication, Operations Series, ADFP 37 Supplement 1—Interim Edition, 7 March 
1994, Art. 970 (“pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is prohibited”); see 
also The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Canadian Office of the Judge 
Advocate General, 1999, p. 15 (“pillage, the violent acquisition of property for private purposes, is 
prohibited. Pillage is theft, and therefore is an offence under the Code of Service Discipline.”).
26. At Nuremberg for instance, the tribunal observed that “[p]roperty offences recognised by 
modern international law are not limited to offences against physical tangible possessions or to 
open robbery in the old sense of pillage.” WCC, Vol. X, Notes on the Case, p. 164.
27. See infra, Chapter IV of this manual.
28. United States v. Krauch et al., (IG Farben), 8 Trials of War Criminals 1081, p. 1133 [hereafter 
IG Farben Case].
29. IG. Farben Case, p. 1133.
30. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Annex Vol. 5, p. 95. 
31. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C § 903, art. 103 (2008). 
32. Prosecutor v Simic´, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, para. 98 [hereafter Simic´ Trial Judgment].
33. Delalic´ Trial Judgment, para. 590.
34. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, para. 751 (June 20, 2007) [here-
after Brima Trial Judgment].
35. Delalic´ Trial Judgment, para. 591.
36. ICC Statute, Art. 9(1) (“[e]lements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and 
application of articles 6, 7 and 8.”) (emphasis added).
37. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi).
38. N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij and Others v. The War Damage Commission, Sin-
gapore Law Reports (1956) p. 65 [hereafter Singapore Oil Stocks].
39. Hadžihasanovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 52.
40. Brima Trial Judgment, para. 754; see also Prosecutor v. Fofana et al., Case No.SCSL-04-14-T, 
Judgment, para. 160 (August 2, 2007) [hereafter Fofana Case].
41. See Doris Graber, The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation: A Historical Survey, 
198 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1949) [hereafter A Historical Survey] (claiming that the Italian Delegate 
at the Brussels meeting in 1874 that codified the exceptions that were later adopted in the Hague 
Regulations proposed “that the protection of private property should be made dependent on military 
necessity, as in the Russian draft.” This proposal “was defeated on the ground that the principle 
expressed in the article is a general one, and that exceptions to it are discussed in the articles deal-
ing with requisitions and contributions.”).
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42. The leading case for this proposition is Heinz Heck et al. (Peleus case) (1949), Law Reports of 
Trials of Major War Criminals, Vol. 1 (rejecting a German submarine commander’s claim that the 
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44. IG Farben Case, p. 1133.
45. Prosecutor v. Martic´, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, (June 10, 2007), para. 102. [hereafter 
Martic´ Trial Judgment] (“for the crime of plunder [pillage] to be established, the appropriation of 
private or public property must be done without lawful basis or legal justification… According to the 
Hague Regulations, forcible contribution of money, requisition for the needs of the occupying army, 
and seizure of material obviously related to the conduct of military operations, though restricted, 
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46. Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., SCSL-04-15-T, Judgement, para. 982 (March 2, 2009).
47. Id.
48. See for instance, Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 100-104 (applying the provisions of the Hague 
Regulations despite have failed to qualify the conflict). Causa originalmente instruida por el Consejo 
Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas en cumplimiento de Decreto 158/83 del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, 
Cám. Nac. Apel. Cr. y Correcc., Judgment of 30 December 1986, published in en Fallos de la Corte 
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Tomo 309, Vol. II, 1986 (applying terms of the Hague Regulations 
in non-international armed conflicts).
49.  See infra, Chapter V of this manual.
50.  Tadic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 84.
51. Prosecutor v. Blaškic´, IT-95-14-T, Judgment, March 3, 2000, paras. 75, 76 and 94 [hereafter 
Blaškic´ Trial Judgment]. 
52. Prosecutor v. Kordic´ and Cˇerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, February 26, 2001, para. 108(2) 
[hereafter Kordic´ and Cˇerkez Trial Judgment].
53. See  J.G. Stewart, “Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humani-
tarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict,” International Review of the Red Cross, 
June 2003, Vol. 85, No. 850, pp. 328–333.
54. Le Procureur c. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,  Décision sur la confirmation des charges, No.: 
ICC-01/04-01/06, 29 January 2007 para. 220. For an English translation, see http://www.icc-cpi.
int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.pdf.
55. Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., IT-96-21-A, Judgment, 20 February 2001, para. 13 [hereafter Delalic´ 
Appeal Judgment].
56. Tadic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 137. 
57. Id. 
58. See for example, Prosecutor v. Brðanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch., Judgment, September 1, 
2004, paras. 144–155; see also Delalic´ Appeal Judgment, paras. 28–50.
59. Prosecutor v. Katanga et al., Decision on Confirmation of Indictment, ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 
September 2008, para. 240.
60. Geneva Conventions, Common Article 2.
61. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka “Dule” (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction), IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), October 
2, 1995, para. 70.
62. International Committee of the Red Cross, Working Paper, June 29, 1999.
63. See Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, November 18, 1997. http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/97eng/Argentina11137.htm. 
64. Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, July 10, 2008, paras. 244 and 249.
65. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, November 20, 2005, para. 132 
[hereafter Limaj Trial Judgment].
66. Prosecutor v. Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, paras. 83–179 (November 20, 2005).
67. See Martic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 41-46.
68. See Prosecutor v. Oric´, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Judgment, June 30, 2006, paras. 259–260 [here-
after Oric´ Trial Judgment].
69. See Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 75 (entered into force November 26, 1968); see also European 
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes (January 25, 1974) E.T.S. 82; Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, Vol. I, pp. 
614–618 (concluding that, as a matter of customary international law, “statutes of limitations may 
not apply to war crimes.”); see generally, Ruth A. Kok, Statutory Limitations in International Criminal 
Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007).
70. See infra, Chapter XIII of this manual. 
71. Id.
72. The International Criminal Court has itself followed this course. See Prosecutor v. Germain 
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Confirmation of 
Charges, para. 381 (Sept. 30, 2008) (“[a]s neither the Statute nor the Elements of Crimes define the 
phrases ‘in the context of’ and/or ‘was associated with’, the Chamber applies the case-law of the 
international tribunals”).
73. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 58 (February 22, 
2002) [hereafter Kunarac Appeal Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Blagojevic´, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 
para. 536 (January 17, 2005).
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74. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 58.
75. Id., (“if it can be established, as in the present case, that the perpetrator acted in furtherance 
of or under the guise of the armed conflict, it would be sufficient to conclude that his acts were 
closely related to the armed conflict.”); Prosecutor v. Bagambiki et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judg-
ment and Sentence, para. 793 (February 25, 2004) (“the Chamber considers that when soldiers 
took part in the massacre of refugees at the Gashirabwoba football field on 12 April 1994, they did 
so under the guise of the underlying armed conflict.”); Prosecutor v. Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, 
Judgment, para. 345 (March 22, 2006) [hereafter Stakic´ Appeal Judgment] (“All of the crimes the 
Appellant carried out through his role as President of the Crisis Staff were thus, in effect, carried 
out “under the guise of the armed conflict”).   
76. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 59 (emphasis added).
77. Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 57; see also Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 
Judgment, para. 105 (“it is not necessary that actual armed hostilities have broken out in Mabanza 
commune and Kibuye Prefecture for Article 4 of the Statute to be applicable. Moreover, it is not 
a requirement that fighting was taking place in the exact time-period when the acts the offences 
alleged occurred were perpetrated.”). See also Blaškic´ Trial Judgment, para. 69 (“This does not mean 
that the crimes must all be committed in the precise geographical region where an armed conflict 
is taking place at a given moment”).
78. Blaškic´ Trial Judgment, para. 70.
79. Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para. 444.
80. IG Farben’s acquisition of the Boruta dyestuff factories in Poland from the Reich Ministry 
of Economics, for instance, was temporarily hampered by the occupying power because “competi-
tion developed for the purchase of the property, and price negotiations were protracted.” IG Farben 
Case, p. 1143. Likewise, when IG Farben acquired the Nordisk-Lettmetall factory through a coerced 
shareholder takeover, it only accepted the Reich as a partner in the project reluctantly. The tribunal 
found that “Farben immediately entered into this large-scale planning and fought for as large a 
capital participation as possible. It may have accepted the Reich nominees as partners reluctantly, 
but its consenting participation in the project cannot be doubted.” IG Farben Case, p. 1145. As for 
representatives of the Flick concern, the tribunal itself concluded that with one exception “the defen-
dants were not officially connected with the Nazi government but were private citizens engaged as 
businessmen in the heavy industry of Germany.” Trial of Frederick Flick and Five Others (Flick), 6 
Trials of War Criminals, p. 1191 [hereafter Flick Case]. 
81. The Hague District Court, Mpambara, March 23, 2009, LJN: BK0520, Rechtbank’s-Graven-
hage, 09/750009-06, http://www.rechtspraak.nl.
82. Id., para. 60.
83. Id., para. 62.
84. Nuremberg Judgment, p. 306. 
85. Trials of German Major War Criminals 13 (British Transcripts), 170 http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.
cgi/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-13/ftp.py?imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-13//tgmwc-13-123.04 (“This company was con-
cerned with oil industries all over Europe. It had its beginnings in the Rumanian oil interests and 
whenever German troops occupied territories where there were oil deposits, that company, which 
was a part of the Four-Year Plan, was given the task by the various economic offices, later by the 
armament industry, of producing oil in these territories and of restoring the destroyed oil-producing 
districts.”).
86. Nuremberg Judgment, p. 307. 
87. U.S.A. v. Von Weizsaecker et al. (Ministries Case), 14 Trials of War Criminals 314, p. 741 (1949) 
[hereafter Ministries Case]. BHO standards for Berg und Huettenwerke Ost. 
88. Ibid.
89. See Report of Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Appendices, Volume III: Eco-
nomic Crimes and the Conflict, Exploitation and Abuse, paras. 29–33.
90. Report of the Forest Concession Review Committee, Phase III, May 31, 2005, at 20.
91.  Judgment of the Permanent Military Tribunal at Metz, 2nd December, 1947, in 9 Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals, p. 65. Likewise, a German settler in France named Elisabeth Neber was 
found guilty of receiving crockery stolen by her nephew from a French woman, which she took with 
her when returning to Germany towards the end of the war. Id.
92. Trial of Alois and Anna Bommer and their Daughters, Permanent Military Tribunal At Metz, 
9 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, (February 19, 1947), p. 64 [hereafter Bommer Case].
93. Id.
94. France v. Roechling, 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under 
Control Council Law No. 10, app. B, (1949), pp. 1117–1118 [hereafter Roechling Case]. 
95. Id., p. 1113.
96. Id., p. 1118.
97. IG Farben Case, p. 1143; see also IG Farben Case, pp. 1146–1147 (convicting Farben executives 
of pillage for purchasing the Mulhausen Plant from the German Reich and for purchasing the 
oxygen and acetylene plants, referred to as Strassbourg-Schiltigheim, under similar circumstances).
98. Krupp Case, p. 1351. Similarly, members of the firm Krupp were convicting of pillage for pur-
chasing machinery from a German appointed administrator who had seized the machinery from a 
Jewish owner.
99. Ministries Case, p. 731.
100. The Model Code stipulates that “a person is guilty of theft if he purposely receives, retains, 
or disposes of moveable property of another knowing that is has been stolen, or believing that it 
has probably been stolen…” American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part II, 
§223.6 (The American Law Institute, 1980) (emphasis added) [hereafter Model Penal Code].
101. Model Penal Code, p. 232. 
102. See also Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law 848–849 (David Ormerod ed., Oxford University 
Press 2005).
103. In most of these countries, the separation between theft and receiving stolen property 
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ing stolen property as a type of complicity in the original theft. As the law on complicity matured, 
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118. Both Covenants state, at Article 1(2), that “[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
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and titled.”) [hereafter Awas Tingni Case]. Similarly, see Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Judgment of November 28, 2007, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R.
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as implying that “a requisitioned object may be used and consumed in its natural state, but it cannot 
be sold or exchanged for another.” See also Muhlmann v. Bauer 18 I.L.R. 692 (Italy Ct. of Cassa-
tion 1951), where the same court held that article 52 of the Hague Regulations was violated “where 
goods were requisitioned from one person and sold or otherwise transferred to another.” Likewise, 
in Kostoris v. Meinl, an Italian court found that a requisition then sale of Jewish property was not 
sufficient to pass title in the property because “these acts cannot possibly be regarded as dictated 
by the needs of the army of occupation.” Kostoris v. Meinl, Court of Appeal of Trieste, January 28, 
1949, ILR (1949) Case No. 171, p. 473.
162. Thiriez v. Deschamps, 15 I.L.R. 608 (Ct. of First Instance of Mons 1948).
163. Blum v. Société d’Injection Rapide et de Conservation des Bois, 22 I.L.R. 1007 (Fr. Ct. of Cassation 
1955) (upheld on appeal). See Société d’injection Rapide et de Conservation des Bois v. Blum, France, 
Court of Cassation. October 27, 1958. 
164. Feilchenfeld, p. 36.
165. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907), 36 Stat 
2277, ch 1, art 53(1).
166. The original reads, « toute propriété mobilière de l’Etat de nature à servir aux opérations de 
la guerre. » 
167. Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, (2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 219 [hereafter Dinstein].
168. According to Mechelynck, this reference to “nature” in the original provision was expressly 
inserted in order to restrict seizures to objects which, “by their very nature,” are capable of military 
use. Albert Mechelynck, La Convention De La  Haye Concernant Les Lois Et Coutumes De La Guerre 
Sur Terre D’apres Les Actes Et Documents Des Conferences De Bruxelles De 1874 Et De La Haye De 1899 
Et 1907, (Maison d’Éditions et d’Impressions, 1915), p. 407.
169. Actes De La Conference De Bruxelles, 121 (F. Hayez, 1874)
170. Max Huber, La Propriété Publique en Cas De Guerre Sur Terre, 20 R.G.D.I.P. (1913), p. 668 
[hereafter Huber] (“il faut comprendre dans la propriété mobilière de l’Etat de nature à servir aux 
opérations de la guerre, les objets pouvant directement servir à des buts militaire.”); see also Charles 
Cheney Hyde, Land Warfare, 21 (Government Printing Office, 1918) (arguing that “[t]he Rules of 
Land Warfare advert to the fact that while all movable property belonging to the State, and which is 
directly susceptible of military use, may be taken possession of as booty and utilized for the benefit 
of the invader’s Government,’ other movable property, not directly susceptible of such use, ‘must 
be respected and can not be appropriated.”); Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict, 
715-716 (Stevens and Sons, 1959) [hereafter Stone]; Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of War 
(Univ. Calif. Press, 1959), p. 292  [hereafter Greenspan] (“Moveable public property which may not 
be appropriated by the occupant is that not directly susceptible of military use.”) (emphasis added). 
For authors who consider property that only indirectly contributes to military operations, see Yutaka 
Arai-Takahashi, The Law of Occupation: Continuity and Change of International Humanitarian Law, 
and its Interaction with International Human Rights Law, 200 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) [hereafter 
Arai-Takahashi]; Dinstein, pp. 218–220.
171. See Wayne Sandholtz, Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change, 71–100 (Oxford University 
Press, 2007) [hereafter Sandholtz] (detailing the history of the relationship between pillage and 
art); see also Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300; 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804, reprinted in 60 Am. J. Int’l L. 851, 
853–853 (1966) (discussing the pillage of a painting by Marc Chagall from occupied Belgium).
172. Krupp Case, p.  1483.
173. Id.
174. See, for example, P. v. A.G.K and P. Annual Digest 1948, Case No. 196 (where the Swiss 
Federal Tribunal found that the German occupant was not entitled to seize a calculating machine 
owned by the Polish government, because that machine was not one used for operations of war.”); 
see also Ministero Difesa v. Ambriola, Italy, Court of Cassation. June 15, 1951, ILR (1951) Case No. 
213, pp. 690–691 (reiterating that Article 53 of The Hague Regulations “indeed permits occupying 
forces to seize cash and securities, depots of arms, means of transportation, magazines and stores, 
and in general all movable property of the occupied State, but only in so far as they may be of use 
in military operations, and not for purposes of trafficking with individuals.”). 
175. See Al Nawar v. Minister of Defence, Case H.C. 574/82, Judgment of 11 August 1985, published 
in Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 321–328.
176. Thiriez v. Deschamps (1948) ILR, Case No. 205, p. 609.
177. Singapore Oil Stocks. For commentary, see N.V. De Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij c. The 
War Damage Commission,  A.J.I.L. 808 (1956), 51, p. 808. B, The Case of the Singapore Oil Stocks, 
Int’l. and Comp. L. Q. 5(1). 84-98 (Jan., 1956); Evan J. Wallach, The Use of Crude Oil by an Occupying 
Belligerent State as a Munition de Guerre, 41(2) Int’l. and Comp. L. Q. 287–310 (April 1992). 
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178. Singapore Oil Stocks, p. 78.
179. Id., p. 79.
180.  U.K. Military Manual 1958, para. 597. For commentary that supports this criticism, see 
Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order, 812, 817 (Yale 
University Press, 1961).
181. U.K. Military Manual, p. 301.
182. Institut de droit International, Réglementation internationale de la contrebande de guerre, §2 
(1896) (defining munitions-de-guerre as “articles which, to be used directly in war, need only be 
assembled or combined.”); Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law,  Vol I: International Law as 
Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 272 (Stevens & Sons, 1945), (“In the case, however, of 
private property susceptible to direct military use, only seizure is permitted, and, in accordance with 
Article 53, paragraph 2, it must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is declared.”), Erik 
Castréns, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, 236 (Helsinki, 1954), (“Raw materials and semi-
manufactured products necessary for war production can hardly be regarded as munitions of war.”); 
J.M. Spaight, War Rights on Land, 412 (Macmillan 1911) (“[w]arlike material, and all property which 
is directly adaptable to warlike purposes (railways and other means of communication, etc, may be 
seized by the occupant, whether belonging to the State or to individuals.”);  see also Department 
of the Army, International Law, Da Pam 27-161-2, p. 177 (“arms and munitions of war include all 
varieties of military equipment including that in the hands of manufacturers, component parts of 
or material suitable only for use in the foregoing, and in general all kinds of war materials”). It will 
be noted that many items that could be extremely useful to a State at war are not included. Such 
items in occupied areas are heavy industry not yet converted to war production, crude oil and other 
petroleum products. Efforts to interpret broadly the term of the Hague Regulations ‘ammunition 
of war’ have not been successful.”; Greenspan, p. 296.
183. Eliu Lauterpacht, The Hague Regulations and the Seizure of Munitions-de-guerre 32 Brit. Y.B. 
Int’l L. 218, 226 (1955).
184. Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, Field Manual No. 27–10, (July 1956), 
§ 410(a) [hereafter U.S. Field Manual].
185. In re Esau, Holland, Special Criminal Court, Hertogenbosch, 483–484 (February 21, 1949) 
in Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1949).
186. Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ et al., Case No. IT-98-34-T,  March 31, 2003, para. 616; see also Martic´ 
Trial Judgment, para. 102.
187. Hadžihasanovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 52.
188. Brice M. Clagett and O. Thomas Johnson, “May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant Lawfully 
Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?” 72 The American Journal of 
International Law, 558–585, 558, 568 (1978) [hereafter Clagett and Johnson]. 
189. T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, (D.C. Heath and Co., 2nd ed., 1899), 
p. 368.  
190. U.S. Field Manual, § 402; U.K. Military Manual, p. 303; New Zealand Defence Force, Interim 
Law of Armed Conflict Manual, DM 112, (1992),  § 1341(2) [hereafter New Zealand Military Manual]. 
See also Feilchenfeld, p. 55; Stone, p. 714.
191. F. Laurent, Principes De Droit Civil, 563-564 (1887).
192. Department of State Memorandum of Law on Israel’s Right to Develop New Oil Fields in 
Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, 16 Int’l Legal Materials 733, 740 (1977) [hereafter US Department of State 
Legal Memorandum]. 
193. Edward R. Cummings, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories under the Laws of Belligerent 
Occupation, 9 J. Int’l L. and Econ. 533, 563 and 565 (1974) (acknowledging that appropriating prop-
erty that would be consumed by use, “would not be permissible under the classical law on usufruct,” 
but endorsing certain domestic interpretations that enable an occupying power to exploit mines 
“already open and in operation at the beginning of the usufruct.”); Iain Scobbie, “Natural Resources 
and Belligerent Occupation: Mutation Through Permanent Sovereignty,” in S. Bowen (ed.) Human 
Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 221, 250 
(Kluwer, 1997) (conceding that “there is room to argue that an occupant, as usufruct, is not entitled 
even to continue the exploitation of resources in which the displaced sovereign was engaged on its 
own account,” but later condoning a degree of continuing exploitation); U.S. Department of State 
Memorandum, p. 740 (stating that the exploitation of non-renewable natural resources in accordance 
with the doctrine of usufruct constitutes “an illogical compromise,” but latter accepting a degree of 
exploitation provided new mines are not opened). 
194. Clagett and Johnson, p. 574. 
195. For examples of civil law countries that do not allow a usufruct to exploit non-renewable 
natural resources, see U.S. Department of State Legal Memorandum, pp. 736–739. For other civil law 
precedents that conclude similarly, see Clagett and Johnson, pp. 571–572.
196. Id., p. 570.
197. Ministries Case, p. 744 (finding that the company BHO “concentrated its efforts largely upon 
the manganese ore mines in Nikopol, the iron mines in Krivoi Rog, and the coal and ore mining 
in the Donetz Basin.”).
198. Id., p. 746.
199. Id., p. 747.
200. For example, see Ministries Case, p. 734 (convicting Koerner of pillage for having ordered that 
“[t]he economic command in the newly occupied territories should direct its activities to extracting 
the maximum quantities of goods required for the war effort, particularly steel, mineral oil, and 
food. All other points of view should take second place.” As a consequence, he became criminally 
responsible for the plunder that resulted in Russia); see also Trial of Dr. Joseph Buhler, Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals, Vol. XIV, p. 23 [hereafter Buhler Case] (convicting Buhler of pillage in 
Poland for “economic exploitation of the country’s resources,” achieved through the confiscation 
of mining rights and mining shares, installations and equipment of the mineral oil industry, raw 
materials, iron ores, crude oil, nitrogen, phosphates and coal). For further examples, see Annex 1 to 
this Manual.
201. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1698 (2006) concerning the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2007/68, para. 57.
202. Dominic Johnson and Aloys Tegera, Digging Deeper: How the DR Congo’s Mining Policy Is 
Failing the Country, 16 (Pole Institute, 2005); see also Leiv Lunde and Mark Taylor, “Regulating 
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Business in Conflict Zones: Challenges and Options” in Profiting from Peace, at 332–333 (discussing 
the difficulties of designing targeted regulations that do not harm civilians.
203. See R. Dobie Langenkamp and Rex J. Zedalis, What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some 
Significant, Unexamined International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields, 14 EUR 
J INT LAW 417–435, 432 (2003) (“’Expenses of occupation’ might be seen as including a vast range 
of things. In regard to the occupation of Iraq, could it be understood to include the costs associated 
with preparing for the invasion, stationing forces overseas and at-the-ready in advance of the inva-
sion, conducting the military operations that result in the occupation, administering the oil fields 
following the successful wrap-up of operations and the commencement of occupation, providing 
assistance to the indigenous Iraqi population in helping the creation of a transitional and, eventu-
ally, permanent governing structure?”).
204. These obligations include duties to ensure education for children, provide food and medical 
supplies to the local population, maintain medical and hospital establishments and preserve law 
and order. See Geneva Convention IV, Arts. 50, 55, and 56. See also, Hague Regulations, Art. 43.  
205. Krupp, at 1341. McDougal and Feliciano make a similar point when arguing that a major 
purpose of the law of belligerent occupation has been to mitigate the ancient and recurrent demand 
that “war must support war.” McDougal and Feliciano, at 809.
206. DRC v. Uganda Case, 249.
207. Gerhard Von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory, 177 (1957). See also, U.S. Department 
of State Legal Memorandum, p. 741 (“an occupant may not open wells in areas where none existed 
at the time the occupation began, since the prior or normal rate of exploitation was zero”); Claggett 
and Johnson, pp. 576–577 (“a rule that allows occupants to work mines or wells that were being 
exploited at the commencement of the occupation is not wholly consistent with this policy”.)
208. Administration of Waters and Forests v. Falk, p. 563.
209. Government of Israel, Israel: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Law on the Right 
to Develop New Oil Fields in Sinai and the Gulf of Suez, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 432 (1978), p. 10.
210. See McDougal and Feliciano, p. 812; Allan Gerson, Off-Shore Oil Exploration by a Belligerent 
Occupant: the Gulf of Suez Dispute, 71 A.J.I.L. (1977), p. 731 (“international law forbids exploitation 
of natural resources, including oil, only where the practice is marked by wanton dissipation of such 
resources”).
211. See infra, Chapter V of this manual.
212. IG Farben Case, p. 1134.
213. See, Chap. IV. of this manual.
214. Ministries Case, pp. 758, 763. (In finding Kehrl guilty of pillage, the tribunal concluded that 
“through his active participation in the acquisition and control of the industries and enterprises 
hereinbefore specifically referred to, [Kehrl] violated the Hague Convention with respect to belliger-
ent occupancy.”)
215. Id., p. 758.
216. IG Farben Case, p. 1147.
217. Id., p. 1146, 1164. In a more specific application of the same reasoning, the manager of 
Farben’s Offenbach plant, Friedrich Jaehne, was found guilty of pillage on the basis of an employee’s 
testimony to the effect that “[n]o negotiations were conducted with these former owners, nor were 
their interests considered by us. We rather negotiated with the sequestrators appointed by the 
German Reich.”
218. For further information about the distinction between concessions and mining agreements, 
see Danièle Barberis, Negotiating Mining Agreements: Past, Present and Future Trends (Kluwer, 1998).
219. Congolese Mining Code, Arts. 5, 109 and 111.
220. Id., Art. 5 (stating that “[a]ny person of Congolese nationality is authorized to engage in arti-
sanal exploitation of mineral substances in the National Territory, provided that he is the holder of 
an artisanal miner’s card, issued or granted by the relevant government entity in accordance with 
the provisions of the present Code.”).
221. Id. See also, Congolese Mining Code, Arts. 116–126.
222. Ministries Case, p. 720.
223. Buhler Case, pp. 23, 30, 39.
224. See Krupp Case, pp. 1361–1362.
225. Roechling Case, p. 1118.
226. IG Farben Case, pp. 1135–1136.
227. Ministries Case, p. 777.
228. IG Farben Case, p. 1150.
229. Id. (concluding that “[t]he essence of the offence is the use of the power resulting from the 
military occupation of France as the means of acquiring private property in utter disregard of the 
rights and wishes of the owner. We find the element of compulsion and coercion present in an 
aggravated degree in the Francolor transaction, and the violation of the Hague Regulations is clearly 
established.”); for other incidents of coercion in trade, see the Nordisk-Lettmetal takeover, IG Farben 
Case, p. 1146.
230. Geneva Convention IV of 1949, Article 33, second paragraph. For other codifications of 
pillage in the law of war, see infra, paras. 1–2 of this manual. 
231. Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 104; see also Hadžihasanovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 50 ( “the mens 
rea element of the offence of plunder of public or private property is established when the perpetra-
tor of the offence acts with the knowledge and intent to acquire property unlawfully, or when the 
consequences of his actions are foreseeable.”) 
232. Roechling Case, pp. 1110–1111.
233. Id., p. 1080.
234. Id., p. 1116.
235. Id., p. 1113.
236. In the United Kingdom for example, courts have found that “[a] court or jury may also find 
that a result is intended, though it is not the actor’s purpose to cause it, when (a) the result is a 
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virtually certain consequence of the act, and (b) the actor knows that it is a virtually certain conse-
quence.” Smith and Hogan, p. 94. These standards appear to approximate to what German criminal 
law considered dolus directus (2nd degree). See Albin Eser, “Mental Elements: Mistake of Fact and 
Mistake of Law”, The Rome Statute of The International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 889, 906 
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2002). 
237. As previously noted, the businessman Roechling was also convicted of pillage for purchasing 
stolen property from ROGES. See infra, para. 104 of this manual. 
238. Krupp Case, pp. 1361–1362.
239. Id.
240. Id., p. 1363.
241. Id.
242. Martic´ Trial Judgment, para. 104. Although the terminology seems slightly different to estab-
lished tests for indirect intent, see also Hadžihasanovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 50. (The Hadžihasanovic´ 
Trial Judgment articulated this standard in slightly different terms by stating that “the mens rea 
element of the offence of plunder of public or private property is established when the perpetra-
tor of the offence acts with the knowledge and intent to acquire property unlawfully, or when the 
consequences of his actions are foreseeable.”)
243. Although the initial decisions of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber affirm that dolus eventualis can 
attach to international crimes charged before the court, the most recent decision suggests that this 
is inconsistent with the wording of Article 30 of the statute and the intention of states who drafted 
it. See Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the 
Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, 15 June 2009, 360–369 (conclud-
ing that with respect to dolus eventualis and recklessness, that “the Chamber is of the view that such 
concepts are not captured by article 30 of the Statute”).
244. In Australia, the Criminal Code Act states that “[t] f the law creating the offence does not 
specify a fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, reckless-
ness is the fault element for that physical element.” Criminal Code Act 1995, Act No.12 of 1995 
as amended. In the United Kingdom, cl. 20 of the draft Criminal Code states that “[e]very offence 
requires a fault element of recklessness with respect to each of its elements other than fault ele-
ments, unless otherwise provided.” In the United States, the Model Penal Code insists that “when 
the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such 
element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.” See 
Model Penal Code, supra note 99, §2.02(3).
245. Jacques-Henri Robert, Droit pénal général, 325 (6e éd. refondue. ed. 2005) (describing dol 
eventuel); Elise van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, 43–53 (2003) (explaining dolus eventualis in civil law jurisdictions and comparing 
to recklessness); Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law, 63–67 (2008) (explaining 
dolus eventualis in German criminal law). See also Commentario Breve al Codice Penale, 103 (Cedam, 
1986) (discussing dolus eventualis in Italian criminal law).
246. A number of jurisdictions will not view recklessness as a component of intention. Moreover, 
if the ICC cannot prosecute pillage perpetrated with indirect intent, this may influence national 
courts. For example, in the United Kingdom’s legislation implementing the ICC Statute, a provision 
insists that “[i]n interpreting and applying the provisions of the articles referred to in subsection (1) 
[war crimes] the court shall take into account any relevant judgment or decision of the ICC.” U.K. 
International Criminal Court Act 2001, § 50(5). 
247. U.S. Model Penal Code, § 2.02(c). See also R v. G and another [2004] 1 A.C. 1034, 1057 (stat-
ing that “[A] person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 
1971 with respect to-(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a 
result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, 
unreasonable to take the risk…”) (United Kingdom). See also R v. Crabbe (1985) 58 ALR 417, 470 
(“A person who does an act causing death knowing that it is probable that the act will cause death 
or grievous bodily harm is…guilty of murder”) (Australia).
248. BGHSt 36, 1–20 [9–10] (“the perpetrator is acting intentionally if he recognizes as possible 
and not entirely unlikely the fulfilment of the elements of an offence and agrees to it in such a way 
that he approves the fulfilment of the elements of the offence or at least reconciles himself with it 
in order to reach the intended result, even if he does not wish for the fulfilment of the elements of 
the crime”) (Germany). See also Commentario Breve al Codice Penale, Cedam, Padua (1986), p. 103 
(“the occurrence of the fact constituting a crime, even though it is not desired by the perpetrator, is 
foreseen and accepted as a possible consequence of his own conduct.”) (Italy).
249. Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 358 (July 10, 2008) (“indirect intent 
may be expressed as requiring knowledge that destruction was a probable consequence of his 
acts.”), 382 (“indirect intent, i.e. in the knowledge that cruel treatment was a probable consequence 
of his act or omission”); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, 261 (Jan. 28, 2005) 
(“the Chamber holds that indirect intent, i.e. knowledge that cruel treatment was a probable conse-
quence of the perpetrator’s act or omission, may also fulfill the intent requirement for this crime.”); 
296 (“the mens rea requirement for a crime under Article 3(b) is met when the perpetrator acted 
with either direct or indirect intent, the latter requiring knowledge that devastation was a probable 
consequence of his acts.”); Martic´ Trial Judgment, 65 (“The mens rea element of extermination 
requires that the act or omission was committed with the intent to kill persons on a large scale 
or in the knowledge that the deaths of a large number of people were a probable consequence of 
the act or omission”); 79 (reasoning that the term “likely” as a synonym for “probable”); the same 
jurisprudence appears to treat “an awareness of a substantial likelihood” as a synonym. Prosecutor v. 
Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T , Judgment, 509 (Nov. 20, 2005) (“The requisite mens rea is that 
the accused acted with an intent to commit the crime, or with an awareness of the probability, in the 
sense of the substantial likelihood, that the crime would occur as a consequence of his conduct.”). 
250. Model Penal Code, § 223.6 (emphasis added).
251. LaFave, p. 989 (“[t]he circumstance that the buyer paid an inadequate price for the goods, 
that the seller was irresponsible, that the transaction between them was secret—these factors all 
point towards the buyer’s guilty knowledge.”) Rassat, p. 205 (“caractère bizarre de la négociation 
qui est à l’origine de la détention, liens du receleur et du voleur, absence de facture, prix dérisoire 
payé ou même absence de prix … ”). See also J.C. Smith, The Law of Theft, 211–215 (Butterworths, 
4th ed., 1979); Smith and Hogan, pp. 853–858.
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252. Krupp Case, p. 1353.
253. Erik Kennes, “The Mining Sector in Congo: The Victim or the Orphan of Globalization?,” 
in The Political Economy of the Great Lakes Region in Africa: The Pitfalls of Enforced Democracy and 
Globalization, 170 (2005) ( “the war situation allows [companies] to purchase important quantities 
of raw materials at a lower price than would be possible in the context of normal production pro-
cesses.”).
254. Ministries Case, pp. 609, 620–621.
255. Id., p. 618.
256. Id.
257. See infra, paras 95–99 of this manual. 
258. See infra, paras 107–116 of this manual. 
259. Id. 
260. See infra, paras 107–116 of this manual. 
262. DRC v. Uganda Case, 249.
262. See infra, para. 97 of this manual. 
263. Glahn, supra note ___ at 177. For further discussion, see infra, para. 98 of this manual.  
264. 88 Eng Rep 1518 (KB 1701).
265. Survey Response, Laws of Germany (Remo Klinger), “Commerce, Crime and Conflict: 
A Survey of Sixteen Jurisdictions,” FAFO AIS, 2006, p. 8.
266. Article 121–2, Code Pénal Francais. Apparently, the phrase was deliberately included to coun-
ter the critique that corporate criminal liability might shield corporate officers and directors from 
individual criminal responsibility. See Gerard Couturier, « Répartition des responsabilités entre 
personnes morales et personnes physiques, » 111 Revue des Sociétés (Dalloz, April 1993), p. 307. 
267. Flick Case, p. 1192. See also Krupp Case, p. 1375 (“[t]he laws and customs of war are binding 
no less upon private individuals than upon government officials and military personnel.”). 
268. U.S. Navy, The Commander’s Handbook On the Law Of Naval Operations, NWP 1-14M, § 6.2.6 
(July 2007); see also U.S. Field Manual,  § 499 (“The term ‘war crime’ is the technical expression for 
a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military or civilian.”); New Zealand Military 
Manual, § 1701(1)] (“The term ‘war crime’ is the generic expression for large and small violations of 
the laws of warfare, whether committed by members of the armed forces or by civilians.”) Office 
of the Judge Advocate General (Canada), The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical 
Level, § 48; UK Military Manual, § 16.30.1.
269. Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (Essen Lynching case), British Military Court for the Trial 
of War Criminals, Essen, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 88–92 (December 22, 1945). 
270. Trial of Alfons Klein and Six Others (“the Hadamar trial”), United States Military Commis-
sion Appointed by the Commanding General Western Military District, U.S.F.E.T., Wiesbaden, 
Germany, 1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 46–54 (October 15, 1945).
271. Alfons Klein was the chief administrative officer of the institution. Adolf Wahlmann was the 
institution’s doctor, Heinrich Ruoff the chief male nurse, and Karl Willig a registered male nurse. 
Irmgard Huber served as the chief female nurse, while Adolf Merkle was the institution’s book-
keeper in charge or registering incoming and outgoing patients. Philipp Blum was a doorman and 
telephone switchboard operator, although his tasks extended to burying the bodies of murdered 
patients. Klein, Ruoff, and Willig were sentenced to be hanged. Wahlmann was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Merkle, Blum, and Huber were sentenced to 35 years, 30 years, and 25 years impris-
onment respectively. Id.
272. U.S. v. Joseph Altstoetter et al. (Justice case), 3 Trials of War Criminals, 954–1201.
273. Bommer Case, p. 62. The case is similar to that of Karl Lingenfelder, a German from Muss-
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Pillage means theft during war. Although the prohibition against pillage 
dates to the Roman Empire, pillaging is a modern war crime that can 
be enforced before international and domestic criminal courts. Following 
World War II, several businessmen were convicted for commercial pillage 
of natural resources. And although pillage has been prosecuted in recent 
years, commercial actors are seldom held accountable for their role in 
fuelling conflict.
Reviving corporate liability for pillaging natural resources is not simply 
about protecting property rights during conflict—it can also play a 
significant role in preventing atrocity. Since the end of the Cold War, the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources has become a prevalent means 
of financing conflict. In countries including Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, and Sierra 
Leone, the illicit trade in natural resources has not only created incentives 
for violence, but has also furnished warring parties with the finances 
necessary to sustain some of the most brutal hostilities in recent history. 
In Corporate War Crimes, law professor James G. Stewart offers a 
roadmap of the law governing pillage as applied to the illegal exploitation 
of natural resources by corporations and their officers. The text traces 
the evolution of the prohibition against pillage from its earliest forms 
through the Nuremburg trials to today’s national laws and international 
treaties. In doing so, Stewart provides a long-awaited blueprint for 
prosecuting corporate plunder during war.
Corporate War Crimes seeks to guide investigative bodies, war crimes 
prosecutors, and judges engaged with the technicalities of pillage. It 
should also be useful for advocates, political institutions, and companies 
interested in curbing resource wars.
